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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
A STUDY OF CORRUPTION, FOREIGN AID, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
           Foreign aid donors increasingly demand that aid is used efficiently and effectively.  This 
study examines the effect of corruption levels, measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index, 
within a recipient country on the levels of economic growth.  A growing literature outlines the 
mechanisms through which corruption impedes economic growth and is summarized within.  
Additionally, as longevity gains may result from foreign aid but are not captured in economic 
growth, this study computes a variable called the Life Quality Indicator (Life Quality) that 
combines such gains with economic growth and examines corruption’s effect on Life Quality 
growth.   
          As any windfall, foreign aid has been argued to exacerbate problems within corrupt 
countries—causing economic decline.  This study develops an interaction of corruption levels and 
the ratio of aid receipts to GDP to examine the effects of this interaction on economic growth and 
Life Quality growth.  Conducting a regression analysis shows the relationships between the 
interaction term and economic growth and the interaction term and Life Quality growth are 
negative, leading to policy recommendations that corrupt countries not receive foreign aid.   
           Using game theory, this study predicts the outcomes of interactions between aid recipients 
and donors during the Cold War, post-Cold War, and in the present.  The present predicted 
outcomes suggest that recipients will be the winners because they are able to choose between 
receiving aid from emerging donors and from the Development Assistant Committee (DAC).  
Policy guidance to the aid community includes understanding that emerging donors may exert 
influence on aid recipients and programs to monitor this influence ensuring that it does not 
become exploitation may be necessary.   
          Finally, a case study of Russia is presented, highlighting corruption and foreign aid receipts 
in the post-Soviet timeframe.  A separate analysis is conducted on the countries that were in the 
Eastern Bloc to determine whether Russia’s corruption and aid receipts are associated with lower 
levels of economic and Life Quality growth than that experienced by other Eastern Bloc 
countries.  While results do not show this, the negative relationship between the interaction term 
and economic and Life Quality growth is also found in this subset.   
 
KEYWORDS:  Economic Development, Longevity, Corruption, Foreign Aid, Russia 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
  In 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed the following 
decade as “the decade of poverty eradication” (United Nations, p.1).  Subsequently, 
worldwide summits were held to formulate international agreements for development 
goals that, if met, would result in such eradication.  However, despite such efforts by 
international, national, and subnational organizations, we are currently midway through 
the second decade to eradicate poverty.  To quantify poverty at present, the World Bank 
uses an estimate of $1.25 per day ($456.25 per year in current U.S. dollars) as the line for 
poverty in developing countries.  (The original estimate of $1 per day was a result of data 
available in 1990.  The poverty line has been increased due to improved data availability 
on price levels.)   
 According to data from the World Bank (2009), using current U.S. dollars as 
measurement, the poorest countries on the planet were Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, and Liberia—with all three having per-capita GDPs of less than $250 (well 
below the poverty line).  However, in contrast, the same year, there were three countries 
with per-capita GDPs 280 times greater than this $250.  Luxembourg, Norway, and Qatar 
all experienced wealth levels of $70,000 or greater.  In fact, Luxembourg’s per-capita 
GDP was over 600 times greater than that of Burundi.  While such inequality is stunning, 
it is far from unheard of.  In fact, using data available for each year since 1960, the 
country with the highest per-capita GDP is, on average, almost 600 times wealthier than 
the country with the lowest per-capita GDP.  While the goal of development economists 
is not to decrease inequality by making the rich poorer but to do so by making the poor 
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richer by a relatively greater amount than the rich, data indicate that economic growth for 
the poorest countries is still elusive (World Bank, 2009). 
 Increasing economic growth in these poor countries is the subject of a vast 
amount of literature.  And, as discussed in the following chapters, economic theory poses 
as a guide for realizing economic growth.  For example, a country with good institutions 
and a competitive market should realize allocative efficiency, leading to economic 
growth.  Additionally, theory suggests that foreign aid receipts by countries with weak 
institutions and a lack of a working market will do more harm than good in promoting 
economic growth.   
 
Purpose of Dissertation 
 In this dissertation, I aim to examine the relationships between weak institutions 
within a country (i.e., corruption), foreign aid, and economic growth.  In the following 
chapters, I will detail the definition of corruption and explain the mechanisms through 
which corruption, foreign aid, and their interaction affect economic growth.  To add to 
the social infrastructure literature concerning institutions and policies that encourage 
investment and production as opposed to consumption and diversion, I use a corruption 
index to that includes many more years and countries than indices previously used in this 
literature.  Much discussion will be given to the Corruption Perceptions Index in later 
chapters, but by using this index, my analysis and findings will be more encompassing 
than previous studies using corruption findings.  Also, I attempt to quantify the influence 
that the combination of corruption and foreign aid has on economic growth in a manner 
that has not been examined in the literature.   
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 Finally, I add to the small but increasing field of literature that asserts that quality 
of life gains (typically measured through per-capita GDP growth) are not the only gains 
that should be measured but that increased life expectancy (longevity) is a resultant of 
improved living conditions.  Following literature in this field, I compute an index that 
accounts for both per-capita GDP growth and increased longevity.  The aim of this 
dissertation is to provide policy-relevant recommendations concerning corruption, 
foreign aid and their relationship with economic growth and longevity that are data-
driven and theoretically-sound.    
  The next chapter presents an introduction to theories concerning economic 
development; the following chapter details the measurement of economic growth, 
longevity, and basic variables that have been shown to influence the two, including an 
introduction to foreign aid concepts.  Chapter Four provides a game-theoretic model of 
interactions between foreign aid donors and receipts in the past, the present, and the 
future.  Chapter Five discusses institutional variables that have been shown to affect 
economic growth, while Chapter Six develops a research design and tests data for 
relationships between corruption, foreign aid, and economic and longevity growth.  
Chapter Seven provides a case study of corruption and foreign aid in post-Soviet Russia 
and includes a data analysis similar to that in Chapter Six but that is limited to Former 
Soviet Union countries.  The final chapter discusses the policy implications of this 
dissertation and presents future avenues of research.   
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Chapter Two:  A Brief Introduction to Economic Growth through Time 
 
Introduction 
            This chapter provides an introduction to theories concerning economic growth.  
Lewis (1955) and Solow (1956) developed seminal theories concerning economic 
development that have been further developed and tested in the last sixty years.  The 
more recent theories described in this chapter provide a background for the reader 
concerning stages of economic development within a country and why it is relevant to 
examine how corruption, foreign aid, and their interaction affect economic growth.   
 
Urbanization 
  In a 1988 report by the National Commission on Urbanization, it is noted that the 
number of urban-dwellers in India has increased from 50 million to 200 million since 
1947 (Harris, 1990). Many developed countries saw statistics like this during the 19th 
century, while most developing countries just began to see large increases in urbanization 
in the latter half of the 20th century.  In the United States, at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, six of seven workers were employed in the agricultural sector, and by 
1850, only half of the workers were employed in this sector.  Table 1 illustrates this 
urbanization trend from 1950 to 2030 estimates for the world overall, more developed 
regions such as Europe, North America, Australia/New Zealand/Japan, and less 
developed regions such as Africa, Asia (excepting Japan), Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and including Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.   
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Table 2.1:  Urban Population Size and Distribution by Major Geographic Area (in 
millions), 1950-20301
 
 
Region 1950 1975 2000 2030 
Total population     
World  2519 4068 6071 8130 
More Developed Regions 813 1047 1194 1242 
Less Developed Regions 280 3021 4877 6888 
Rural Population     
World 1786 2552 3214 3185 
More Developed Regions 386 344 311 228 
Less Developed Regions 1400 2208 2902 2958 
Urban Population     
World 733 1516 2857 4945 
More Developed Regions 427 703 882 1015 
Less Developed Regions 306 813 1974 3903 
Percentage of Population 
Living in Urban Areas 
    
World 29.1 37.3 47.1 60.8 
More Developed Regions 52.5 67.2 73.9 81.7 
Less Developed Regions 17.9 26.9 40.5 57.1 
Distribution of World’s 
Urban Population 
    
World 100 100 100 100 
More Developed Regions 58.3 46.4 30.9 20.5 
Less Developed Regions 41.7 53.6 69.1 79.5 
 
 
  The urbanization process begins as advances in agriculture are introduced into a 
society; food production is no longer on a subsistence basis.  During the nineteenth 
century, these advances included the seed drill, the horse hoe, and improved methods of 
crop rotation and animal husbandry.  Food surpluses are created, and there is more food 
available for consumption at lower prices.  Families have discretionary income to spend 
                                                          
1 Source:  Cohen, B.  2006.  “Urbanization in Developing Countries:  Current Trends, Future Projections, 
and Key Challenges for Sustainability.”  Technology in Society, 28:  63-80. 
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on non-food items, and with more food available, families can feed more children.  As 
many families increase their size, this society begins to experience a population increase.  
The labor market drives this increased population to cities, as a nation’s output transitions 
from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors (e.g., from agriculture to 
manufacturing).   
  As discussed by Lewis (1955), increased development in poor countries occurs 
when there is a shift in labor into manufacturing, and capitalists can use their profits to 
increase the saving (or investing) portion of the economy, resulting in economic growth.  
Using this explanation, Lewis explained the phenomenon of high growth in middle-
income countries and lower growth in low- and high- income countries.  He posited that 
very poor countries experience low economic growth because there is a nonexistent 
manufacturing sector, middle-income countries have high levels of growth due to growth 
in the manufacturing sector that is taking the underemployed from the low-productivity 
sector of agriculture, and, finally, high-income countries that already have a large 
manufacturing sector have slower growth because all workers that can be removed from 
the agricultural sector have.  Combined with infrastructure (i.e., capital), urbanization 
results in a concentration of workers that increases productivity and is an initial phase in 
developing the economy of a nation (Harris, 1990).  However, as discussed in the next 
section, Lewis’s explanation did not include productivity gains from innovation and 
technology. 
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The Solow Residual 
 Prior to the work of Solow, explaining growth and output due to this urbanization 
was thought to be a function of labor and capital coming together and creating output for 
a nation, as shown below:   
Output = f (Capital, Labor) 
 
And, with more capital or more labor, a nation would realize more economic output.  
However, as discussed in the seminal articles, “Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function,” and “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” (1957 
and 1956), Solow finds that half of economic growth cannot be accounted for through 
changes in labor and capital.  This unaccounted portion of economic growth is commonly 
referred to as the Solow residual and is the effectiveness of labor, commonly referred to 
as A.  A higher effectiveness of labor allows a higher output with lower levels of capital 
and/or labor.  A takes various forms and is a catch-all for specifics, e.g., the education of 
the labor force, technology, innovation, property rights of a nation, and cultural attitudes 
toward entrepreneurship (Romer, 2001).  A includes a society’s institutions, or the rules 
of the game within a populace.  North explains institutions as the limitations to behavior 
imposed on the individual by society (1990).  Including this factor, the equation becomes: 
 
Output = f (Capital, Labor, A) 
 
And, with this equation, increases in capital, labor, or A will result in increased output. 
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Income Inequality 
 In a developing economy, as urbanization is occurring, so is a natural cycle of 
economic inequality known as the Kuznets’ curve (Kuznets, 1955).  Kuznets observed 
that at low levels of income per-capita, inequality within a society is low.  As per-capita 
income increases, so does inequality.  This is explained by the following:  during the 
early expansion of an economy, members of the society that have money are bombarded 
with investment opportunities to increase their wealth, while the wages of workers within 
cities are depressed due to the continual influx of cheap labor emigrating from the 
agricultural sector, and the workers still in agriculture begin losing income as food 
becomes cheaper.  Income inequality reaches its apex, and once a certain level of average 
income is reached, by-products of industrialization such as democratization or the rise of 
the welfare state cause trickle-down benefits from growth and increase per-capita income.  
As per-capita income continues to increase, inequality decreases.   
 To quantify income inequality of citizens in a given set, the Gini coefficient was 
developed and is now a well-known measure.  If one person in a country has all of the 
money, the Gini coefficient is 100.  However, if everyone in the country has one dollar, 
the Gini coefficient is zero.  The Gini coefficient is currently forty in the United States 
and is thirty in continental Europe (Peltzman, p.177).  In developed countries, the Gini 
coefficient (inequality) was declining following the industrial revolution until recently, 
when inequality within the developed world has increased.  Alderson and Nielson (2002) 
show that this is due to globalization, specifically through the mechanism of immigration 
from developing countries, capital outflows to developing countries, and increased trade 
between developed and developing countries.  The authors contend that as the world 
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becomes more interconnected, global inequality will decrease, with inequality in the 
developed world leveling off.   
 
Human Capital and Institutions 
 Since Solow’s findings, dozens of studies have been conducted to parse out how 
much a specific aspect within the residual affects growth.  For example, in “Why Do 
Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?” Hall and 
Jones (1999) seek to discover why the average worker in the United States in 1988 
produces as much in ten days as the average worker in Niger produces in an entire year.  
In this article, the authors specifically analyze how years of schooling affect economic 
growth.  They find that roughly a quarter of the gap between the growth of the richest and 
poorest countries is attributable to the years of schooling the workforce has received.  As 
an economy expands and a society moves toward urbanization, human capital (education) 
becomes important in many ways.  The type of education discussed here is irrelevant 
(i.e., primary or secondary versus skills-related), as this is simply an overview of the 
learning by individuals.  First, increased schooling leads to increased skills, greater 
worker productivity, and greater output in the economy.  Also, education increases 
innovation within a society, and new ideas create greater output.  Finally, the ideas of an 
educated populace diffuse within the population and increase the realization of new 
processes and technologies (Hanushek and Wössmann, 2007).  Different types of human 
capital, the methods of measuring them, and how they affect economic growth will be 
discussed at length in following chapters.  In this subfield of growth accounting, the 
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general findings have been that human capital differences account for about one-third of 
growth (Romer, 2001).  
 Following seminal examinations of human capital’s influence on economic 
growth, economists began exploring other causes of cross-country income differences.  
Hall and Jones (1999) referred to the social infrastructure of a society when discussing 
institutions and policies that foster economic growth.  The first distinction between a 
society that lacked this social infrastructure and one that did not was that a society that 
fostered economic growth encourages investment over consumption.  This investment 
can be realized through physical capital or human capital that would increase future 
output as opposed to creating goods and services for current consumption.  The second 
distinction between these two societies is that the society fostering growth has policies 
and institutions that encourage production instead of diversion, with production being 
activities increasing output and diversion being activities such as rent-seeking, that 
reallocate output that has already been created.  
 In a ground-breaking study concerning social infrastructure, Olson (1996) 
examines countries that have been divided, with one-half of the country under a market-
oriented regime and the other under a Communist regime.  The findings of this study 
show that differences in social infrastructure within these countries results in much higher 
output per worker in the market-oriented part of the country.  For example, following the 
reunification of Germany, a West Germany’s worker’s output was 2.5 times that of a 
worker in East Germany.  Since the conception of the social infrastructure idea, 
prominent economists such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), Mauro (1995), Sachs and 
Warner (2005), and many more have derived measures of social infrastructure to examine 
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how these measures are related to the level of economic growth within a society.  These 
measures, studies, and results are discussed at length in following chapters. 
 
Theories Concerning Foreign Aid and Economic Growth 
Another factor that has been posited to affect economic growth is the receipt of 
foreign aid.  When looking at the motivations for foreign aid from the 1960s to present, 
encouraging economic growth through aid was not the sole impetus, but a large one for 
donor countries and organizations to provide funds (Hjertholm and White, 1998).  
However, with ever-increasing amounts of aid provided, citizens and government 
officials from the donor countries demanded to know the results of the aid.  Because of 
calls for accountability, techniques to measure growth and determine if such aid was 
effective would need to be developed.  One theory behind foreign aid begins with the 
discussion that a well-functioning economy is one dominated by market prices, property 
rights, and good information from both buyers and sellers that can be used to make 
decisions concerning goods and services that are worthy to purchase and provide.  
Conversely, central-planning can lead to a poorly-functioning economy, as 
interference with the market distorts decision-making processes, and central planners lack 
information about local conditions necessary to make efficient decisions.  Following this 
reasoning, a lack of economic growth despite the general form of foreign aid as an overall 
transfer of money is discussed by Skarbek and Leeson (2009), who explain that foreign 
aid can be viewed as a method of central-planning that distorts choices and information in 
the recipient economy, with the institutions that provide aid viewed as the central 
planners that, from afar, provide directions to recipient countries about how to use the aid 
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or improve their economies.  Following this vein, foreign aid may even discourage 
economic growth and encourage inefficiency through market distortions.  However, these 
authors continue their examination of foreign aid to show that by not using aid as a form 
of central planning or a general transfer but as a tool used for a specific purpose, aid can 
be effective.  By using aid to increase a specific output by providing more inputs, certain 
outcomes may be achievable but will not immediately lead to overall economic growth.  
For example, aid associated with the goal of ending malaria can create incentives and 
payments that actually lead to the eradication of the disease—leading to a larger, 
healthier workforce and the downstream consequence of economic growth for the 
eradicated area.  Foreign aid will be discussed at length in following chapters. 
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Chapter Three:  Literature Review of Basic Variables of Economic Growth 
 
Introduction  
  There is a far-reaching literature that discusses economic growth, the effects of 
corruption on economic growth, and the efficacy of foreign aid in encouraging economic 
growth.  The works examined in this dissertation are limited to published books, articles 
from academic journals or presented at academic conferences, and documents publicly-
available from varying organizations (e.g., the United Nations).  Specifically, the purpose 
of this review is to:  (1) identify and assimilate the literature concerning variables that 
affect economic growth, (2) summarize the findings concerning the relationship between 
these variables and economic growth, and (3) identify limits in the current literature that 
are conducive for future research.  The following section discusses seminal publications 
that empirically or theoretically discuss explanatory variables of economic growth.  As 
noted in “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions” (Levine and 
Renelt, 1992), “over fifty variables have been found to be significantly correlated with 
growth in at least one regression,” (p. 942).   
 
Defining Economic Growth 
 Economic growth is an expansion in the long-term productive potential of an 
economy (World Bank, 2000).  The main idea behind the quest for economic growth is to 
reduce scarcity in an economy and, therefore, increase standards of living.  In the short-
term, economic growth is usually quantified by the Gross Domestic Product (the entire 
production of goods and services) or the per-capita GDP (GDP divided by the 
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population).  Using a measure like per-capita GDP is a simple method for researchers to 
compare wealth across nations and over time.  Despite the usefulness of this 
measurement, scholars have recently developed other measures that aim to include the 
quality and of life that are also comparable across countries.   
 In “The Quantity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality,” 
Becker, et al. (2005) posit that while per-capita GDP is a useful measure of quality of 
life, it is necessary also to measure the quantity of life (longevity) to reach conclusions 
about overall welfare.  The authors discuss that while income inequality has not changed 
much in recent history (p. 278), health inequality (with health measured as life 
expectancy at birth) has dramatically decreased.  By developing the “hypothetical life-
cycle individual” (HLCI), the authors use a counterfactual measure of the mortality rate 
that would be observed in the 1990s if all individuals retained their mortality rates from 
the 1960s.  This counterfactual allows the researches to quantify welfare increases 
attributable to decreased mortality.  The majority of welfare gains realized through 
decreased mortality are found in the reduction of early death (before the age of twenty) 
due to infectious, respiratory, and digestive diseases in developing countries.   Using the 
HLCI, cross-country inequality found through solely examining income is reversed when 
per-capita GDP is replaced with the full income of an individual.  Also, the authors find 
statistically significant evidence of convergence—that the poorest countries realized 
larger gains than the richest countries.   
 Following this vein, in “Mortality Inequality,” Peltzman (2009) develops a Gini 
coefficient for mortality.  The author uses mortality rates to develop a Gini coefficient 
measuring years of life.  A score of 100 would indicate that one person had all years of 
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life, while a score of zero would indicate that everyone lived the exact same amount of 
time.  Worldwide, in 1852, the mortality Gini coefficient was 47.6, and in 2002, it was 
10.8—indicating a much more equal distribution of life-years in 2002 than in 1852.  The 
closing of this gap is due to a decreased risk of premature death; there are more people 
living longer.  This article adds to the literature by using a well-known measure of 
economic well-being (the Gini coefficient) to show that despite stagnant economic 
inequality changes, welfare realized through increased life-years has dramatically 
increased throughout the world in the last one hundred years.    
 Along this vein, Pandey, et al. (2006) develop a measure that reflects revealed 
preferences for the ratio and productivity of work and leisure time.  The authors 
developed the Life Quality Index to discover a value of life calibrated by implied values 
garnered from the societal willingness to pay for additional years of life.  Their findings 
suggest that, while societies differ in the ratio of work and leisure time, the formula used 
in computation of the Life Quality causes these differences to only slightly affect the 
score.  The computation of the Life Quality is discussed in following chapters, and this 
measure will be used as a dependent variable in a set of analyses found in this 
dissertation.   
 
Measuring Economic Growth 
  To examine the effects of foreign aid and corruption in economic growth and 
changes in longevity, it is necessary to control for other factors that affect growth.  In the 
literature, economic growth is generally measured by calculating the changes in real per-
capita GDP from year to year (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Levine and Renelt, 1992).  
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While this is a measure provided in many datasets across time and for various levels of 
geopolitical boundaries, as each country has differing attributes that affect their economic 
growth, it is necessary to account for variations in economic growth across countries and 
time.  When examining specific relationships between growth and other factors, it is 
imperative to include explanatory variables, as not accounting for them can alter the 
findings of the relationship of interest.  In seminal pieces, such as “Aid, Policies, and 
Growth” (2000), the authors examine relationships between economic policies, foreign 
aid, and the growth of per-capita GDP, while using many variables to explain differences 
in per-capita GDP growth.  The explanatory variables used in these articles are usually of 
a standard variety based on previous seminal publications, and the control variables used 
in this study are presented below.  
 
Basic Variables in Economic Growth  
One such control variable is the initial per-capita GDP and can be the level of 
GDP from any base year chosen by the researcher.  The specified base year should be a 
stable year with respect to economic activities and reliable data should be available for 
the selected year (Agarwal, 2006).  As discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), the 
theoretical argument for including this measure in a growth regression is that, following 
the theory of convergence, countries with a lower level of initial GDP should experience 
faster growth compared to countries that have already reached high levels of growth.  As 
discussed in Solow (1956), the idea of convergence comes from an exogenous growth 
model based on neo-classical assumptions.  The theory follows that, in countries with 
similar institutions and factors like savings rates and population growth, poor countries 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
17 
 
should experience higher levels of per-capita GDP growth.  This higher growth is 
attributable to both lower diminishing returns to capital in capital-poor developing 
countries and the replication of technology already available in developed countries.    
However, as found in Barro’s seminal article, “Economic Growth in a Cross 
Section of Countries” (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992) also found evidence supporting 
only conditional convergence—indicating that poor countries grow faster than rich 
countries, only if a human capital measurement is controlled for (in this study, secondary-
school enrollment) in the explanation of per-capita GDP growth.   
This conditional convergence theory suggests that human capital affects growth 
through two mechanisms:  domestically-produced technological innovation and the speed 
of adoption of technology from abroad.  In different studies, human capital is measured in 
various ways.  These measures include literacy rates (Islam, 2004), initial secondary-
school or primary-school enrollment at a point in time (Barro, 1991), or the percentage of 
females attending secondary-school and are all theoretically positively-correlated with 
economic growth because a more educated populace should create more investment 
opportunities and wealth within the country.   
As discussed in “Economic Growth and Human Development,” Ranis, Stewart, 
and Ramirez (2000) examine the idea that human capital and economic growth are 
intertwined and exhibit endogeneity.  The authors examine data concerning health and 
educational development and economic growth to determine if countries become mired in 
virtuous (or vicious) cycles wherein health and educational development support (detract 
from) economic growth, which, in turn, supports (detracts from) health and educational 
development.  The authors find empirical evidence for the existence of such cycles, and 
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the data suggest that a country can only move from a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle by 
increasing levels of health and educational development.   
Using literacy rates poses many issues such as differences in measurements across 
countries, the higher likelihood of sampling in urban areas where literacy is higher, and 
that literacy rates in most developed countries are one hundred percent (Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994).  Using school enrollment measures shows the level of investment and 
assumes that attending schools actually educates students.  If the argument that the 
students do not learn useful skills despite school attendance follows, the literacy rate may 
prove more useful.  Additionally, there are some arguments that developing countries 
may experience a “brain drain” of their educated citizens.  This argument postulates that 
the level of school enrollment does not accurately capture the human capital in a country 
because educated citizens flee the country for better opportunities elsewhere—which 
would actually decrease levels of economic growth (Beine, Docquier, Rapoport, 2008).   
In Human Capital:  A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference 
to Education, Becker (1994) argues that human capital is a stock variable that provides 
low returns when the stock is low and, up to a certain point, the returns increase as the 
stock increases2.  This implies that the return on education is higher in developed 
countries (that already have high human capital stocks) than in less-developed countries3
                                                          
2 A stock variable is a variable that is accumulated inter-generationally and, in this case, is illustrated by 
the strong positive relationship between the human capital of parents and the learning of their child 
(Becker, 1994).   
.  
Building on this idea, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) also posit that the stock of human 
capital is difficult to measure and previous measures such as school enrollment or literacy 
3 Becker (1994) notes that after very high levels of human capital stock have been developed, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to absorb more knowledge. 
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rates at a specific point in time may not accurately reflect the stock variable.  In this 
piece, the authors cite an often-used method of estimating human capital stock that was 
constructed by Kyriacou (1991), and estimate the relationship between educational 
attainment and past values of enrollment in all levels of school.  This index is available 
for forty-two countries for the 1970s and can be extrapolated for other time periods based 
on enrollment ratios.  Using this estimate, the authors are able to account for the growth 
in income from 1965-1985 through the growth in labor, physical capital, and human 
capital.   
In the same vein as Kyriacou, Barro and Lee (1993) developed a cross-country 
distribution of human capital from 1960-1990, for the adult population over twenty-five, 
based on average years of schooling.  While the authors were able to assemble a large 
and accurate dataset, there are two problems with these data as discussed in the literature.  
First, as noted by the authors, measuring educational attainment of only the adult 
population leaves out a sizable portion of the population, and the under-25 demographic 
in developing countries is often larger than in developed nations.  Additionally, as 
discussed by Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin, using educational attainment as a measure of 
human capital includes many assumptions that may not be correct:  that workers from 
each category of education are perfect substitutes for workers from other categories, that 
the differences in productivity in workers with varying levels of education are 
proportional to their educational attainment, and that a year of schooling is comparable 
across countries and schools (p. 216).   
In “Democracy and Growth,” Barro (1996) examines the influence of different 
measures of human capital on economic growth.  In this study, the author examines the 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
20 
 
average years of enrollment in secondary schools by the adult population as a whole, 
parsed out by gender, and how these measures affect economic growth and the 
development of democratic institutions.  The findings show that in the development of 
democratic institutions, of the variables GDP, life expectancy, educational attainment of 
males, and educational attainment of females, the most significant and the largest effect is 
found through the educational attainment of females.  The importance of female 
education to economic growth and longevity improvements is thought to be realized 
mostly through the mechanism of lowering fertility rates.  Increased levels of secondary 
school attendance by females reduce their fertility levels in almost all countries (Ranis, 
Stewart, and Ramirez, 2000), resulting in lower levels of population growth and higher 
levels of economic growth.  However, this measure can suffer from a lack of data 
availability as, until recently, it was not a measure that was gathered by all countries. 
Despite the problems found in using educational attainment as a measure of 
human capital, de la Fuente and Domenech (2006) suggest that many of the 
inconsistencies of findings concerning human capital in empirical growth literature are 
caused by poor data quality.  In “Human Capital in Growth Regressions:  How Much 
Difference does Data Quality Make?” the authors compile meta-estimates of the 
coefficients found for years of schooling in the growth equation.  Their argument is that 
educational attainment data quality suffers because of missing values and measurement 
error.  The authors hypothesize that studies in this literature often have conflicting 
findings that can be attributed to differences in data quality.  Using reliability ratios to 
measure data quality, the authors find that as schooling data becomes more accurate, the 
coefficient of human capital in the growth equation increases.  The takeaway point of this 
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piece for future researchers is to ensure that the data concerning human capital are 
accurate.   
In this dissertation, I use the percentage of females enrolled in secondary schools 
over time across countries as a measurement of human capital.  However, for some 
countries, specifically in former Soviet Union countries following the dissolution of the 
USSR, this data is not available.  In these cases, I will use a variable that measures the 
average number of years of total schooling the population over the age of fifteen has 
completed.  The drawbacks of both variables have been mentioned, however, I agree with 
previous literature that these variables are more useful than literacy rates as a human 
capital measurement, for the reasons discussed previously.  To address problems with 
data quality, the values I will use come from the World Bank Development Indicators, a 
source that has been collecting human capital data for over five decades.  I argue that by 
lowering the age from the usual twenty-five to fifteen, human capital levels in developing 
countries with large populations of young people will be more accurately represented.   
An additional variable that warrants further discussion and often included in this 
basic category of explanatory variables is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) 
score.  The ELF score represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
from a specific country will not be in the same ethnolinguistic group—the higher the 
score, the more fractionalized the country (Mauro 1995).  A higher score indicates a 
higher level of fractionalization within the country. 
The theoretical argument is that higher ELF scores are correlated with lower 
economic growth through various mechanisms.  One mechanism is explained through the 
fact that a country with a high ELF score contains heterogeneous groups of people—
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these groups may differ in their religion, their language, or their ethnic background.  
Because of the high levels of heterogeneity, each group will have its own preferences 
concerning service packages from the government. 
As it is argued that individuals will be more loyal to their individual group than to 
their country, the group that is currently in power in the country will impose laws to 
benefit its group and to be congruent with their beliefs—not necessarily to promote 
policies that benefit the entire country4
Table 3.1:  ELF Scores of Selected Countries 
.  This type of group-wide rent-seeking 
undermines institutional quality and allocative efficiency, as well as leads the other 
groups to lose respect for the government.  The other groups may challenge the 
government through unlawful coup d’états or political uprisings.  If the groups are of 
comparative size, a different group may be in power next and change the laws set by the 
previous government and engage in its own rent-seeking.  A large ELF score has been 
shown to decrease economic growth by discouraging investment through increased 
political instability, assassinations, and black market premiums.  Table 3.1 shows 
examples of the ELF scores from 1985 of countries selected to show a range of ELF 
Scores.   
Country ELF Score 
United Arab Emirates 0.242 
Australia 0.437 
Brazil 0.576 
United Kingdom 0.389 
China 0.132 
United States 0.575 
Russia 0.333 
 
                                                          
4 While this is the general idea behind the ELF score, the overall political institutions in place will 
determine the extent to which the group in power can impose group-only benefits.   
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Foreign Aid Receipts 
In addition to the previously-discussed variables that influence economic growth, 
recently, theories concerning determinants of growth have expanded to include aid 
receipts (Levy, 1988 and Boone, 1995).  Academics and practitioners have hypothesized 
and looked toward theory for reasons as to why findings in this literature show that 
foreign aid receipts have not increased overall growth rates.  These findings are relevant 
for the entire aid community:  international financial institutions, developed countries that 
fund such institutions, and developing countries that receive aid.  It is imperative to 
understand what has gone wrong in this process and under what conditions aid can be 
used to encourage global economic growth.   
 Aid acts as a transfer from one institution to another.  Following the two-gap 
model from Chenery and Strout (1966), a recipient country is not experiencing economic 
growth due to a gap between a necessary amount of investment for economic growth and 
the domestic savings or a gap between a necessary level of imported goods needed as 
inputs for production and earnings from foreign exchange.  Based on this model, foreign 
aid could “fill the gap” presented by either deficiency and result in economic growth.  
This model became the basis for future research focusing on how the use of foreign aid 
affects economic growth in the recipient country.  Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that 
a lump-sum of aid increases investment in productive sectors of the recipient’s economy 
(in countries with low levels of corruption), while Easterly (2002) posits that such aid 
simply increases state consumption and payments to elites (in countries with higher levels 
of corruption).  As Burnside and Dollar (2000) discuss, the likelihood that aid will be 
invested, as well as how productive the investment will be, depends on specific policies 
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of the country.  Weak institutions pose problems for investment.  An efficient judicial 
system is needed to enforce contracts, as property rights are necessary to encourage any 
investment, and efficient bureaucracies are needed to ensure timely licensing (Mauro 
1995).  Bureaucratic inefficiency affects growth directly and indirectly--directly by 
misallocating investment into unproductive sectors and indirectly through lowering the 
overall investment rate.  For example, a three-month-long wait for a restaurant permit 
directly affects growth because the investment must be on hold for three months.  
Indirectly, such a wait may discourage restaurateurs from even venturing into this 
business area.    
 Institutions, such as property rights, have been developed by humans to shape our 
interaction and reduce uncertainty.  Change in institutions is usually incremental and 
evolutionary but can occur rapidly during revolutionary periods.  Neo-classical theory 
suggests that efficient institutions will prevail; however, the continued existence of poor 
institutions has led some to argue that neo-classical assumptions do not always hold.  The 
argument against these assumptions suggests that the information feedback process for 
institutions does not operate efficiently but may require exogenous correction from 
outside of the market.  For example, in the third world, these imperfect institutions may 
result in a large underground economy and rampant corruption as residents of these 
countries may incur lower transaction costs within the black market than in the formal 
sector.  In fact, as discussed by North (1990), such poor institutions can incentivize 
unproductive activity of their citizens.  To change the incentives in this economy, the 
government may intervene and create harsher laws concerning black market dealings.  
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Such an exogenous correction can aid in improving such a country’s institutions and 
pushing it toward economic growth.   
 However, corruption may be a byproduct of another underlying aspect of the 
country.  As discussed in “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking,” (Svensson, 2000), 
disbursements of aid often cause a decrease of public goods in fractionalized countries.  
For the reasons noted previously in this chapter, a fractionalized society’s competing 
social groups participate in more rent-seeking activities than a homogeneous society.  
Using game theory, the author finds that, given the expectation of foreign aid, competing 
groups are better off in the long-term to cooperate and allocate the aid effectively.  
However, the larger the windfall is, the larger the short-term impetus for the groups to not 
cooperate but to extract rents from the payoff.  Using the ELF score, a corruption index, 
and foreign aid data, the author finds that in a fractionalized country, there is a positive 
correlation between foreign aid and corruption.  This piece introduces the idea that a 
fractionalized country that receives with a windfall from foreign aid is likely to 
experience corruption.   
 
Foreign Aid for Geopolitical Reasons 
As discussed in the seminal article, “Dimensions of Conflict in the General 
Assembly” (Alker, 1964), during the Cold War and prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
vote-buying schemes were used by both the Americans and the Soviets.  In this article, 
Alker studies voting in the 1961-1962 United Nations General Assembly to observe the 
effect of the Cold War on voting patterns.  With data that includes seventy roll-call votes 
(which can result in yes, no, or abstention) by United Nation members, the author uses a 
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factor analysis and notes that sixty-four percent of the votes can be explained through the 
East-West rift.   Data concerning economic aid from the United States and the Soviet 
Union is included in a regression analysis to predict the voting patterns found.  The 
highest predictor of voting in Soviet alignment is found to be the recent receipt of Soviet 
aid and trade with the Soviet Union.  This effect is found to be larger than the recent 
receipt of aid from the United States or trade with the United States.  Additionally, it is 
noted that $100 of per-capita Soviet aid explained voting patterns better than formal 
group membership.  While this piece of literature is quite dated, it indicates that the 
relationship between foreign aid and voting cohesion is not novel.      
 In this same vein, Wittkopf’s “Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes:  A 
Comparative Study” (1973) begins with the news that several United States Senators had 
publicly-expressed the belief that countries that have received aid had not shown their 
appreciation through votes in the United Nations General Assembly and that, in light of a 
recent vote, their foreign aid should be decreased.  The author examines all roll-call votes 
from 1963 and 1966 from the General Assembly.  Data concerning aid receipts is divided 
into bilateral aid from a donor within the Developmental Assistance Committee and 
bilateral aid from a donor within the Soviet Bloc from 1962-1967.  The author 
hypothesizes that bilateral aid and voting agreement between the donor and the recipient 
should be found.  The results show strong correlations in both time periods between aid 
and voting agreements when the United States was the donor, weaker correlation only 
with the aid provided in 1964 when the Soviet Union was the donor, and no significant 
correlation when other DAC or Soviet bloc countries are the donors.   
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However, following the Soviet collapse, the aid game changed.  As recipient 
countries did not have another superpower donor to choose from, acceptance of aid 
conditions was required.  While not all conditions of aid were met or enforced, the 
conditions of democratization and human rights were often tied to aid receipts.  As 
discussed in “Does U.S. Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes?  A Disaggregated 
Analysis,” (Dreher, et al., 2008), not all geopolitical aspects of aid have disappeared.  The 
authors use panel data from 1973-2002 to analyze the effect of financial assistance from 
the United States on the voting patterns of recipients in the United Nations General 
Assembly, specifically in comparison to the other countries in the G-7 (France, United 
States, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada, and West Germany).  The contribution of 
this piece to this substantial literature comes in disaggregating aid.  By classifying types 
of aid, the authors hypothesize that different kinds of aid will result in different levels of 
voting compliance within the General Assembly.  For example, emergency aid given for 
humanitarian reasons has been previously shown to be given altruistically (Abrams and 
Lewis, 1993).  However, program and project-related aid has been consistently shown to 
be motivated by the self-interest of donors.  Using a Two-Stage-Least-Squares analysis, 
aid provided by the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is shown to be a valid 
instrumental variable for aid provided by the United States and the G-7 donors, as these 
four countries have been shown to not grant aid for geopolitical reasons.  The authors 
find that receiving project and program aid significantly increases the likelihood of voting 
compliance with the United States within the General Assembly.  The same specification 
using bilateral aid from the other countries in the G-7 did not show such a pattern.   
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 Additionally, in “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth?  Foreign 
Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” (2008), Kuziemko and Werker examined foreign 
aid provided by the United States and voting within the Security Council.  As explained 
by the authors, the United Nations Security Council has five permanent members:  China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Also on the council are ten 
non-permanent seats that are reserved for countries serving two-year terms.  Each year, 
five non-permanent seats become open, and a country has to be nominated by its regional 
caucus and voted in by two-thirds of the General Assembly.  The five members that retire 
each year are not available for immediate reelection.  To pass a resolution, nine of the 
fifteen members must vote in favor.  However, each of the permanent members can veto a 
resolution.  As discussed in the article, some years have more pressing issues than others, 
thus, giving the non-permanent members of that year more opportunities to vote on 
global security issues.  Using historical panel data, the authors examine the changes in 
foreign assistance to non-permanent members from the United States and the United 
Nations.  The authors found that when a non-permanent country rotates on to the Security 
Council, the amount of aid given solely by the United States increases by fifty-nine 
percent, and the amount given by the United Nations increases by eight percent.  
Additionally, the authors cite examples when aid was cut following a vote on the Security 
Council.  For example, following the 1991 vote concerning the resolution to use force in 
Iraq, the assistance provided to a dissenting Yemen drastically decreased.   
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Conditional Aid and Economic Growth  
Because of the knowledge that weak institutions and corruption can affect a 
country’s economic growth, much recent literature focusing on aid’s role in economic 
growth draws on  institutional efficiency and corruption levels to explain that differing 
levels of the two can result in differing levels of aid effectiveness (Collier and Dehn, 
2001; Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Rajan and Subramanium, 2005).  Making consistent 
results more difficult to find, some empirical studies have found diminishing returns and 
nonlinearity when examining the relationship between aid and economic growth.  In 
“Aid, Policies, and Growth in Developing Countries:  A New Look at the Empirics,” the 
authors generate a score for countries depending on several institutional quality factors.  
Using this score, data concerning official development assistance (ODA) and measures of 
economic growth, the authors examine the relationship between ODA, institutional 
policies, and economic growth (Alvi and Shukralla, 2008).  Their findings indicate that 
countries that receive high levels of aid (as measured by ODA as a percentage of GDP) 
and have a low score in institutional quality show diminishing returns to aid.  Other 
literature has found that in countries with very low institutional quality scores, aid does 
not help economic growth at all (Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp, 2004).   
 Following research that examines institutional quality and economic growth, the 
current conclusion concerning development assistance indicates that aid can be best 
utilized for economic growth by countries with low levels of corruption and high 
institutional quality.  Unfortunately, some developing countries with low levels of 
economic growth still have weak institutions and high corruption.  The apparent problem 
with foreign aid in these countries, as previously noted, is that these countries do not 
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experience economic growth from ODA.  One way that foreign aid donors can 
incentivize such countries to improve their institutional quality is by requiring disbursed 
aid be contingent on such improvements.  Restricting aid can mean that before, after, or 
during the disbursal of aid, the receiving country must do something (e.g., experience 
reductions in the number of black market transactions).   
 However, imposing conditions on aid or restricting its receipt is not a perfect way 
to ensure economic growth in the receiving country.  As discussed by Amegashie, 
Ouattara, and Strobl (2007), public economics theory somewhat supports the idea of 
restricted transfers.  For a domestic example, food stamps are a type of restricted 
transfers.  The money given by the government to the grocer (indirectly, through the food 
stamp beneficiary) is only able to be used for certain items.  This somewhat alleviates 
moral hazard issues that transfers, such as food stamps, could be used for purchasing 
alcohol or drugs.  However, as basic utility theory explains, an unrestricted transfer will 
result in a (usually) higher level of utility than a restricted one.  For example, if the food 
stamp recipient is not hungry but needs to pay rent, an unrestricted transfer from the 
government would raise their utility more than the food stamps.  This example illustrates 
the “deadweight losses” (p. 2) discussed in “Moral Hazard and the Composition of 
Transfers:  Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid” (and previously in Blackkorby 
and Donaldson, 1988 and Gahvari and Enlinson, 2007) that occur when incomplete 
information concerning the recipient’s preferences is held.  In the context of foreign aid, 
the World Bank (1998) takes note of this economic principal by advising that aid to 
countries with sufficient institutions be that of the unrestricted kind.   
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 While the literature that discusses and analyzes the effects of applying restricted 
transfers to foreign aid is quite small, Amegashie, Ouattara, and Strobl (2007) draw upon 
theories from more traditional applications to develop a model to explain the interactions 
between a recipient country and a donor agency and how the actors affect whether 
restricted or unrestricted aid is given.  The main proposition of their model is that a donor 
that gives restricted aid to a recipient will reduce the proportion of restricted aid with an 
improvement in the level of governance of the recipient.  Using data from the OECD 
concerning the type of aid provided and governance measures including indices of both 
political liberties and civil liberties, the authors examine the relationship between the two 
from 1993 to 2003.  They conclude that as governance improves in one period, the 
proportion of restricted aid does, in fact, decrease in the following periods.   
 Additionally, in “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, Collier and Dollar 
(2002) develop a theory to find an efficient poverty-reducing allocation of aid.  As 
discussed previously, the purpose of foreign aid throughout history has not necessarily 
been to reduce poverty.  However, with this noted, these authors find a method of aid 
allocation truly meant to reduce poverty.  Using ratings of twenty aspects of national 
policy from the World Bank and the levels and distribution of a nation’s income, the 
authors compare current aid allocations to a “poverty-efficient” allocation.  Their findings 
suggest that the current allocation of aid is not optimal in reducing poverty.  Currently, as 
a recipient country’s policies improve in these twenty aspects of national policy, their aid 
is decreased.  To efficiently reduce poverty, the authors suggest increasing levels of aid 
as policies improve.  The final suggestion from the authors is that aid should be directed 
to countries with residents that live in poverty.  This, seemingly simple policy 
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recommendation is found by the authors to not currently be a prerequisite for aid 
disbursal.   
 
Conclusion 
 This discussion of basic economic variables such as initial per-capita GDP, 
human capital, the ELF score, and foreign aid receipts and how these variables influence 
economic growth will be used as a foundation for later chapters that examine how 
institutional factors can influence economic growth, net of other factors.  The following 
chapter presents a game-theoretical model of foreign aid based on theories and findings 
presented thus far.     
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Chapter Four:  Game Theory Analysis of Foreign Aid  
 
Introduction 
Foreign aid has been a hotly-contested issue among academics and practitioners 
for centuries (Morgenthau, 1962).  In the seminal article, “A Political Theory of Foreign 
Aid,” Morgenthau discusses six types of foreign aid while noting that all have political 
motivations behind their disbursal.  In previous centuries, foreign aid with the intention 
of out-and-out bribery was not condemned to be unethical.  However, recently, this 
practice has been somewhat replaced with foreign aid for humanitarian, subsistence, 
military, prestige, or economic development uses.  As donor countries are argued to not 
simply give their money away, they may retain expectations for the use of their aid or 
have not-fully-disclosed motivations for giving.  For example, during the Cold War, the 
Soviets and the Americans used aid and trade as a mechanism to influence newly-
independent countries.  Both superpowers would try to trump the other’s packages to 
less-developed countries.  As discussed in The Giant’s Rival:  the USSR and Latin 
America, Blasier (1983) asserts that the not fully-disclosed motivation behind the U.S. 
aid was to keep new countries from adopting Communist policies.  In this period, there 
were many recipient countries that wielded power over the donor countries; many leaders 
of recipient countries would hold out from accepting aid packages or confirming trade 
terms, in order to receive the best offer.  Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, specifically, 
held bargaining power over the Soviets, as these countries produced products that Soviet 
consumers were in tremendous need of, such as clothing and food products (Blasier, p. 
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167).  However, Nicaragua and Cuba did not hold such bargaining power because they 
were quite dependent on the Soviet Union for economic support. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, members of the DAC (the Development Assistance Committee, comprised of the 
World Bank, the IMF, and 24 Western country members) became practically the only 
donors (with small amounts given by Arab countries) in the world.  The CMEA (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance) was composed of Soviet-bloc countries and provided 
their largest amount of ODA (Official Development Assistance) in the time period 1984-
1988.5
 
 
Figure 4.1 Net ODA by Major Donor Group 1969-1997 
 
 
As the only donors, the DAC gained power to impose conditions upon the receipt 
of aid.  This committee established standards concerning Official Development 
                                                          
5Source:  Manning, Richard.  “Will “Emerging Donors” Change the Face of International Cooperation?”  
OECD/DAC Meeting, 2006. 
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Assistance (ODA) disbursal, and its aid provision adhered to these rules.  Such standards 
are important to DAC countries, and arguably recipient countries, because much aid is 
given for the stated purpose of economic growth, and such conditions would ensure that 
foreign aid was going toward this--and not being channeled through corrupt means that 
would work cause the opposite.  Additionally, these standards have evolved over the last 
century to optimize the outcomes of the aid process as the DAC has gained experience 
with aid disbursal. 
However, in recent years, non-Western donors, such as China and India, have 
greatly increased their aid provision.  As a result, recipient countries are once again 
gaining power by having two different sources to choose from.  While these donors are 
increasing the worldwide level of aid, they are not adhering to the standards and 
conditions developed through the experience of the DAC.  When receiving aid from non-
DAC countries, recipients may not be subject to restrictions like privatizing national 
companies or improving their human rights situation.  However, while recipients may be 
able to better negotiate aid packages, they should consider that even if their aid package 
is not tied to policy changes, donor countries may have underlying motivations.   
In this chapter, I will discuss the motivations of donors and recipients in recent 
history and how these motivations determine their actions.  As the period between the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new donors represents a monopoly 
that Western countries had over the aid community, much discussion will be focused 
here.  As economic growth and eradicating the plague of third-world living standards 
(World Bank 2010) has become the overarching goals of foreign aid during this time, 
these economic concerns are seen as the motivations for much aid given throughout these 
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years and will be discussed at length.  Finally, I will use game theory to explain actions 
taken by donors and recipients during the Cold War, the 1990s, and currently. 
 
Recipients 
 While the donors of foreign aid have been in the recent past a somewhat Western-
concentrated group, aid recipients are much more diverse.  In the past ten years, more 
than three-quarters of the countries in the world have received some type of foreign aid.  
These countries range from the most populated countries of China and India to some of 
the least populated countries like Belize and Tonga (World Bank, 2010).  The vast array 
of recipient countries makes it somewhat difficult to discuss their preferences and 
reactions to the aid process, however, a reasonable assumption is that recipient countries 
want aid and would prefer aid without restrictions to the restricted kind.     
 As discussed by Oduor-Owinga (2007), former French and Portuguese colonial 
territories often receive different forms of aid than other countries:  they may receive 
higher levels of overall and untied aid from their former colonial rulers, and it has been 
shown that these countries receive lower levels of aid from multi-lateral organizations 
and the United States.  The general reasoning behind this is that the mother countries 
have specialized interests in the former colonies, and, therefore, provide more aid.  And, 
as more aid is provided by the colonizing countries, less is provided by other 
organizations and countries.  Additionally, as discussed briefly by Poirine (1999) in “A 
Theory of Aid as Trade with Special Reference to Small Islands,” small countries and 
countries located in strategic geographical areas also receive aid differently than other 
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countries.  Using the example of Cuba, Poirine notes the large amounts of aid provided 
by the Soviet union due to Cuba’s proximity to the United States.   
 Aside from these special cases of recipient countries (and perhaps including these 
countries), assumptions about their preferences can be made.  On the country-level, 
higher levels of unrestricted aid are preferred.  Aid that is not based on specific 
conditions acts as an increase in income to the country—allowing their utility to be 
increased in line with their preferences.  Restricted aid may be preferable to no aid at all 
but can create problems within the recipient country.  As noted by the World Bank 
(2010), in countries without adequate administrative capacity, positions may need to be 
created to monitor aid and report findings to the donor—creating unintended costs.  
Furthermore, meeting specific conditions can be both politically and monetarily costly to 
the government of recipient countries.   
 During the Cold War, aid-receiving countries could usually choose between aid 
offered from the West or the East.  As discussed by Blasier in The Giant's Rival: The 
USSR and Latin America, (1983), from the 1950s until the Soviet collapse, both large 
donors, the United States and the Soviet Union, offered competing aid packages to many 
developing countries.  These usually-unrestricted offerings were geopolitical in nature 
with the attempt to try to influence the government of many newly-independent 
countries.  Specifically in Latin America, the over-arching theme behind Soviet aid was 
to destabilize the region and carry Latin American countries onto the non-aligned (with 
the United States) route (Blasier, 1983).  While the two competitive donors put together 
aid packages, the recipients were pitting them against each other for their own benefit.  
As revolutions throughout Latin America were taking place, most developing countries 
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had no direct intent of immediately adopting a U.S.-inspired form of democracy or 
Soviet-style communism but could emphasize such choices to extract larger amounts of 
unrestricted aid from the donors.   
 Following the Soviet collapse, recipients were faced with a united front of 
multilateral agencies and Western countries that looked to use foreign aid efficiently and 
effectively.  The days of unrestricted aid were replaced with talk of institutional quality 
that would best utilize the aid provided and measurements of factors that would cause aid 
to be discontinued if not met.  Without a viable alternative, many recipient countries were 
forced to either meet these conditions or, at least, pretend that they did by falsifying 
documents or fabricating statistics.  Such conditions include but are not limited to the 
privatization of government-controlled industries, inflationary precautions, improvement 
of human rights, or the restructuring of the tax code (Kenan, 1994).  While it is argued 
that such changes provided a catalyst for the economic growth realized in the late 1990s, 
much research has focused on the corrupt practices and rent-seeking that redirected 
millions of dollars of aid into private pockets during this period (World Bank, 1992). 
 As the hegemony enjoyed by western countries in the world of aid is once again 
being threatened, recipients have begun to realize that large amounts of aid are available 
from areas other than the Western world.  This major recognition has far-reaching 
implications across the aid community.  For example, specific projects funded with aid 
from China and India are not held to the same environmental and safety standards as 
projects funded by the World Bank.  Additionally, such aid from China is often 
accompanied by lowered trade barriers and foreign direct investment in the receiving 
country—flagged by some as a possible exploitation of low-income African countries 
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that can export commodities to China and import their goods made with cheap labor6
 
.  
While recipients may be glad to see unrestricted aid, it is imperative that they take into 
consideration the larger implications of their acceptance.   
Donors 
On the other end of the aid relationship, donors can also be classified in various 
ways.  As an example, the donor decision could be made by Congress or by the leader of 
a private organization or, at an aggregated level by an international organization such as 
the World Bank or the United Nations.  Depending on the position of the decision-maker, 
different games and motivations will ensue.  Additionally, as political actors or 
circumstances change, it can be expected that the motivations of actors will change, thus, 
altering the foreign aid game.   
Two of the largest and most well-known international financial institutions are the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  As discussed in The 
Globalizers:  The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers, by Ngaire Woods (2006),  
both institutions were created post-World War II, were conceived at the Bretton Woods 
meeting of economic officials in 1944, and are headquartered in Washington D.C.  The 
original charters of both institutions direct them to stimulate employment and real 
income, facilitate balanced growth of international trade, and develop the productive 
resources of all members.  These two institutions employ a combined 13,000 people, and 
are home to the largest gathering of economics Ph.D.’s in the world.  However, despite 
                                                          
6 It is argued that as China provides aid to African countries, trade between the donor and recipient is 
increasing and becoming more open.  As Chinese exports are inexpensive due to cheap domestic labor, 
African countries, despite their extremely low-incomes, will be able to import Chinese products.  
Additionally, Chinese demand for commodities has been increasing rapidly and improved trade with 
African countries may augment exploitation of the continent’s natural resources (Manning, 2006). 
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the fact that both of their memberships consist of over 180 countries, most of the 
economic professionals in these institutions have been educated in the United States and 
subscribe to the liberal economic theories that are embedded in U.S. thinking7
 In addition to these international financial institutions (IFIs), individual countries 
and groups and individuals within countries also officially provide aid.  While aid is 
sometimes provided in an altruistic fashion, donors typically have their preferences about 
who should receive the aid, how it should be used, and the issue of repayment.  In 
“Evidence on Changes in Aid Allocation Criteria,” (Claessens, Cassimon, and 
Campenhout, 2009), the authors look at historic data concerning aid to examine reasons 
for differences in bilateral aid.  Their argument begins with a discussion of how 
geopolitical interests have beset aid provision in the recent past.   
.  These 
factors contribute to the fact that the two institutions are de facto led by U.S. Treasury 
officials and their decisions and policies have come to be known as the “Washington 
consensus,” even though the U.S. only holds seventeen percent of the voting rights in 
each.   
Geopolitical interests that may provide an impetus for aid include colonial ties, 
such as between the Francophone countries and their mother country or specific strategic 
interests, such as U.S. aid to Egypt and Pakistan.  However, in historical data concerning 
bilateral aid, the most discussed and most significant strategic interest in giving aid is the 
Cold War.  Such motivations can be explained through various ways.  First, what is 
referred to as the small country bias, which means that small countries typically receive 
more aid (in proportion to their GDP) than large countries, can be explained through two 
                                                          
7 Such examples of these theories include global market-liberalism, free-trade policies, and the overall 
functioning of the free market. 
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competing arguments.  The selection bias argument to this notion is that larger countries 
may have better access to borrowing funds on international markets due to more capital 
and credit available—making small countries less able to borrow funds and more reliant 
on aid receipts from larger countries.  Additionally, as the spread of communism and 
anti-communist sentiments acted as an impetus for aid, it was to the detriment of 
restricted aid.  Powerful donor countries did not have significant leverage on recipient 
countries to demand conditions of aid be met—as the recipients could volley between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, looking for the best aid deal.   
The geopolitical argument explaining the small country bias is that small 
countries’ populations are over-represented in international organizations like the United 
Nations (and constitute many votes).  Consequently, aid receipts may be cause for a small 
country to vote in a specific fashion.  So, bilateral aid can be viewed as a vote-buying 
scheme for countries that lack votes but have money to give.  Despite the opportunity to 
pit aid packages from the Soviet Union and the United States against each other, 
acceptance of such aid did come with some expectations from the donors.  As discussed 
previously, many studies have shown that bilateral aid from the United States and the 
Soviet Union resulted in higher voting compliance than bilateral aid from other countries.   
Despite the geopolitical strings that were delivered along with aid from the United 
States, these studies have all shown that aid from the other DAC countries is not 
associated with voting compliance within the United Nations.  Bilateral aid from these 
countries, coupled with aid provided by IFIs has focused on improving good governance, 
transparency, and aid efficacy in recipient countries.  Aid restrictions have required 
countries to make improvements that improve economic development.  Without the threat 
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of stopping aid receipts, recipient countries lack motivation to change policies that are 
stifling their economies.  Tying aid to improved institutional efficiency and policies is 
referred to by Claessens, Cassimon, and Campenhout (2009) as a “more optimal 
allocation” of aid across countries (p. 206). 
 
Emerging Donors 
As the previous sections have detailed the restrictions placed on aid during the 
post-Cold War period, this section discusses the emerging donors in the aid community 
and how they are changing the landscape in of foreign aid.  In “Whose aid? Whose 
influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance,” 
Woods (2008) argues that despite the realized benefits of conditional aid, new donors 
such as Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and India 
have been changing the aid game.  Instead of encouraging the new funds, some in the aid 
community are worried about a return to the Cold War-like competition model for 
donors.  And, as seen before the collapse of the Soviet Union, these competitive pressures 
on donors can decrease aid restrictions and allow recipients to choose among different aid 
packages.  An example discussed by Woods is that China provides aid to Zimbabwe and 
Sudan—despite the enormous human rights problems in both countries that have kept 
Western aid out of the countries.   
There is evidence that these emerging donors have, in fact, helped the economies 
of such countries.  The Chinese government argues that they provide aid while respecting 
the recipient’s sovereignty, and as discussed by the OECD DAC Chair, Richard 
Manning, these emerging donors are actually not entirely new to the aid game and have 
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been working with recipient countries to actively improve economic growth.  However, 
the economic growth of these recipient countries is being realized through channels such 
as better terms of trade with China and technical assistance from India.  This, combined 
with the Chinese statement citing “mutual benefit” (Manning, p. 6) as a motivation for 
providing aid to developing countries flags that China may certainly have some less-than-
wholly-altruistic reasons for being an emerging donor.  While there is not currently a 
Cold War between these new donors and the Western aid community, in following 
sections, there will be more discussion concerning the implications of Chinese aid 
donation and how it will affect the Western world.   
From here, I will focus on the modern historical contexts of foreign aid to 
demonstrate the strategies of donors and recipients using a game theoretical model.  The 
first time period analyzed will be the Cold War period, with the United States and the 
Soviet Union as donors.  The post-Cold War period analysis includes DAC (western) 
countries as the foreign aid donor, and the current period includes both Western countries 
and emerging donors.  While it is arguable that recipient countries vary on their specific 
preferences, a generic recipient country will be mostly used in the analysis for all time 
periods.  This assumption will be discussed in following sections. 
 
Game Theory 
Game theory was developed as a branch of applied mathematics and was studied 
intensively in the late twentieth century.  Typical applications of the theory are in the 
fields of economics, politics, and evolutionary biology.  A game theory model can be 
useful when discussing the various relationships and decisions involved in the process of 
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foreign aid disbursal.  As discussed in Osborne’s An Introduction to Game Theory, while 
game-theoretical models may not be perfectly accurate in predicting behavior between 
actors, such models can improve our understanding of a process.  These models contain 
underlying neo-classical assumptions that are in line with rational choice theory.  These 
theories suggest that when faced with choices, a rational actor will choose the best action 
based on her preferences and constraints.  However, it has been argued that neo-classical 
assumptions do not always hold.   
The rationality behind these assumptions is evident when the actors consistently 
make choices that result in the best outcome available and possible, and for the purpose 
of the model, these assumptions are used with the acknowledgment of their shortcomings.  
A further assumption underlying rational choice is that preferences are transitive:  if a>b, 
b>c, then a>c.  Among equally attractive choices, the chosen action’s outcome will be at 
least as good as the outcomes of the other choices.  As in economic models, preferences 
can be indicated by numbers, with higher numbers designating higher levels of utility.  In 
game theory models, these numbers are called payoff functions, and the higher values of 
payoffs will signal preferred choices.    
 Depending on the rules of the game and the payoffs available to the actors, 
various assumptions about decision-making can be made—with the final solution to the 
game often predictable.  A strategic game is one in which the actors each have 
preferences and can take actions based on their preferences.  Each player must make a 
decision independent of the other players; however, the payoffs received may change 
depending on the choices of the other players.  The infamous Prisoner’s Dilemma is an 
example of a strategic game that ignores temporal factors by simply having the actors 
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choose an action and not allowing them to change their mind.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
as follows:  two suspects of a crime are separated and questioned about the crime.  If 
neither admits to its commission, the police do not have enough evidence to prosecute 
either.  However, if one does confess and one does not, the confessor will be better off 
and the other will be worse off.  If both confess, then they both receive lighter sentences 
but are not as well off as if both had not confessed.  An example of a payoff matrix of 
this dilemma is shown below, where the numbers are indicative of utility:   
 
Table 4.1:  Prisoners’ Dilemma 
 
  Suspect 2 Suspect 2 
  NOT CONFESS CONFESS 
Suspect 1 NOT CONFESS 6, 6 -1, 5 
Suspect 1 CONFESS 5, -1 0, 0 
 
 Based on these estimated payoffs, it is possible to determine the course of action 
for each player.  However, the action chosen by each player not only embodies elements 
of rational choice, but the decision must also be made with consideration of the choices 
of the other player.  When players have experience with the game, they can develop 
beliefs about the choices others will make.  When each player makes the best decision 
based on their preferences, after taking into consideration their beliefs about the choices 
of the other players, what is called a Nash equilibrium has been reached.  When such 
equilibrium is reached, no player has incentive to deviate.  To continue with the example 
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of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both suspects will choose to confess because both have 
potentially-higher payoffs upon confession than staying quiet.  This outcome is parallel to 
the tragedy of the commons often found when public goods are in use.  Each player will 
have an incentive to free ride or attempt to obtain a higher individual payoff than would 
be achieved if all chose the socially optimal outcome.  However, because every player 
will make this same free-riding choice, they will all end up with lower payoffs. 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of a non-zero-sum game because they both 
prefer the outcome of (NOT CONFESS, NOT CONFESS) to (CONFESS, CONFESS).  
In a zero-sum game, also known as a strictly competitive game, the players’ interests are 
opposing:  to maximize one player’s payoff minimizes the opponents’ payoff.  In such a 
game, the players’ preferences run in opposite directions.  An example of a strictly 
competitive game is found below: 
 
Table 4.2:  Strictly Competitive Game8
 
 
  Player 2  Player 2 
  L R 
Player 1 T 2,1 0,5 
Player 1 B 1,3 5,0 
 
 
                                                          
8 Source:  Osborne, M.  2004.  An Introduction to Game Theory.  New York:  Oxford University Press. 
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As shown in the payoff matrix, the decision that brings the highest level of utility 
to Player 1 brings the lowest utility to Player 2 and vice versa.  The zero-sum property 
indicates that there is a sole payoff that one player wishes to minimize, while the other 
player wishes to maximize. 
To complicate matters, some games have more than two players.  In the following 
applications, there are three players.  As discussed in “The Core of an N Person Game,” 
(Scarf, 1967), the highest utility in a three-person game is realized when all players 
cooperate and form a grand coalition that will result in super-additive utility.  This 
requires that the utility realized from the grand coalition is higher than any other 
combined utilities of the players.  However, forming a grand coalition does not result in 
the highest utility possible for each player, as coalitions between players and against 
another player may result in increased utility for the players involved in the coalition, or 
one player may begin with a unique advantage that results in higher utility than that of the 
other players.  However, for a coalition to form, the assumptions of collective and 
individual rationality previously discussed must hold.  If a grand coalition is formed, the 
task of dividing the utility between the players often proves to be difficult.  A final 
condition in forming coalitions requires the convexity of preferences of the players9
 
.   
Game Theory Application 
 In the first application, the historical context is that of pre-Soviet collapse, and 
there are three players:  the United States and the Soviet Union as potential donors and 
                                                          
9 Convexity of preferences is indicated by, when the notation, ≥, means at least as good as, and x, y, and z 
denote three consumption bundles (combinations of various quantities of various goods), preferences for 
the consumption set, X, are convex if for any x, y, z ∈ X, where y ≥x and z  ≥x, it is the case that θy + (1-
θz) ≥ x for any θ∈[0,1] (Varian, 1999). 
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developing countries as a recipient.  Because of tremendous hostility between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, a grand coalition is not formed.  As discussed in “The 
Communist Bloc and the Foreign Aid Game,” (Beim, 1964), each donor gains utility 
when providing aid to a recipient because they are expanding their sphere of influence, 
and the recipient gains utility upon receipt of aid, regardless of the donor.  During the 
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union could both afford to pay for influence 
in recipient countries, while recipient countries were willing to be influenced for aid.  
While aid is quantifiable, influence is more difficult to value.  For example, aid can result 
in influence through four channels (Beim, 1964):  through the promotion of goodwill, by 
making a recipient dependent on the donor, by encouraging ideological similarities within 
the recipient countries, and by obtaining military advantages.  Upon reaching an 
agreement concerning aid, the donor and the recipient would both profit from the 
agreement, while the Donor 2’s utility is decreased because of Donor 1’s expanded 
sphere of influence.  However, the issue for both donor and recipient quickly becomes 
how to maximize what they are getting while minimizing what they are giving.  The 
United States and the Soviet Union both wished to maximize the influence-to-aid ratio:  
getting more bang for each buck, and the recipients wished to minimize that ratio, as 
most developing nations did not want to be entirely dependent on a foreign power for its 
economic livelihood.   
 The goal of each donor is to give aid to a recipient that will increase the 
dependence of the recipient on that donor.  This dependence would increase the influence 
of the donor, while allowing the donor to decrease aid due to this dependence.  While this 
did occur, i.e., the Soviet Union and Cuba, many recipient countries found that their best 
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strategy was to volley back and forth between the donors, promising to be influenced by 
each, and waiting for each donor’s aid offers to exceed the others.  Had the Soviet Union 
and the United States been on friendlier terms, this probably would not have worked as a 
recipient’s strategy. 
 As discussed in Blasier (1983), many recipient countries volleyed between each 
donor, accepted aid from both, and were influenced by both donors.  These countries 
were able to receive payments without committing to either.  By doing this, the recipient 
was minimizing the influence-to-aid ratio—receiving money from both but not allowing 
either to exert much influence.  Given the hostility toward each other during this time 
period, the United States and the Soviet Union would not be outdone by the other.  As a 
result, the best strategy for the recipient countries was to remain somewhat neutral and 
accept aid from both factions.  The theme of this application is to show that during the 
Cold War, recipient countries did not need to worry about meeting good governance or 
human rights conditions to receive foreign aid.  The overarching hostility between the 
two donors ensured that if one donor did not provide aid to a country, the other donor 
would, in an attempt to expand its sphere of influence.  In terms of maximizing their 
preferred ratios, the recipients were in the winning position of this aid game until the 
Soviet Union began to falter and decrease aid disbursements due to domestic austerity 
measures. 
 
A Cold War Example 
 In a specific example that demonstrates the occurrences of the Cold War aid 
process, there are three players, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Uganda.  As 
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previously discussed, the United States and the Soviet Union were not communicating 
with each other concerning foreign aid.  As the recipient, Uganda would not approach 
either superpower and demand aid, and will not make an official move until there is an 
offer of aid.  Separately, the United States and the Soviet Union both prepare aid offers 
and present them to Ugandan officials.  Following this, Uganda can publicly announce 
which offer is preferable.  Based on indications from Ugandan officials, the United States 
and the Soviet Union can alter their offers to make each more enticing.  Uganda can 
continue to defer acceptance in hopes of a continual improvement of each offer but 
receives no aid until it accepts an offer, so there is a cost to delay but a benefit in 
improved terms.   
 However, if Ugandan officials play this game for too long, their payoff may end 
up being suboptimal.  If the United States and the Soviet Union have also offered an aid 
package to Rwanda, and both hegemons view Rwanda and Uganda as substitutes (e.g., if 
both had recently regained independence from colonial rule, were creating a new 
government, and were viewed as a way to extend the reach of capitalism or communism), 
the first recipient to accept may obtain significant benefit.  These recipient countries 
could be viewed as substitutable if alliance from both is unnecessary:  the benefit to the 
United States or the Soviet Union could be greatest from the first African ally and 
diminishing upon increasing allies.  Assuming that Uganda and Rwanda are not colluding 
to extract better aid terms from the donors, it is easy to see that an uncooperative country 
may lose aid or negotiation power.  This example demonstrates that while the recipients 
have some bargaining power, they also may have motivation to not act in a never-ending 
cycle of pitting Soviet and American offers against each other.   
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Post-Cold War  
 Following the end of the Cold War, foreign aid became exclusively donated by 
DAC countries.  The ratio of restricted aid to unrestricted aid dramatically increased from 
the end of the Cold War to the present (OECD, 2012).  A very different aid game 
emerged.  Not only could the recipients not volley between hostile donors, but they were 
also being required to meet requirements to obtain foreign aid.  There are two methods to 
examine the aid game during this time.  Under the first approach, the game becomes a 
two-player game, and, I argue, also becomes a zero-sum game.  A generic aid recipient is 
one player, and the DAC becomes the other player.  As previously discussed, the DAC is 
somewhat controlled by the United States, however, for the purpose of this application, 
the DAC, collectively, will be the other player.   
 The strategies of each player have changed:  the recipient now desires aid without 
restrictions, while the donor gains utility through having its restrictions met when 
disbursing aid.  As in the previous application concerning influence, now it is very 
difficult to measure utility lost or gained from restrictions on aid disbursal.  Despite the 
difficulty in measurement, it is clear that the two players are involved in a strictly 
competitive game:  gaining utility for one player results in a loss of utility for the other 
and is shown through various mechanisms.  As discussed in “Tied Aid and the Paradoxes 
of Donor-Enrichment and Recipient-Impoverishment,” (Kemp and Kojima, 1985), tied 
aid can harm the recipient because the aid may be required to be spent in a manner 
incongruent with local preferences, building capacity in the recipient country for 
necessary bureaucratic requirements may be cumbersome and politically costly, and 
corruption in the recipient country may be increased due to the aid receipt.  However, 
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recipient acquiescence to the terms of tied aid can be politically beneficial to the donor 
country, especially if trade increases as a result (Lloyd, et al., 2000).  Also, if restrictions 
are not met, human rights abuses and corruption within the recipient country can be 
politically costly to the government of the donor country.   
In the following matrix, the game is simpler, as after the Cold War, almost all 
foreign aid is provided by one donor.  The recipient and donor are both aware that if the 
terms of aid are not accepted, another recipient will accept these terms.  The game below 
illustrates the payoffs (in utility) based on decisions made by the donor and the recipient.    
As illustrated, offering unrestricted aid to the recipient results in lower utility to the donor 
through the mechanisms previously noted.  Therefore, the donors will never offer 
unrestricted aid.  As shown, the best strategies for each player result in a strictly 
competitive game.  The recipient has two options:  accept restricted aid or decline 
restricted aid.  If accepted, the recipient also accepts the restrictions that may be difficult 
to impose.  However, during this period, as there were no other options, recipients are 
better off to accept tied aid than to have no aid at all.  If a recipient declines the restricted 
aid, the donor loses a small amount of utility due to failed negotiations.  This application 
shows that during this time period, the donor was able to impose restrictions on aid, and 
the recipient would meet them (or pretend to meet them through falsifying documents or 
fabricating statistics).   
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Table 4.3:  Post-Cold War Aid Payoffs 
 
  Recipient Recipient 
  Declines Accepts 
Donor Restricted Aid 4,1 5,3 
Donor Unrestricted Aid  3,1 3,5 
 
 
There is another method of examining the post-Cold War situation.  Here, instead 
of all recipients being grouped into one, there are many recipients, but still only one 
donor.  The recipients are now competing with each other, the utility of each increasing 
in levels of unrestricted aid but decreasing, based on their own preferences, with 
restricted aid.    For aid receipt to be agreed upon, each side must gain something.  Also, 
the donor seeks benefits beyond altruism, to increase its utility.  While the donor will not 
provide excessive benefits to recipients, the competition between recipients may result in 
more favorable terms for the donor than otherwise realized.  For example, the United 
States approaches Pakistan with an aid package (Move 1).  Pakistan would gain utility 
through the receipt of aid, and the United States could gain utility through having an ally 
in this region of the world.  However, (Move 2) if Pakistan will not meet the 
requirements of aid receipts (e.g., allowance of a United States military base in the 
country), the United States may look for another country that will.  The United States 
may approach Kazakhstan (assuming Kazakhstan and Pakistan are uncooperative) with 
an aid package (Move 3).  In this game, it seems that the recipients will undercut each 
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other in the quest for foreign aid receipts, and the United States will end up winning the 
game.   
 
Current Aid Game 
In the current aid situation, there are again two groups of donors.  While the 
western countries represent Donor 1, emerging donors (China, India, and Brazil) will 
represent Donor 2.  The similarities between the Cold War aid game and this current 
situation are stark:  both donors are looking for influence in the recipient countries, and 
there is a bit of hostility between the donors.  While the Sino-American relationship is 
complicated, it has not reached the levels of the Russian-American hostilities of the Cold 
War.  A significant difference in this game is that now the aid provided by DAC 
countries usually comes with some restrictions.  Aside from disaster relief aid and aid to 
very poor countries, aid from these donors, bilaterally or multi-laterally, has various 
restrictions concerning human rights, corruption, and democracy.  As previously 
discussed, aid from emerging donors is usually without restriction of the policies within a 
country.   
 This current aid game is a three-player game, indicating, as discussed previously, 
that the highest total utility will be realized when a grand coalition is formed.  In this 
application, this could happen if both sets of donors and the recipients agreed on a course 
of action.  If both donors met and decided to only give restricted aid and to help 
recipients comply with the terms, this super-additive utility could be realized.  However, 
in a grand coalition, despite the overall higher utility, the utility of an individual player 
may be lower than otherwise possible.  An example of this would be that, as it is not 
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politically costly domestically for the governments of emerging donors to provide 
unrestricted aid, as they may lose utility through influence in recipient countries if forced 
by international organizations to provide restricted aid.  As the emerging donors will not 
receive additional payoffs to provide restricted aid, it will not be a likely outcome of the 
game.   
 Another difference between this aid game and that of the Cold War is that of 
global economic power.  During the Cold War, the Americans had the dominant 
economic position, with a declining national debt (as shown in Figure 4.2) and an 
increasing GDP, and the Soviet Union was experiencing the opposite.  In the current aid 
game, it seems that the economic problems of the Western donors are similar to those of 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War—with increasing debt and stagnating growth 
(OECD, 2012).     
 
Figure 4.2:  United States Gross Public Debt as a percentage of GDP10
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Source:  World Bank.  2012.  World Development Indicators.  Washington DC:  World Bank.   
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Also, the current economic strength, despite a worldwide recession, displayed by 
the emerging donors is similar to that of the Western donors during the Cold War.  
Therefore, if we look back to the aid game during the Cold War, it will provide many 
insights into the current aid game.  First, both donors wish to influence the recipients.  
The restrictions necessary for the receipt of aid from the DAC often pushes countries 
toward a pro-democracy, open-market design.  Aid receipts from emerging donors often 
come with improved trade conditions between them and the recipients (Woods, 2008).  
These open avenues better allow culture, ideas, and goods to flow from the donors to the 
recipients, resulting in overall influence.   
The recipients of aid from the emerging donors are just beginning to realize their 
best strategy in this new aid game.  As discussed in “’Emerging Donors’ from a Recipient 
Perspective:  An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia,” Sato, et al (2001) 
discuss the aspect of donors competing to provide aid for a country.  In this analysis, 
Cambodia is able to choose aid that works best for its needs.  Depending on the specific 
project, Cambodia may have as many as ten different offers to consider—from traditional 
and emerging donors.  As more recipient countries move toward the institutional 
efficiency required by DAC countries to receive aid, more will be able to choose the best 
aid package from the emerging donors or the traditional donors.   
I posit that this increasing competition, coupled with an increasingly complicated 
relationship between the United States and China, will lead the aid game to look very 
similar to that of the Cold War era.  The first move in this new game will be for the 
donors to offer aid to the recipients.  Some recipients will only be offered aid by one of 
the donors.  For example, because of its human rights abuses, Sudan will only receive aid 
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offers from emerging donors.  For Sudan, the choice will be easy:  take the aid.  While 
this aid may result in an increased influence of the donor in the country, Sudan’s utility 
from aid receipts will presently outweigh the costs.  Also, some countries may only 
receive aid offers from the United States.   These countries will have to weigh the benefit 
of aid receipts and the costs of complying with the standards required by aid disbursal 
from the United States.  However, in countries like Cambodia, their strategy will be to 
pick and choose the aid package that is best for them in that specific instance.  
At the present time, the Sino-American relationship is complicated but not 
comparable to U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War.  So, while emerging donors 
have surprised traditional donors with their increase in aid provision, the quest for 
influence upon aid recipients has not yet reached the competitive level of that during the 
Cold War.  However, if this relationship deteriorates, the United States may once again 
find itself in competition with another global hegemon looking to provide aid.  If this 
happens, I assert that a return to a Cold War-like aid game is very likely—with the 
recipients in the winning position.  If this relationship improves or holds constant, I 
theorize that the emerging donors and the traditional donors will continue to provide aid 
in their current respective fashions.   
 
Conclusion 
 Foreign aid is a lifeline for many countries to lead them to better living standards.  
While the aid game is continuously changing as political relationships, and even 
country’s boundaries, shift, there has been continued need for disbursals of aid.  
Academics and practitioners have made great strides in the past century in understanding 
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how to use aid as a tool to better the lives of recipients and encourage economic 
prosperity; however, there is much more work to be completed.  Especially important to 
the current situation is to examine the motivations and decisions of the emerging donors 
compared to the DAC.  As I have shown using ordinal payoff matrices, it is common-
sensical that each party (recipient or donor) will make a decision based on their own 
preferences and expected payoffs.  Such examination can show when and how recipients 
react to these donors’ offers and provide insight to the DAC about how they should 
respond to this new state of affairs to best encourage economic growth.  The following 
chapter details institutional factors that affect economic growth and explains how these 
factors can interact with foreign aid receipts to influence economic growth.   
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Chapter Five:  Literature Review of Institutional Variables 
 
Introduction 
 While Chapter Three examined classical variables that have been shown to 
influence economic growth, this chapter discusses institutional variables that have been 
added to the literature since the 1990s.  Forty years ago, Friedman (1962) argued that 
political and economic freedoms were mutually reinforcing, as democratic institutions 
keep a check on governmental power and the rent-seeking of rulers, and Lipset 
hypothesized (1959) that increases in the standard of living lead to a rise in democracy.  
However, the empirical analysis involving these concepts was scarce until the past two 
decades, likely due to poor data collection and availability.  However, with recent 
increases in computing ability and information access via the Internet, the analysis of 
such factors has quickly added to the economic growth literature.  The factors discussed 
in this chapter have transitioned from theoretical suppositions into testable hypotheses. 
 
Measuring Political and Economic Freedom  
A major form of diversion of resources from consumption and investment in an 
economy is corruption.  Corruption can hinder economic performance in many ways.  
This might occur through the waste of resources, investment distortions, diverting capital 
to unproductive sectors, decreasing funding for public education, and lowering the 
returns to human capital.  Rose-Ackerman (1999) discusses three broad types of corrupt 
practices that involve public servants.  First, there are bribes to expedite services to which 
citizens are legally entitled, including services such as telephone line installation.  While 
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these payments are argued by some to be economically efficient, Rose-Ackerman argues 
that these payments ingrain corruption into the culture and waste resources.  Following 
the economically efficient argument, if these payments do signal higher willingness-to-
pay by some, these fees should be made legal and regulated if they are truly acting as 
market-clearing mechanisms.  Secondly, there are payoffs that are made to reduce costs 
to citizens.  However, the reduction in costs is usually limited to a specific group of 
citizens while the costs are spread over the general populace.  An example of this would 
be a payoff given to a bureaucrat in an environmental agency to change or block a 
regulation that will benefit a specific company or industry.  While the profit benefits will 
be concentrated, the costs of pollution will be widespread.  However, if the country’s 
regulations are excessive, payments to circumvent them can be argued to increase 
efficiency.  In this case, Rose-Ackerman argues that the industry should lobby to change 
the regulation and the law and not allow efficiency arguments to justify corrupt practices.  
Finally, the author discusses illegal businesses that pay officials to protect the business 
from prosecution.  These businesses may be drug cartels or polluting companies that pay 
off police, prosecutors, or regulatory officials.  The economic distortions created by these 
businesses are highest when they dominate legal businesses by creating an environment 
of violence and uncertainty.  While each type of corrupt practice introduces specific and 
differing distortions into a country’s economy, perhaps, the most damaging result of 
corruption is the resulting perception of an overall illegitimate government.   
 The relationship between economic growth and democracy has proven to be more 
complicated than growth’s relationship with corruption.  In “Political Regimes and 
Economic Growth,” Przeworski and Limongi (1993) discuss the arguments concerning 
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that of regime type and economic growth.  The authors then perform a meta-analysis of 
eighteen studies that have examined the effects of regime type on economic growth (An 
interesting alternative meta-analysis might examine the effects of economic growth on 
regime type.)  Recent literature posits that one mechanism through which democratic 
regimes encourage economic growth is through securing property rights.  The argument 
for secure property rights being necessary for economic growth is simple to follow and 
discussed at length in North (1990):  if a sovereign can alter property rights for personal 
benefit, the expected returns on investment will decrease, as will the likelihood of 
investment.  The logic follows that this is less likely to occur in a democracy because the 
ruler will be voted out by an unhappy populace (Olson, 1991).   
 Another aspect of the democracy and economic growth relationship concerns how 
democracy affects consumption.  As discussed by Huntington and Dominguez (1975), 
democracy causes immediate consumption to occur at the cost of investment, which 
hinders future economic growth.  The logic of this argument follows that a populace 
values consumption today over consumption tomorrow, and with universal suffrage, the 
poor will vote for redistribution mechanisms that will move money from investment to 
consumption, leading to decreased economic growth.  While consumption does have 
immediate positive effects on economic growth, increased consumption levels translate to 
decreased investment levels.  And, without long-term investments in education and 
infrastructure, the economic growth of a nation will suffer.  On the other side of the 
political regime for this argument, a dictator can force the poor to stay in poverty 
(therefore, continuing investment by cutting current consumption) without fears of being 
ousted from power.  This investment may be beneficial for future generations that can 
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reap the benefits of long-term investments, but is not advantageous for the current 
poverty-stricken citizenry.   
 The final argument concerning the differences for how regime type affects 
economic growth concerns the effects of dictatorships insulating their countries from 
particularistic pressures.  The regimes of the Asian Tigers and many Latin American 
countries are illustrated by this incredible state autonomy.  For example, the economic 
growth of the Asian Tigers occurred due to the ability of the government to pursue their 
economic policies without succumbing to pressures from market influences, unions, or 
interest groups.  However, the opposing argument is that some dictators use this state 
autonomy for their own benefit and that only democracies are able to constrain predatory 
rulers through the election process (North, 1990).   
 The meta-analysis (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) includes eighteen studies 
concerning regime type and economic growth and the twenty-one conclusions of these 
studies indicated that democracy promoted economic growth more than authoritarianism 
eight times, the opposite was found eight times, and five findings indicated no difference.  
Przeworski and Limongi posit that many of these studies were rife with econometric 
difficulties that rendered their conclusions invalid, and they urge more work to be done to 
answer the question of how regime type affects economic growth.   
 Citing this seminal work by Przeworski and Limongi, Barro (1996) looks to 
examine the relationship between democracy and economic growth by examining data 
from one hundred countries from 1960 to 1990 with the growth rates of real per-capita 
GDP over time periods as a dependent variable, and previously discussed variables like 
human capital, initial GDP, black market premiums, longevity, and democracy as the 
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explanatory variables.  The democracy variable is measured on a scale developed by 
Gastil (1987) and ranges from one to seven.  The regression indicates that countries with 
low economic development do not sustain democracy, and countries with moderate levels 
of democracy experience the highest economic growth.  While Barro concludes that 
democracy’s overall effect on economic growth is weakly negative, many variables that 
increase with democracy (human capital, property rights and free markets) increase 
economic growth.  The takeaway point of the study is that while democracy may not be 
the absolute key to economic growth, exporting Western economic principles may 
effectively promote democracy.   
Barro’s thoughts that the causality between economic and political freedom may 
run both ways leads to the piece “Democracy and Economic Growth:  A Historical 
Perspective” (Gerring, et. al., 2005).  The authors begin by citing previous findings that 
while democracy has been found to have a negative or null effect on economic growth, 
democracy does have positive indirect effects.  Additionally, their data show that while 
most rich countries in the world are democratic, the direction of causality is unclear.  
While many articles look at recent levels of democracy to explain economic growth, 
Gerring, et. al. contend that democracy should be viewed as a stock variable (measured at 
one point in time but developed over time)—as democracy and authoritarianism often 
extend decades or centuries.  This stock variable can be seen as political capital and can 
increase economic growth through economic policies and efficient bureaucracies.  The 
authors continue to argue that through the institutionalization of democratic policies and 
the learning that occurs during the democratic experience, long-lived democracies may 
better generate political capital than new democracies and authoritarian regimes.  Using a 
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polity score, the authors are able to capture how institutionalized a country’s authority 
patterns are, measured by checks on executive power, how an executive is selected, and 
the form of political competition.   To arrive at the stock measurement, the authors add 
each country’s polity score from 1900 to present, with an annual one percent depreciation 
rate.  Using the level of democracy, the authors find no effect on economic growth.   
However, when using the stock of democracy and other explanatory variables 
(longevity, instability, investment, inflation, and economic policies) to explain economic 
growth, the stock of democracy exerts a positive and significant effect on economic 
growth.  This measure of the stock of democracy seems to be an interesting way of 
combing out effects of regime type that has not been extensively explored.  In examining 
differences between authoritarian regimes and democratic governments, authors began 
noticing that countries with higher levels of natural resources seemed to experience lower 
levels of economic growth than their counterparts without such resources.   
 
Natural Resource Curse 
The idea of an actual natural resource curse really took shape within economic 
development literature as Latin American economies contracted following decreases in 
commodity prices (Sachs and Warner, 2001).  This theory received empirical support 
throughout the 1990s, as researchers found that many countries endowed with natural 
resources, such as oil or minerals, experience lower levels of economic growth than 
countries without—even when controlling for other variables (Auty, 1990 and Sachs and 
Warner, 1995).  In fact, as discussed in Doppelhofer et al. (2000), of the countries with 
high levels of exports of natural resources as a percent of their GDP in 1970, none had 
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high levels of economic growth in the following twenty years.  Recent research has 
begun identifying the mechanisms of how an abundance of natural resources can 
negatively affect economic growth.   
Sachs and Warner (2001), found that high levels of natural resource exportation 
increases a country’s price levels, which in turn make other industries less competitive 
domestically.  Therefore, aside from the natural resource exports, not much else is 
exported, resulting in an export economy dependent on the natural resource  Additionally, 
as discussed in Gylfason (2000), high wages in the natural resource sector (implying 
dangerous work conditions) could crowd out innovation and entrepreneurship in the 
country as workers obtain high rewards from working in this sector.  These high wages 
also reduce the returns to schooling in these countries.   
Finally, as discussed in Escaping the Resource Curse, (Humphreys, Sachs, and 
Stiglitz, 2007), in countries exporting high levels of natural resources, the fiscal social 
contract between government and citizens in which citizens pay for the government 
through taxes, and therefore, the government has a responsibility to the citizenry’s 
demands is breeched.  Revenues from the natural resources allow officials to run the 
government how they deem fit.  The government receives their power from the 
companies paying for their resources and is able to run a kelptocracy within the country.  
Auty (2000) also discusses that in resource-abundant economies, it is easy for 
government officials to engage in rent-seeking and corruption to siphon gains from 
natural resource exports.  As discussed in the previous section, corruption could be a 
contributing culprit for causing lower economic growth.   
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However, as discussed in recent works such as Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 
(2006) and Hodler (2006), the natural resource curse is able to be broken.  In “Institutions 
and the Resource Curse,” Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) point out that some 
countries with natural resource wealth have experienced economic growth, while some 
have not.  In countries with a weak rule of law, a disabled bureaucracy, or corruption, 
resource wealth will divert productive resources into rent-seeking activities.  Using 
institutional quality measures, the authors find that the combination of weak institutions 
and resource abundance cause low levels or even negative economic growth.  Following 
this vein, in “The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries,” Hodler 
(2006), notes that Norway and Botswana have seen great economic growth despite 
natural resource exportations.  The author asserts that the homogeneity of the populace of 
these countries has allowed this growth to be realized.  Using a game-theoretic model, the 
authors find that the more fractionalized (using the ELF score) a country, the more 
fighting will occur over the real and potential natural resource profits.  Such fighting 
between ethnic groups results in weakened property rights, overall uncertainty, and 
increased rent-seeking by government officials, all which negatively influence economic 
growth.  As noted in Svensson (2000), these effects can be found from the windfalls of 
natural resource exports and foreign aid.   
 
Institutional Variables in Economic Growth 
Following from the general arguments of economic and political freedoms, there 
are many country-specific factors that have been found to influence economic growth.  
These factors have become explanatory variables in the growth equation including 
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economic policy indicators and civil liberties and will be discussed in that order.  
Inclusion of economic policy indicators followed from findings that countries closed off 
to world trade have not experienced the levels of economic growth that open countries 
realized.  Specifically, Sachs and Warner (1995) developed a dummy variable to account 
for the openness of a country, using data concerning industry protection, tariffs, and 
quotas.  Following the neo-classical model, the theoretical supposition to justify use of 
the openness to trade variable is that economies with fewer distortions should have higher 
economic growth.  Trade restrictions may discourage economic growth through several 
mechanisms such as by providing domestic firms with protection from outside 
competition, resulting in an inefficient use of resources—if competition was allowed, the 
country with the restriction would not necessarily be able to supply the good at a lower 
cost than available through importation and would choose to allocate its resources in a 
more market-efficient manner11
The following variables have been found to be significant in some studies and 
were included in the policy index found in the seminal empirical piece, “Aid, Policies, 
and Growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), but their significance is dependent on model 
specification.  These variables are macroeconomic indicators that have been found to 
correlate with growth and include the black market premium, inflation, and the share of 
exports in GDP.  The share of exports in GDP is correlated with economic growth, as an 
increased amount of exports brings non-domestic money into the country—if this money 
is not spent on imported goods.  The theoretical argument for these macro-level variables 
is straight-forward and intuitive:  higher inflation and black market premiums are 
.   
                                                          
11 However, countries do maintain certain industries for reasons other than efficiency.  For example, some 
industries that provide defense intelligence capabilities in the United States are given protection from 
competition as a matter of national security.   
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correlated with lower growth.  These variables may affect economic growth through 
increasing uncertainty in the macro-economy, which discourages future investment in 
various ways.  Extreme inflation discourages investment and encourages immediate 
consumption because money will be worth less tomorrow than it is today.  Black market 
premiums indicate a large black market and may be the result of overly stringent trade or 
currency restrictions or price controls often used by governments to ineffectively deal 
with inflation.  A large black market generally provides higher returns to investors than 
regular markets—providing incentives to trade there.   
 Another subset of measures in this category of economic policy variables includes 
variance in money supply, investment share of GDP, and population growth.    Increased 
variance in the money supply in the short-term correlates with lower economic growth, as 
it may indicate meddlesome governmental policies that can create distortions in the 
money market.  These distortions cause expectations of monetary policy within the 
country to vary—making investors unsure and causing overall output to decrease.  
Investment share of GDP is theoretically argued to be positively associated with per-
capita GDP growth, as a larger share toward investment is argued to increase capital and 
promote future growth.  And, in “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions,” Levine and Renelt (1992) find empirically that a larger share of investment 
in GDP is correlated with higher per-capita GDP growth.  Also, the average annual 
population growth is associated with two theoretical arguments that may cancel each 
other out.  First, a high population growth may lead to lower growth in real per-capita 
GDP growth, as more people drain the economic resources of the country.  However, a 
higher population can support more production, thus, having a positive effect on per-
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capita GDP.  The findings concerning the influence of population growth on per-capita 
GDP, and vice versa, have been mixed (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990; Barro, 
1991; Levine and Renelt, 1991).   
Other measures in this such as social and political instability, probability of 
opposition group takeover, instability of labor, bureaucracy and red tape, and corruption 
are all theoretically argued to decrease economic growth.  Also, as discussed earlier, 
extreme regulations create distortions that encourage use of the black market.  Social and 
political instability may discourage this growth through the mechanism of creating unsure 
expectations for investors.  For example, a multinational corporation would be hesitant to 
finance a long-term investment in a country that may experience political turmoil and 
nationalize the corporation’s investment, quickly alter the tax structure, or change the 
industry’s regulations, causing unpredictable changes in the project’s profitability.  
Additionally, bureaucracy and red tape can act as deterrents to obtaining permits and 
licenses necessary for new investments.   
Further, fiscal policy indicators are measures such as the deficit as a percentage of 
GDP, the percentage of government expenditures of GDP, the growth rate of government 
expenditures, and their influence on economic growth is somewhat contested.  On one 
hand, high levels of these fiscal policy measures may indicate that governments are 
mitigating the disparity between private and social costs by providing growth-inducing 
services.  For example, a large government sector that has a high percentage of 
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP may be investing in expensive 
infrastructure or new schools that will benefit the future economy.   However, on the 
other hand, a high percentage of government expenditures could indicate a corrupt 
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government that is funneling tax revenue into private pockets or awarding over-priced 
contracts for unneeded (or poorly constructed and short-lived) infrastructure to political 
supporters.   
 
Conclusion 
 The literature concerning institutional quality and economic growth has 
dramatically increased in the past thirty years.  In fact, there is such an expansive 
literature in the realm of institutional quality and economic growth, a meta-analysis has 
been conducted to discuss the differences in findings of varying works (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam, 2005).  Some authors prefer to develop an index of institutional or 
governmental indicators by which to measure the efficiency, while some borrow others’ 
indices and add variables they assert to be relevant.  Specifications and data may vary 
across analyses, but the literature suggests comparable conclusions:  regardless of aid 
status or the presence of natural resources, countries with good governance and efficient 
institutions have higher economic growth than countries without.   
However measured, these factors are significant in the policy environment of 
foreign aid.  As previously discussed, in countries with very weak institutions and/or 
ethnic fractionalizaion, foreign aid has been found to decrease economic growth.  
Additionally, research suggests that tying aid to improvements in a recipient country’s 
institutions or changing restricted aid to unrestricted aid based on improvements in 
policies could increase economic growth.  However, as also noted, the level of 
fractionalization within a country has been shown to increase corruption when the 
country receives windfalls from foreign aid or natural resource exports.  As literature in 
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this vein increases, perhaps policy-makers can look to this research to adjust the 
composition of foreign aid as to encourage good institutions and economic growth or to 
apply different levels of restrictions based on the fractionalization of the populace or the 
strength of local institutions.  The following chapter develops a specification to test the 
relationships of corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth and reports results of the 
analysis. 
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Chapter Six:  Estimating Effects of Corruption and Foreign Aid 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter showcases the analyses examining the role that corruption levels and 
foreign aid play in a country’s economic growth and growth in longevity.  This 
dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature by using a more encompassing 
measurement of corruption to explain economic growth than previous studies in this area 
have.  Also, this dissertation adds to the literature that uses a combined quantity- and 
quality- of-life measure to capture gains that are not realized solely through economic 
growth but also through longevity increases.  The following section summarizes existing 
literature that analyzes the relationship between economic growth and corruption levels.  
Following this discussion, the data and methodology of specification are discussed, 
results are presented, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of findings and future 
avenues for research.     
 
Institutions and Economic Growth 
 In “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” Burnside and Dollar (2000) examine relationships 
between economic policies, foreign aid, and the growth of per-capita GDP.  The authors 
begin by discussing previous findings that foreign aid has not increased growth rates 
overall but that growth is conditional on the economic policies of the receiving country.  
This is explained analytically in that foreign aid is an income transfer to a recipient and 
has different effects based on how the transfer is used.  Previous literature has shown that 
when aid is consumed, rather than invested, it will not benefit development (Barro, 1991 
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and Boone, 1995).  However, as Burnside and Dollar discuss, the likelihood that aid will 
be invested, as well as how productive the investment will be, depends on specific 
policies of the country.  From here, the authors hypothesize that economies with fewer 
distortions will realize greater aid effectiveness.   
Using data spanning fifty-six countries over six four-year time periods from 1970-
1973 through 1990-1993 from the World Bank, the authors use the sum of grants and 
concessional loans to a country as their measure of foreign aid in 1985 U.S. dollars.  With 
data concerning the budget surplus, inflation rate, and a dummy variable of trade 
openness, an index of policies is developed.  Following previous literature, the authors 
include this index, initial per-capita GDP, aid receipts relative to GDP, a vector of 
political and institutional variables (such as the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score and 
frequency of assassinations), dummy regional variables and fixed-time effects to capture 
the business cycles as explanatory variables to estimate a regression with per-capita real 
GDP growth as the dependent variable.  Upon running the regression, it is found that the 
policy index has a significant and positive effect on per-capita real GDP growth.  The 
authors then estimate the same regression using only low-income countries—countries 
with a real per-capita GDP below $1,900 and find similar results. 
Additionally, the authors estimate an equation to explain the receipt of aid by a 
specific country and find (consistent with previous literature) that donors direct aid to 
low-income countries, small countries receive more aid, and donors give aid based on 
their own strategic interests.  However, controlling for this, the authors do not find that 
having strong institutional policies results in more aid received.  Additionally, an 
equation for government consumption as a share of GDP is estimated; it is found that 
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bilateral aid has a strong positive impact on consumption—suggesting that this aid is 
fungible.  Following aid theory, while this kind of aid increases government 
expenditures, it has no effect on growth.   
Following this vein of research that examines how the policies of aid-receiving 
countries affect their growth, there has been much research as to which specific policies 
have the greatest effect on recipients’ growth.  In “Corruption and Growth,” Mauro 
(1995) begins by discussing the problems weak government institutions pose for 
investment, and that an efficient judicial system is needed to enforce contracts, property 
rights are necessary to encourage any investment, and efficient bureaucracies are needed 
to ensure timely licensing.  In this paper, the author sets forth to measure how the 
efficiency of government institutions affect economic growth.   
Using data from Business International (BI) from 1980-1983, which rates 
perceptions of corruption, red tape, and judicial system efficiency from seventy countries, 
Mauro discusses how these institutional factors affect economic growth and the 
magnitude of these effects.  In this corruption index, the following measures are used to 
form an overall score for each country:  institutional political change, social political 
instability, probability of opposition group takeover, instability of labor, relationships 
with neighboring countries, terrorism, bureaucracy and red tape, and corruption.  
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, all of these measures are positively-correlated.   
Before estimating a regression, the author discusses the issue of endogeneity 
between government institutions and economic variables; when rating a country, the BI 
correspondents’ ratings of institutional efficiency may be influenced by the country’s 
economic performance, or economic performance may affect institutional efficiency.  
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Mauro argues that other measures such as lagged initial levels of corruption or political 
instability would not be valid instruments, as these variables are highly auto-correlated.  
In the quest for an appropriate instrument, a previous study by Canning and Fay (1993) in 
which the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) measure is used as a proxy for political 
stability is cited.  The ELF score used here was constructed in 1960 and represents the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a specific country will not be in 
the same ethnolinguistic group—the higher the score, the more fractionalized the country.  
Assuming that the ELF score of a country is exogenous and does not affect a country’s 
economic performance except through its influence on institutional efficiency, Mauro 
chooses it as an instrumental variable.  Despite a formal specification test that fails to 
reject the hypothesis that the ELF score is an appropriate instrumental variable, Mauro 
cautions that there might be a lack of long-run exogeneity—there may be an 
immeasurable factor that affected the ELF of a country and is affecting its economic 
variables.  However, with this note of caution, Mauro moves on to the estimation.       
Using OLS, and controlling for initial GDP, education measures, and political 
instabilities, Mauro finds a negative and significant relationship between corruption and 
investment rate.  The author then estimates the same regression using the growth rate of 
per-capita GDP as the dependent variable.  Following these estimates, the author explains 
that bureaucratic inefficiency affects growth directly and indirectly; directly by 
misallocating investment into undeserving sectors and indirectly through lowering the 
investment rate.  Additionally, corruption lowers the private marginal product of capital.  
The paper is concluded with the real-world example that if Bangladesh would reduce its 
corruption levels to that of Uruguay (a difference of one standard-deviation in the index), 
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its annual per-capita GDP growth rate would increase by more than half a percentage 
point.   
While Mauro’s empirical findings follow theory very closely, I think that the 
argument and findings would carry more weight if the corruption index encompassed 
more than three years, rated more countries, and was from a more reputable reporting 
agency.  However, the use of a corruption score is novel in the literature of this area and 
makes for much simpler data collection and analysis than that of other literature that 
includes dozens of institutional indicators.  Adding to the literature, in “Foreign Aid, 
Political Corruption, and Economic Growth,” Xu (2009) develops a study that includes 
data with more countries and more encompassing measures over a longer period of time 
than Mauro.    
In this article, Xu equates corruption with institutional quality and asks the 
question, is foreign aid’s effectiveness contingent upon the recipients’ corruption level?  
The theoretical debate behind this question follows from conflicting previous literature:  
some literature argues that aid increases investment in productive sectors of the 
recipient’s economy, while some argues that aid simply increases state consumption and 
payments to elites (Easterly 2003).  The argument that corruption can hinder economic 
performance in numerous ways has been discussed at length in previous chapters.   
To answer the research question, Xu estimates a regression using data from the 
previously discussed Burnside and Dollar (2000) article, with an additional time period 
that covers sixty-two countries over seven four-year periods ranging from 1970-1973 to 
1994-1997.  Average growth of per-capita GDP in each of the four-year periods is the 
dependent variable.  Explanatory variables in this model include the ratio of aid to GDP 
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(all in real 1985 U.S. dollars as in Burnside and Dollar), the corruption index from the 
International Country Risk Guide (somewhat like the Business International index used 
by Mauro but includes more years and countries), and an interactive variable between aid 
and GDP.  Control variables used here are mostly the same as in previous studies:  the 
recipient’s macroeconomic policy index, level of M2 as a fraction of GDP, initial per-
capita GDP, political and institutional indices, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score 
(as constructed in 1960), and regional (for East Asia and Africa) and time dummies.   
Xu finds that the economic policy index and initial GDP positively affect growth.  
As a human capital measure was not included, it is not surprising that convergence was 
not found.  While corruption statistically significantly affects GDP growth negatively, 
there is no evidence that corruption levels affect the receipt of foreign aid.  However, 
adding support to the argument that aid may augment corruption, the author finds that 
receiving foreign aid negatively affects growth.   Findings concerning the interaction of 
aid and GDP are not significant.  In the discussion, it is noted that decreasing corruption 
within a country may lead to more efficient institutional and economic policies, which, in 
turn, lead to a more efficient use of foreign aid and higher growth rates.   
 
Dependent Variables 
In the data analysis, I perform multiple analyses with two dependent variables.  In 
the original analysis, per-capita GDP growth as a percentage is the dependent variable.  
In addition to this measure, I have also searched for a dependent variable that captures 
improvements in longevity and economic growth.  The Human Development Index 
(HDI) seemed like a fair contender for the use as such a dependent variable.  This index 
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was developed by the United Nations and takes into account per-capita GDP, longevity, 
and a measure that includes both the literacy rate and enrollment in schools in a nation at 
a given time.12
 
   The gist of the inclusion of longevity is that improvements in global 
well-being in the last fifty years have not solely been realized through economic growth.  
An increased life expectancy for much of the world’s population has also been grasped.  
As this index is only publicly-available for eleven years from 1980 to the present, 
analysis would have been limited to those years.  Additionally, as discussed in “The 
Human Development Index:  Yet Another Redundant Composite Development 
Indicator?” McGillivray (1991) determines that the index is flawed as it is positively 
correlated with each component variables.  I heeded this warning, and continued the 
search for a dependent variable that measures both economic growth (measured by per-
capita GDP) and longevity (life expectancy at birth) but leaves out the measure of 
education that is included in the HDI.  Following Pandey and Nathwani (1996), I choose 
an indicator called the Life Quality Indicator that was discussed in Chapter Three and is 
created from the expression: 
Life Quality Indicator = (Per-Capita GDP) w * (Life Expectancy) 1-w 
 
In which w is the time spent producing output, and 1-w is all other time.  These 
ratios follow findings from Lind et al. (1992), in which the authors strive to quantify the 
accrual of benefits expected from ensuring health and safety for the public.  In much 
work from 1992-2006 by the authors that pioneered this index, Lind, Pandey, and 
                                                          
12 For future work using the HDI, note that after 2011, a different calculation will be used.  The education 
portion of the index will be calculated by estimating the number of years a five-year-old can expect to 
spend in school.   
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Nathwani, the ratios used were 1/6 and 5/6.  However, in Pandey et al. (2006), this ratio 
is found to differ across countries.  In the United States, 1/5 and 4/5 are more accurate 
ratios, while the original ratios were very accurate for Europe.  However, the sensitivity 
to changes in the ratios is mathematically insignificant, so I will use the original ratios for 
all countries across all years.  As discussed by Sen (2001), it is necessary to include both 
economic growth and longevity growth in this measure because, in some countries, one 
lags behind the other and the order depends on the country.  Including both measures in 
this variable will allow for a more inclusive analysis.  Examples of Life Quality scores I 
have computed of selected countries are shown below: 
 
Table 6.1:  Life Quality Scores of Selected Countries in 2000 
 
Country Life Quality Score 
United Arab Emirates 254.43 
Australia 243.61 
Brazil 154.99 
United Kingdom 246.83 
China 119.58 
United States 260.96 
Russia 126.47 
 
In Pandey and Nathwani (1996), the authors use this Life Quality Indicator to 
examine the societal willingness to pay for increased longevity in Canada.  Using the 
same model, I develop an index to compare the quality and quantity of life by country 
over time.  Following longevity literature that gains are not realized solely through 
economic growth, I hypothesize that Life Quality growth will be better explained by the 
explanatory variables than per-capita GDP growth.  
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Also, like Xu, I aim to look at effects of corruption on economic growth.  
However, I use more recent data and a more objective report of corruption.  Unlike the 
measures used by Xu and Mauro that only take into account a few measures of corruption 
within a country; in this dissertation, corruption is quantified using Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2011) that measures the perceived level of 
public-sector corruption by averaging thirteen different expert and business surveys.  As 
discussed in Transparency International’s Our History (2013), Transparency International 
was founded began as a small organization in 1993 and has expanded its offerings and 
data collection every year.   
I assert that this measure replaces the need of an index of institutional measures as 
the questions in this survey concern many of the variables often included in an 
institutional index.  This encompassing dataset has been compiled since 1993, providing 
more years of information than other corruption indices and is publicly available.  The 
Corruption Perceptions Index score ranges from one to ten:  with one indicating 
perceptions of a country with very high corruption and ten indicating the opposite.  
However, in this dissertation, I have reversed the scoring, as it is very confusing that a 
low level of corruption was indicated with a score of ten.  Therefore, a score of one on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index in this dissertation is a country with a low level of 
corruption.  Below are examples of Corruption Perceptions Index scores of selected 
countries in 2000: 
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Table 6.2:  Corruption Perceptions Index Score of Selected Countries in 2000 
 
Country Corruption Perceptions Index Score 
India 8.2 
Australia 2.7 
Brazil 7.1 
United Kingdom 2.3 
China 7.9 
United States 3.2 
Russia 8.9 
 
Following previous findings concerning other corruption indices, I expect to find 
that high corruption scores negatively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth. 
Additionally, I look at much more recent time period than the previous studies.  Data 
from the World Bank (2007) shows that since 1993, foreign aid has dramatically 
declined, so using more recent data could provide insight to the current aid situation.   
1998 Per-capita GDP will be the initial level of GDP, as 1998 was a stable year 
with respect to economic activities and reliable data is available—making it an 
appropriate base year.  As discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), the theoretical 
argument for including the initial level of GDP in a growth regression is that, following 
the model of convergence, countries with a lower level of initial GDP should experience 
faster growth compared to countries that have already reached high levels of growth13
                                                          
13As discussed in Solow (1956), the idea of convergence comes from an exogenous growth model based on 
neo-classical assumptions.  The theory follows that, in countries with similar institutions and factors like 
savings rates and population growth, poor countries should experience higher levels of per-capita GDP 
growth.  This higher growth is attributable to both lower diminishing returns to capital in capital-poor 
developing countries and the replication of technology already available in developed countries.   
.  
However, as found in Barro’s seminal article, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of 
Countries” (1991), and discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), evidence has only 
supported conditional convergence—indicating that poor countries grow faster than rich 
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countries, only if a human capital measurement is controlled for in the explanation of 
GDP growth.  As I control for a human capital measure, I expect to find that a lower 
initial per-capita GDP from 1998 will positively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality 
growth. 
The initial 1998 per-capita GDP and net bilateral aid levels used in this 
dissertation are from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset (2012) and are in 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  The measure of foreign aid used as an explanatory variable is 
a ratio of net bilateral aid per year to GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars).  This measure 
is useful because it scales aid levels within a country’s economy.  In this dataset, per-
capita GDP growth, the aid ratio, and corruption levels from 1999-2010 for all countries 
that data is available for is used.  Corruption levels are available for all countries for at 
least one year, with most countries having corruption scores for at least one year before 
2006, and many countries having all years from 2008 to the present. Following previous 
discussions concerning the appropriate measure of human capital to use in development 
studies, I use the percentage of females enrolled in secondary school.   
Upon conducting my own formal specification test to determine if the ELF score 
is an appropriate instrumental, I find that it is not.  As a result, unlike Mauro, I use the 
ethnolinguistic frationalization (ELF) score not as an instrumental variable but as an 
explanatory variable.  Previous literature such as Schleifer and Vishney (1993) has found 
that the more fractionalized a country, the less institutionally efficient it is—with the 
argument being that more heterogeneity makes it difficult to agree on institutions, as well 
as, increases the likelihood of corruption (bribes, special treatment, etc.).  I utilize the 
most recent ELF score based on countries’ populations in 1985.  The ELF score ranges 
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from zero to one:  with zero indicating a homogeneous population and one being a 
heterogeneous population.  The expectation for this estimation is that a high ELF score 
will negatively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth. 
 
Data 
I have compiled a dataset that includes these proposed variables from the World 
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance data released by the World 
Bank on May 7, 2012.  This data includes 248 countries, regions, and subcategories of 
income levels.  The dates of available data are dependent on the country.  Data from 
many countries are available for the post-1998 time period examined in this study.  All 
monetary data are inflation-adjusted and are in constant U.S. dollars.  Countries that did 
not receive aid in one year will be included in the analysis as having received zero 
percent of their GDP as aid.  Countries that are missing Corruption scores or aid statistics 
will not be included in the analysis for the year that data is missing.  Below a table listing 
and describing the variables is presented. 
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Table 6.3:  Description of Variables 
 
Variables Description 
Per-capita GDP growth The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from 
year t to year t+1 
Life Quality Growth The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a 
country from year t to t+1 
Corruption The Corruption score given by Transparency 
International 
Aid The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that 
country’s GDP 
ELF The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score  
Initial GDP The per-capita GDP in 1998 
Interaction  Aid * Corruption 
Human Capital  On a scale of 100, the secondary schooling rates of 
females 
Oil Country A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil 
producers. 
Population The natural log of the population of a country 
 
  
For illustrative purposes, the summary statistics for these variables are found 
below: 
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Table 6.4:  Summary Statistics14
 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Per-Capita 
GDP Growth 
  9044       0.020         0.056  -0.5029       0.925 
Life Quality 
Growth 
  8345       0.015         0.032  -1        0.388 
Corruption   1726       6.754         2.246    1       10.6 
Aid   9308       0.038         0.081   -0.029         2.416 
Initial GDP   2912 6932.7      10728.11 105.910 70151.55 
Interaction   3028       0.146         0.470    -0.053         8.858 
Human Capital   1570     65.813       26.896     0.929     100 
Oil Country 12240       0.041         0.199     0         1 
Population 12125     15.490         2.765     8.716       22.654 
 
 
Estimation and Results 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the relationships between 
corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth.  Additionally, I would like to explore the 
role that corruption plays, specifically in non-rich countries, as these are typically the 
countries that receive ODA.  Based on results from previous studies, I predict that, 
controlling for other factors, countries with high corruption scores will have lower 
economic growth than countries with lower corruption scores.  In this same vein, I expect 
that non-rich countries with lower levels of corruption should experience more economic 
growth than countries with higher levels of corruption.  A secondary objective of this 
study is to examine the interaction between foreign aid, corruption, and economic 
                                                          
14 Many reviewers expressed curiosity concerning the country that received the maximum datapoint of Aid 
at 240% of its GDP in foreign aid receipts.  This occurred in Palau, a small Pacific island, in 1994, the year 
that the United Nations trusteeship of the island ended, and the country States entered into the Compact of 
Free Association with the United States, wherein, the U.S. would provide aid in return for Palau furnishing 
military facilities (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008.) 
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growth.  I posit that countries with higher corruption levels and higher foreign aid 
receipts (as a percentage of GDP) will experience less economic growth than countries 
with comparable corruption levels and less foreign aid receipts or lower corruption levels 
and comparable foreign aid receipts.  To quantify this expectation, I have developed an 
interaction variable that uses corruption levels and aid levels by year for each country.  
Finally, I also expect similar results substituting Life Quality growth for economic 
growth.   
Initially, I estimated the following econometric model to test the relationship 
between economic and Life Quality growth, corruption levels, and foreign aid: 
  
Growth = Constant + b1ELF + b2Corruption + b3Initial GDP + b4Human Capital + 
b5Aid +b6Aid*Corruption + b7Oil Country + b8Population, 
 
wherein the average per-capita GDP growth and Life Quality growth of a country is a 
function of the ELF score (ELF), the corruption level, the initial 1998 per-capita GDP, 
human capital, aid receipts as a percentage of GDP, an interaction of aid and corruption, 
the population of the country and whether or not this country is a top-ten global oil 
producer.  When the coefficient on the ELF score is negative, it follows theory that a 
higher level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization decreases economic growth and growth 
of the Life Quality score.  When the coefficient on the corruption score is negative, it 
follows that countries with low levels of corruption have increased economic growth and 
growth of the Life Quality measure.  A negative coefficient on the initial level of GDP 
indicates the theory of conditional convergence is being supported, and a positive 
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coefficient for aid indicates that aid increases economic growth and the growth of the 
Life Quality score.  A negative coefficient on the interaction variable indicates countries 
with a higher combination of corruption scores and aid receipts experience lower 
economic growth and Life Quality growth than countries with a lower combination.  
And, a negative coefficient on the oil country variable indicates the presence of the 
resource curse.  The results of the analysis for all countries and years with data available 
are shown below: 
 
Table 6.5:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
Corruption 0.003  
  (0.002) 
ELF -0.005 
   (0.008) 
Initial GDP           -0.0000007* 
          (0.0000003) 
Aid -0.621 
   (0.497) 
Aid*Corruption  0.083 
   (0.063) 
Human Capital          0.0004*** 
     (0.0001) 
Population -0.001 
   (0.001) 
Oil Country -0.009 
  (0.007) 
Constant  0.009 
  (0.024) 
  
Observations 818 
R-squared 0.072 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
88 
 
These results indicate that in explaining economic growth, the initial income and 
human capital measurement of secondary school enrollment of females are the only two 
significant findings.  With a negative coefficient for initial income, convergence is seen, 
and with a positive coefficient, this human capital measure is shown to increase economic 
growth.  Additionally, when the level of aid is -.005, the effect of the interaction term is 
zero.   
 Next, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable and the 
interaction term are both zero and the results are below:  
 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =         0.79 
Prob > chi2 =    0.674 
  
 At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and 
the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  1) =         0.02 
Prob > chi2 =    0.9 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
89 
 
 To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the following 
equation: 
 
Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),  
 
to find that the impact of aid is -0.06.  This means that for a given country, an increase in 
one unit of aid will result in a decrease in Per-Capita GDP Growth of 0.06.  For example, 
an increase in aid in Algeria in 2003 from 0.331% of GDP to 100.331% of GDP would be 
associated with a 0.06 decline of GDP from a 5.3% growth rate to a -5.9% growth rate.   
I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:   
 
Corruption and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =                  1.96 
Prob > chi2 =    0.376 
 
And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption 
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Corruption and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =                  1.93 
Prob > chi2 =    0.164 
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Using the converse of the impact of aid equation of: 
 
  Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean 
 of Aid),  
 
I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is 0.006.  The application of 
this would indicate that, in Algeria, in 2003, an increase in the corruption score from 8.4 
to 9.4 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Per-Capita GDP from 
5.3% to 5.91%.   
Next, I performed the same regression analysis for growth of the Life Quality 
measure, with the results below:   
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Table 6.6:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These results show similar findings concerning human capital, however the 
coefficients of the corruption score, aid, and population are also significant.  Contrary to 
my hypotheses, though, coefficients of Corruption and the interaction of Corruption and 
aid are found to be positive.  The coefficient of aid is found to be negative and is not very 
surprising; however, the positive coefficients on the corruption score and interaction term 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
Corruption     0.002*** 
  (0.0008) 
ELF 0.005 
 (0.004) 
Initial GDP         -0.00000007 
        (0.0000001) 
Aid     -0.807*** 
 (0.286) 
Aid*Corruption       0.100*** 
 (0.035) 
Human Capital        0.0002*** 
     (0.00005) 
Population     -0.002*** 
   (0.0005) 
Oil Country -0.0002 
 (0.002) 
Constant  0.016* 
 (0.009) 
  
Observations 814 
R-squared 0.055 
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are puzzling.  Additionally, when the level of aid is -.002, the effect of the interaction 
term is zero.   
 
Furthermore, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:  
 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =    5.07 
Prob > F =         0.007 
  
 At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and 
the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   666) =   10.06 
Prob > F =     0.002 
 
 To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I, again, used the 
following equation: 
 
Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),  
 
to find that the impact of aid is -7.395.  This means that for a given country, an increase 
in one unit of aid will result in a decrease in Life Quality Growth of 7.395.  For example, 
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an increase in aid in Algeria in 2003 from 0.331% of GDP to 100.331% of GDP would be 
associated with a 7.395 decline of Life Quality from a 3.65% growth rate to a -735.85% 
growth rate.   
 I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:   
 
Corruption and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =           1.40 
Prob > F =    0.247 
 
And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption 
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Corruption and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   666) =    0.44 
Prob > F =    0.506 
 
 Using the converse equation of: 
   
 Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean 
 of Aid),  
 
I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is 0.006.  The application of 
this would indicate that, in Algeria, in 2003, an increase in the corruption score from 8.4 
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to 9.4 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Life Quality from 3.65% 
to 4.25%.   
Upon further examination of the data, I found that most of the data on per-capita 
GDP growth was between -.15 and .15 and most of the data concerning Life Quality 
growth was between -.08 and .08.  Results of joint test analyses, impact levels, and fixed 
effects regression analyses of the remaining data subsets are found in the appendix.  In 
the following analysis, I isolated the dependent variables to within these two ranges, 
getting rid of data points in the lowest and highest percentiles, to improve the fit of my 
model and found:   
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Table 6.7:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
Corruption  0.003* 
 (0.002) 
ELF  0.0002 
 (0.008) 
Aid*Corruption 0.021 
  (0.046) 
Initial GDP           -0.0000006* 
           (0.0000003) 
Aid  -0.155 
   (0.390) 
Human Capital           0.0004*** 
     (0.0001) 
Population  -0.002 
    (0.001) 
Oil Country -0.01 
    (0.009) 
Constant    0.015 
    (0.023) 
  
Observations 813 
R-squared    0.079 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While the fit of my model did improve, the only variables found to be significant 
were the corruption score (in the opposite direction than expected), human capital, and 
initial income.  Additionally, when the level of aid is -.019, the effect of the interaction 
term is zero.  Once again, convergence is found and the human capital coefficient is 
positive.   Examining data with Life Quality growth between -.08 and .08, I found: 
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Table 6.8:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data 
 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
Aid*Corruption   0.06** 
 (0.028) 
Corruption       0.002*** 
   (0.0008) 
ELF 0.004 
  (0.004) 
Initial GDP          -0.00000007 
         (0.0000001) 
Aid    -0.465** 
 (0.233) 
Human Capital         0.0002*** 
     (0.00005) 
Population      -0.001*** 
   (0.0005) 
Oil Country   0.0001 
  (0.002) 
Constant  0.012 
  (0.009) 
  
Observations 805 
R-squared  0.046 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The fit was not improved in this analysis, and the significant variables were 
similar to the previous analysis of Life Quality growth.  Again, the direction of the 
coefficient of the Corruption score and the interaction term is unexpected; the 
relationship with aid is negative and with human capital is positive.  Additionally, when 
the level of aid is -.019, the effect of the interaction term is zero.   
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Following these results, I narrowed the data further by only examining countries 
that had a level of 1998 per-capita GDP of $21,100 or less.  This number is higher than 
two standard deviations above the mean, so it excludes countries that were rich in 1998.  
The findings are below:   
 
Table 6.9:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Initial GDP of $21,000 or Less 
 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP growth 
  
Corruption  0.001 
  (0.002) 
ELF -0.004 
  (0.008) 
Initial GDP             -0.000002*** 
           (0.0000005) 
Aid  -0.275 
   (0.388) 
Aid*Corruption   0.037 
   (0.046) 
Human Capital           0.0005*** 
     (0.0001) 
Population    -0.0007 
   (0.001) 
Oil Country  -0.012 
   (0.009) 
Constant 0.01 
 (0.024) 
  
Observations 693 
R-squared 0.084 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 These significant findings indicate convergence and show that human capital has 
a positive coefficient.   Additionally, when the level of aid is -.004, the effect of the 
interaction term is zero.   
 With the same initial per-capita GDP cutoff and an Life Quality growth rate 
between -.08 and .08, I ran the analysis again and found: 
 
Table 6.10:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial 
GDP of $21,000 or Less 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
Corruption   0.002* 
 (0.001) 
ELF 0.003 
  (0.004) 
Initial GDP        -0.0000003 
       (0.0000003) 
Aid    -0.486** 
  (0.234) 
Aid*Corruption      0.063** 
  (0.028) 
Human Capital         0.0002*** 
      (0.00005) 
Population  -0.001* 
   (0.0006) 
Oil Country   0.0006 
  (0.002) 
Constant  0.012 
  (0.011) 
  
Observations 685 
R-squared 0.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 These findings indicate convergence, a positive effect of human capital, a 
negative effect of aid receipts, and, again, positive coefficients on the Corruption score 
and the interaction between the Corruption score and aid.  Additionally, when the level of 
aid is -.004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.   
In the previous analyses, the negative relationship between aid receipts and Life 
Quality growth is common-sensical and may reflect endogeneity, as aid is often directed 
to low-income countries or to countries with public health issues that may cause a 
decreased life expectancy.  The puzzling positive coefficients for these variables could be 
picking up on growth in the short-term resulting from corruption.  This growth would be 
seen by increased consumption caused by funneling tax revenue into private pockets or 
awarding over-priced contracts for unneeded (or poorly constructed and short-lived) 
infrastructure to political supporters.  However, growth in this fashion would not be 
expected to continue into the long-term, as this consumption would crowd out investment 
in future infrastructure.   
 Upon closer examination of my data, it became apparent that the dependent 
variable varies dramatically, while the Corruption score does not change as drastically.  A 
disparity in variances could explain the poor fit of the model to the data, as shown in the 
following equation:   
 
Variance(Y) * (1-r2) 
Variance(B) =    Variance(xj) * (1-rj2) 
 
 
When the large variance in Y is divided by the small variance in x, the variance of 
the coefficient increases—leading the model to not fit the data so well, and, perhaps, 
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explaining the puzzling results of the positive coefficients on the corruption score and 
interaction term variables.   
To examine the relationship between corruption and growth further, using a 
binary variable to indicate positive levels of growth or not, I performed a probit analysis 
to examine the relationship between independent variables and whether a country 
experienced positive growth in per-capita GDP and found:     
 
Table 6.11:  Results of Probit Analysis Examining Positive Per-Capita GDP Growth 
  Positive 
Equation Variables GDP Growth 
   
Positive  Corruption   0.024 
GDP Growth    (0.049) 
 ELF  -0.094 
     (0.246) 
 Initial GDP     -0.000006 
          (0.00001) 
 Aid 17.65 
  (15.23) 
 Human Capital     0.003 
      (0.003) 
 Aid*Corruption    -2.119 
      (1.835) 
 Population     0.018 
      (0.037) 
 Oil Country      -0.403* 
      (0.215) 
 Constant     0.391 
      (0.726) 
   
 Observations 819 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The only significant findings here are that being a top oil country does not lead to 
experiencing positive economic growth.  This analysis does not explain the puzzling 
directionality of the coefficients of the corruption score or the interaction term that 
previous analyses found.  The following shows a comparable probit analysis, with this 
iteration concerned with a positive level of Life Quality growth:   
 
Table 6.12:  Results of Probit Analysis Examining Positive Life Quality Growth 
 
  Positive 
Equation Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
   
Positive ELF -0.066 
Life Quality 
Growth 
 (0.242) 
 Initial GDP       0.000005 
      (0.00001) 
 Aid*Corruption     4.264** 
  (1.798) 
 Human Capital 0.004 
   (0.003) 
 Population -0.057 
    (0.038) 
 Oil Country   0.185 
    (0.237) 
 Corruption   0.067 
     (0.049) 
 Aid   -33.86** 
  (14.54) 
 Constant     1.054 
      (0.716) 
   
 Observations 819 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As shown, the significant finding here is that countries with high levels of aid are 
not experiencing a positive Life Quality.  Also, countries with higher levels of the 
interaction term are experiencing positive Life Quality growth—again contrary to my 
hypothesis.   
 As the findings concerning the corruption score and interaction term variables 
were still puzzling, I began examining the data closer.  While the Corruption score is 
provided across a longer period of time and for more countries than many corruption 
indices, prior to 2006, many countries have only one entry.  Did having many corruption 
score entries prior to 2006 indicate that a country had achieved a certain level of 
development that could be skewing the findings toward higher levels of economic and 
Life Quality growth?  Countries with many scores before 2006 may indicate that they are 
safer or more developed than countries without, leading to a positive coefficient for the 
Corruption variable.  To name a few countries at the beginning of the alphabet, 
Afghanistan, Barbados, Benin, and Burkina Faso had scant data concerning the 
corruption score before 2006.  However, countries such as Argentina, Australia, and 
Bolivia have corruption scores available for every year.  Additionally, as discussed in 
Our History (Transparency International, 2013), Transparency International began 
partnerships with numerous non-governmental organizations and were able to expand the 
scope of their data collection.  With this in mind, I analyzed the data after 2006.  Below 
are the results of a regression analysis using all available data from 2008 forward: 
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Table 6.13:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2008 Forward 
 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
ELF 0.002 
 (0.015) 
Initial GDP         0.0000006 
         (0.0000006) 
Aid*Corruption  -0.223* 
  (0.116) 
Human Capital  -0.0003 
    (0.0002) 
Corruption      0.008** 
  (0.003) 
Aid    1.835* 
  (0.932) 
Population  0.002 
  (0.002) 
Oil Country       -0.033*** 
   (0.011) 
Constant  -0.056 
   (0.045) 
  
Observations 195 
R-squared   0.134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
These findings show a significant and expected sign of the coefficient for the 
interaction variable, despite positive coefficients on both the corruption score and aid.  
Also significant in these findings is the negative coefficient on the variable of oil country.  
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.   
Below are the findings concerning the Life Quality growth rate using all data from 2008 
forward: 
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Table 6.14:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2008 Forward 
 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
ELF       0.018*** 
 (0.006) 
Initial GDP         0.0000004 
          (0.0000003) 
Aid*Corruption -0.12* 
   (0.066) 
Human Capital        -0.0002** 
       (0.00008) 
Corruption       0.004** 
    (0.002) 
Aid      0.936* 
    (0.522) 
Population    -0.0008 
    (0.001) 
Oil Country  -0.005 
   (0.008) 
Constant   0.005 
   (0.023) 
  
Observations 195 
R-squared   0.121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As in the prior table, despite having significant and positive coefficients for aid 
and corruption score, the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient.  
However, the negative coefficient for human capital is a surprising find.  The effects of 
aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.  Exploring the truncated 
samples show similar results:   
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Table 6.15:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data from 2008 Forward  
 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
ELF 0.009 
 (0.012) 
Initial GDP         0.0000005 
         (0.0000006) 
Aid*Corruption  -0.215* 
 (0.115) 
Human Capital  -0.0002 
   (0.0002) 
Corruption     0.007** 
 (0.003) 
Aid   1.740* 
 (0.923) 
Population   0.0009 
  (0.002) 
Oil Country      -0.032*** 
  (0.011) 
Constant -0.043 
   (0.043) 
  
Observations 194 
R-squared 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.  
Similar results are shown in analysis limited to the sample of countries with an initial per-
capita GDP of $21,100 and growth rates between .15 and -.15:   
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Table 6.16:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial 
GDP of $21,000 or Less from 2008 Forward 
 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
ELF 0.008 
 (0.015) 
Initial GDP         0.0000001 
        (0.000001) 
Aid*Corruption -0.21* 
   (0.126) 
Human Capital   -0.0002 
     (0.0002) 
Corruption     0.007* 
   (0.004) 
Aid     1.708* 
 (1.02) 
Population   0.001 
   (0.002) 
Oil Country        -0.034*** 
   (0.013) 
Constant -0.051 
  (0.053) 
  
Observations 168 
R-squared  0.109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.  
Examining the Life Quality growth rates, with a truncated Life Quality sample, the 
findings are similar and below: 
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Table 6.17:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data from 2008 Forward  
 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
ELF       0.018*** 
  (0.006) 
Initial GDP          0.0000004 
       (0.0000003) 
Aid*Corruption -0.12* 
 (0.066) 
Human Capital     -0.0002** 
     (0.00008) 
Corruption     0.004** 
  (0.002) 
Aid    0.936* 
  (0.522) 
Population  -0.0008 
  (0.001) 
Oil Country -0.005 
  (0.008) 
Constant  0.005 
  (0.023) 
  
Observations 195 
R-squared  0.121 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.  And, 
the results of the analysis including data from the truncated and initial GDP under 
$21,100 subset do not show much concerning the interested relationships:   
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Table 6.18:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial 
GDP of $21,000 or Less from 2008 Forward 
 
  
Variables Life Quality 
Growth 
  
ELF        0.022*** 
   (0.007) 
Initial GDP           0.0000005 
      (0.0000004) 
Aid*Corruption -0.102 
  (0.066) 
Human Capital    -0.0002* 
      (0.00009) 
Corruption    0.003* 
   (0.002) 
Aid   0.786 
   (0.517) 
Population  -0.002 
   (0.001) 
Oil Country -0.002 
   (0.009) 
Constant 0.02 
   (0.021) 
  
Observations 169 
R-squared   0.097 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.   
However, the negative and significant coefficient on the human capital variable when 
Life Quality growth is the dependent variable is a strange finding, considering the 
positive and significant coefficient found during analyses using data from all years 
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available.  Considering that only four years are being analyzed in these analyses, this 
could be caused by a lack of change in the human capital variable from 2008-2011, 
resulting in unreliable findings.  Or, it could indicate that the percentage of females in 
secondary schools in 2008-2011 decreases Life Quality growth.  This relationship should 
be further examined in future studies.     
 
Conclusions 
Using data from 173 countries over an eleven-year period, this study used a 
regression analysis to investigate the effect of corruption, foreign aid, and their 
interaction on economic growth and growth of the Life Quality.  The significant results 
follow.  Concerning the corruption score, an increase in the score slightly increases the 
growth of the Life Quality; this is also found upon truncating the range Life Quality 
growth to -.08 and .08, and with the exclusion of countries that had a 1998 per-capita 
GDP of $21,100 or higher.  The coefficient of the corruption score is significant and 
positive with per-capita GDP as the dependent variable in the truncated sample and in all 
analyses limited to data from 2008 and forward.  While counterintuitive, this finding 
could be a result from data availability:  some countries experiencing very negative or 
levels of Life Quality and economic growth are missing corruption scores.  Future work 
may find it useful to impute corruption scores that are missing based on available 
information.   
In the analyses of all data, aid often had a negative and significant relationship 
with Life Quality growth.  And, in the probit analysis examining positive Life Quality 
growth rates, it is indicated that countries receiving aid are not experiencing positive Life 
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Quality growth rates.  However, in examining the analyses from 2008 forward, the 
coefficient on aid receipts becomes positive and is significant in overall analysis with 
GDP and Life Quality growth as the dependent variable, the truncated and non-rich 
sample of GDP growth, and the truncated sample of Life Quality growth.  This change of 
directionality is interesting.  The negative relationship can be explained through the fact 
that countries that receive aid are typically poor countries that may be experiencing 
negative Life Quality growth, irrespective of aid receipts.  Or, aid receipts could be 
causing declines in the Life Quality; however, this analysis would not be able to parse out 
the difference.  The switch in directionality is puzzling, but could be explained by the fact 
that, due to the economic recession, aid receipts have declined and donors are increasing 
restricted aid as a percentage of all aid disbursed.  This positive relationship could 
indicate that restricted aid is, in fact, improving conditions in recipient countries as 
measured through economic growth and longevity increases.  This relationship could be 
examined further by separating the aid variable into restricted and unrestricted aid in 
future work.   
 Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction term was found to be slightly 
positive and significant in all samples of the Life Quality growth rates, including the 
probit analysis, until limiting examination to 2008 forward.  In examining data from 2008 
forward, the relationship between the interaction variable and the growth measures 
became negative and significant for all samples, except for the sample of truncated Life 
Quality growth scores of countries with per-capita GDP under $21,100 in 1998.  This 
finding is in line with theories that foreign aid receipts in corrupt countries actually 
decrease productivity and economic growth through exacerbating present distortions.  
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Further work involving the imputation of corruption scores should aid in clarifying this 
relationship, also.   
 Convergence was shown through the prediction of all samples of economic 
growth but not in Life Quality growth.  This may indicate that either countries had 
already experienced significant longevity increases prior to 1998 or that inequalities in 
global longevity are not decreasing during the examined time period.  Another significant 
finding of these analyses is that concerning the human capital measure, which was the 
secondary school enrollment of females within a country.  This measure was significant 
and positive in every regression analysis performed until limiting the data to 2008 
forward.  In this sample, the coefficient on this variable became negative and very small.  
A lack of change in this variable from 2008 forward may be responsible for this change.  
Finally, the ELF variable did not demonstrate much of a significant relationship in any 
samples.  This could be because the measure is dated or, perhaps, fractionalization along 
ethnic and linguistic lines has decreased and is not causing as many problems within 
countries as in the past.  In comparing the two dependent variables, the explanatory 
variables of interest generally affected them similarly.   
 The results of regression analyses controlling for fixed effects are presented in the 
appendix.  These results similar show, pre-2008, a positive relationship between on the 
human capital variable per-capita GDP growth, a negative relationship between the Aid 
and Life Quality growth, and a positive relationship between the interaction variable and 
Life Quality growth.  Post-2007, controlling for fixed effects does not show many 
significant findings.  The joint test results and the impacts of aid and corruption are 
presented in the appendix.  These results indicate pre-2008 that aid has a negative impact 
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on economic and Life Quality growth, and that post-2007, aid demonstrates a positive 
impact on economic and Life Quality growth.  The impact of corruption on the dependent 
variables is shown to be positive before 2008 and negative after 2007. 
 In the following chapter, I use theories previously presented to discuss the events 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and happenings within Russia concerning 
corruption and foreign aid receipts.  Then, analyses similar to that found in this chapter 
are performed on the subset of former Soviet Union countries to examine how corruption 
and aid affected economic growth and longevity in these countries.     
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Chapter Seven:  Examining Russia’s Economic Problems Following the Collapse of 
the Soviet Union 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, foreign aid has been found to both increase and 
decrease economic growth, depending on the recipient’s policies.  This chapter is a case 
study of the problems that corruption caused Russia following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, despite billions of dollars of aid from international organizations and 
windfalls from natural resource exportation.  Since their formation in the 1940s, the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund have given and loaned billions of dollars in 
aid to countries.  Currently over 180 countries belong to each institution and benefit from 
their broad-based economic and project-specific advice.  Throughout their history, they 
have been present and actively providing assistance during numerous country- and 
region-specific crises.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two institutions 
moved to aid Eastern Bloc countries in the transition from a centrally-planned economy 
to one based on a market.  As this chapter chronicles, the most difficult transition was 
found in Russia.  Russia proved a difficult case not only because of the size of the 
country but also due to the natural resource curse and historical factors like weak 
institutions which have proven difficult to remedy.  Following the historical discussion 
concerning corruption and foreign aid to present, an analysis similar to that found in the 
previous chapter is conducted to find if Russia experienced less economic growth and 
growth in its Life Quality score than other Former Soviet Union countries. 
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A Brief History of the Soviet Union 
 Though not official until 1922, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
had its beginnings in 1917, with the Russian Revolution ending three hundred years of 
dynastic rule.  Between 1917 and 1922, Vladimir Lenin led the Red Army to enter nearby 
territories of Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus to aid Communists in 
seizing power.  Through national delimitation15
                                                          
15 National delimitation was the Soviet Union’s attempt to build nations out of the ethnic groups within the 
union.  This was a result of The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia that was adopted in 1918 
and recognized the sovereignty of all peoples of Russia and their right for self-determination.   
, the areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were created within the USSR.   
Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph Stalin came into power and committed the 
newly-formed republic to a centrally-planned economy that would focus on 
industrialization and collectivism.  After the German invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union 
fought as an Allied Power during World War II and absorbed Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania into the USSR.  Despite sustaining the largest loss of life during the war, the 
Soviet Union played a decisive role in the Axis defeat, and built the Eastern Bloc in 
Central and Eastern Europe through economic and military pacts, establishing puppet 
governments, and enacting reigns of terror on the ruling governments.  The countries in 
the Eastern Bloc included East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia.  These countries were what Churchill referred to as 
being “behind the Iron Curtain of Moscow,” and would later officially sign the Warsaw 
Pact that promised cooperation and mutual assistance to one another.   At the end of the 
war, the Soviet Union became one of the five permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council and emerged as one of the world’s superpowers.   
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 The formation of the Eastern Bloc and post-war plans created a rift between the 
Soviet Union and the United States and began the Cold War.  The Truman Doctrine 
Speech of 1947 indicated that the United States was willing to spend much time and 
effort at containing communism.  The United States government developed NATO and 
began distributing anti-communism propaganda that would fuel the Cold War.  
Khrushchev was in power during this time but was ousted and replaced in 1964 by a 
collective leadership team.  This team set out to stabilize the republic and improve 
economic growth through decentralization.  After initial success, further reforms were 
halted in fear that the ruling party would lose power and economic growth would 
stagnate. 
 
Collapsing Economies 
By the 1980s, the socialist system was breaking down throughout the Soviet 
Union.  To the Russian economy that “relied almost entirely on its oil and gas exports to 
earn foreign exchange” (Sachs, p. 131), a sharp dip in oil prices and the depletion of oil 
fields in the late 1980s was the final straw that would lead the planned economy into ruin.  
Following the disbandment of the Soviet Union, the now-sovereign countries began the 
journey to a market economy.  This journey was wrought with difficult transitions for the 
smaller countries, but for Russia, it would prove to be so disastrous that some Russians 
believed the transition to be a plot by the West to weaken their country (Woods, 2006).   
 The dissolution of the Soviet Union left the West with many geopolitical 
questions.  The pressing issue of the nuclear arsenal that had been accumulated during the 
Cold War led the United States to take a vested interest in promoting the stability of the 
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new regime.  During this time, it was believed by many decision-makers in Washington 
that a transition to democracy and capitalism would be an effective method of ensuring 
that Russia would become a stable global partner.  However, for the U.S. to provide 
direct assistance, all funds disbursals would have to be approved by Congress—which 
would be politically difficult, so another strategy was developed.   
 
The International Financial Institutions 
As discussed in The Globalizers:  The IMF, the World Bank, and Their 
Borrowers, Woods (2006) discusses an idea that was a less costly (both monetarily and 
politically for the U.S.) method of assuring that Russia received aid and transitioned to a 
market economy through the international institutions of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Both institutions were created post-World War II, 
were conceived at the Bretton Woods meeting of economic officials in 1944, and are 
headquartered in Washington, D.C.  The original charters of both institutions directed 
them to stimulate employment and real income, facilitate balanced growth of 
international trade, and develop productive resources of all members.  These two 
economic powerhouses employ a combined 13,000 people—and are home to the largest 
gathering of economic Ph.D.s in the world.  However, despite the fact that both their 
memberships consist of over 180 countries, most of the economic professionals in these 
institutions have been educated in the United States and prescribe to the liberal economic 
theories that are so embedded in U.S. thinking.  These factors contribute to the fact that 
the two institutions are de facto led by US Treasury officials and their decisions and 
policies have come to be known as the “Washington consensus,” even though the U.S. 
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only holds roughly seventeen percent of the voting rights in each.  These are the 
institutions that were chosen to be the vehicles to transition Russia to a market economy.    
 
Russian Politics of the Time 
During 1989 and 1990, the Russian political system experienced upheaval that 
translated to disastrous social and economic outcomes for the people.  Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the country elected its first Parliament in open elections 
since 1917 in 1990.  While Mikail Gorbachev was still holding the office of Soviet Union 
President, the Russian public was suffering from food shortages and an ever-increasing 
crime rate.  Desirous of reform, in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin ran against a 
Communist party opponent and was elected by sixty percent of the voters into the 
Russian presidency.   
In 1991, following a speech to the Russian Parliament concerning the economic 
state of the country, Boris Yeltsin was granted power from the Russian Parliament to rule 
by decree for a year.  In this famous speech, Yeltsin pledged cooperation with the IMF, 
World Bank, and other international financial organizations, in exchange for their help 
and advice in improving the Russian economy.  From his decree, Yeltsin eliminated 
entire ministries and various bureaucratic positions and put together an entirely new 
government that consisted of young reformers with economic training.  According to 
Sachs (2005), these reformers were to lead Russia through the transition to a market 
economy.   
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Economic Transition 
On October 28, 1991, following Yeltsin’s pledge of cooperation, a plan to create a 
market economy through privatization, liberalization, and stabilization was unveiled to 
the Russian Congress by the IMF and the World Bank.  The IMF was the first of the two 
institutions to begin the bargaining.  In the months that followed, Russia applied for IMF 
membership only to be granted “associate membership” that did not deem the country 
eligible for aid.  As noted by Woods, the IMF had not only the carrot of full membership 
to coerce Russia into making necessary changes to their economy, but also an already-
approved (by the G-7) debt relief package desperately needed by the Russian 
government.  However, this package was contingent on full membership and the 
complete conditionality of implementing IMF recommendations.  
As discussed in “Russian Economic Reform:  Crossing the Threshold of 
Structural Change,” (World Bank, 1992), the Russian government began rapidly 
implementing macroeconomic changes based on the conditions of admittance to the IMF.  
Beginning in January 1992, eighty percent of wholesale and ninety percent of consumer 
prices were freed.  This price liberalization means that the Russian government began 
allowing the supply and demand of goods to determine prices—instead of the 
government setting all prices.  And, following World Bank advice, wages and social 
benefits were increased—as inflation occurs following price liberalization (World Bank, 
1994).  However, as neither the Bank nor the IMF had ever undertaken a transition 
project affecting such a huge economy, specific outcomes were uncertain.   
The most recent transition economy at the time, Poland, had experienced levels of 
inflation at 250%.  However, the inflation facing Russia for 1992 was 1500% (World 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
119 
 
Bank, 1992).  Adding to this problem of hyperinflation was the overall disregard for basic 
monetary policy by Russia’s Central Bank, which expanded the money supply by roughly 
30% of GDP in 1992 and the fact that the other fifteen countries in the Eatern Bloc used 
and printed the same currency (the ruble) without a coordinated policy (Sachs, 2005).  
This dramatic decrease in real money motivated a group of politically-powerful elite 
industrialists to lobby the government in opposition of future economic reforms. 
However, another group that would emerge from the reforms much better off was 
funneling thirty percent of Russia’s GDP into their personal bank accounts due to a 
different recommended program.  Privatization programs are implemented with the goal 
to turn state-owned enterprises into profit-making entities (that are not dependent on 
government subsidies to survive).  As discussed in “Creating Private Enterprises and 
Efficient Markets” (World Bank, 1994), in contrast to the privatization programs of other 
Eastern Bloc countries, the Russian privatization program was implemented uniformly 
and strictly across the nation—resulting in rapid privatization and a corrupt program.  As 
opposed to the hybrids of methods used in other Eastern Bloc countries, Russia only 
utilized the transfer and voucher systems of privatization.  A transfer simply gives 
employees and managers of the enterprise shares that can be sold or kept to collect 
money upon the enterprise earning profits.  The voucher system distributed free vouchers 
that could be exchanged for shares in government-owned enterprises equally to the entire 
Russian population.  These vouchers could be kept and the voucher-holders could collect 
profits, or the vouchers could be sold.  Contrary to the very design of the privatization 
process, many of the vouchers and shares were not kept to collect profits but sold for 
their face value.   
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A group of businessmen bought most of the vouchers and shares of successful 
enterprises and became known as Russia’s oligarchs, as they were a relatively-small 
group of very wealthy individuals.  These oligarchs became politically powerful and 
would use that power during future reforms to capture huge amounts of money from the 
Russian government and economy.  As corruption and rent-seeking within Russia 
increased, the national deficit was also growing and conditions of the citizenry were 
deteriorating.     
 
Funding to the Rescue? 
Upon implementing price liberalization and privatizing these enterprises, Russia 
had met the conditions demanded by the IMF for full membership.  In August 1992, 
under a broad set of new conditions with the aim to decrease inflation, Russia received $1 
billion from the IMF and $600 million from the World Bank.  These loans were only a 
small fraction of what the institutions were prepared to offer to Russia, however, there 
were significant political changes taking place within the country that would make 
providing more aid difficult.   
 
More Russian Politics  
As the economy of Russia was changing, so were post-Soviet politics.  The 
economic reforms that had devastated Russian citizens through a dramatic decrease in 
real wealth were causing support for Yeltsin to decline.  The Parliament opposed many of 
the reforms and took action to limit Yeltsin’s implementation powers.  The President 
became limited in the positions he could appoint and in the reforms he could set into 
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motion.  Without his decree power of appointment, corrupt bureaucrats began bargaining 
with lobbies for powerful governmental positions.  Additionally, the young reformers that 
had developed strong relationships with the staff of the World Bank and IMF were being 
ousted from their positions and replaced by former government officials with no interest 
in reform.   
From the industrial lobbying forces, two men were brought into the government—
with one being appointed as chairman of the Central Bank of Russia.  While these 
government insiders were increasing the budget deficit through corrupt practices, the 
oligarchs continued lobbying for more sales of government enterprises, decreased 
taxation for their companies, and decreased regulations.  This combination of demands 
and overall oligarchical power that was referred to as the new Russian mafia not only 
decreased receipts by the Treasury but undermined public support of a new “reformed” 
economy by showing that a market economy is also subject to corruption (Sachs, 2005).   
As conditions for the people continued to deteriorate, Yeltsin was pulled in two 
directions.  To the international institutions, he had to demonstrate that his country was 
planning on continuing down the road of dramatic economic reforms.  However, 
domestically, as the Communist party was gaining power in the Parliament and in the 
streets, Yeltsin had to pacify the oligarchs to remain in power.  This balancing act proved 
difficult, and following the new appointments and election of several Communist party 
members to Parliament, the Russian government passed a budget with a deficit that was 
twenty-five percent of GDP—breaking a specific condition of their agreement with the 
IMF and World Bank.  The institutions reacted by announcing that Russia’s economic 
reforms were not sufficient to warrant the $6 billion loan ready for the country. 
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In 1993, it seemed that all was going wrong in Russia.  The region of Chechnya 
within Russia attempted secession, resulting in civil war within the country, there was 
unrest throughout the country, fueled by lack of success from the economic reforms, and 
as Yeltsin attempted to retain his power to impose more economic reforms, he was 
impeached by a political opponent.  This political power struggle resulted in a bloody 
showdown in which the army (under orders) attacked Yeltsin’s opponents, and Yeltsin 
attempted to disband the Parliament and reinstate his Presidential decree.  With Yeltsin’s 
actions deemed unconstitutional, the political stability of Russia was unraveling—to the 
west, this posed a very real threat of Communist resurgence.   During this time of 
political turmoil no new economic reforms were put into motion and some previous 
conditions were breached, so the country certainly could not expect continued funding 
from international institutions—or could they? 
 
American Politics 
Throughout the dissolution period of the Soviet Union, President H.W. Bush and 
his advisers believed aid to Russia via international institutions would be the best (for his 
administration) way to reform the country.  However, domestically, this was not the most 
relevant subject--as the First Gulf War was coming to a close and elections were 
approaching.  Additionally, any of the current Republican President’s encouragement for 
aid to Russia was politically spun by a Democratically-controlled Congress to put the 
President in a negative light.  As the election neared, Bush had little to do with the 
Russian political or economic situations and concentrated on his own campaign.   
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However, as Clinton came into office among a supportive public and Democratic 
Congress, he was able to vocalize his (and his advisors’) opinions about aid to Russia.  
Despite the oligarchic rent-seeking and the conflict in Chechnya still going on, Clinton 
and his advisors developed a slogan of “Russia First,” indicating support for Yeltsin and 
his economic reforms (Talbott, 2003).  As Clinton and Yeltsin developed a personal 
relationship at the beginning of Clinton’s administration, the IMF and World Bank were 
pressured by the administration to loosen their demands and increase lending to Russia.  
As a result, Russia was approved for a $28 billion aid package (some from the U.S. and 
other countries—mostly from the World Bank and IMF) with lightened conditions, an 
additional $1.5 billion from the IMF, and a combined $770 million from the World Bank 
for varying projects.  Following the impeachment of Yeltsin and subsequent turmoil in 
Russia previously described, Clinton and other western leaders sought to provide more 
aid to Russia with less conditions to assist in the overall stabilization of the country (and 
to keep power out of Yeltsin’s Communist opponents’ hands).  These western concerns 
resulted in another $1.5 billion from the IMF and $1.52 billion from the World Bank.   
 
Problems for the International Financial Institutions 
Moving into 1994, the Russian economy deteriorated further as the ruble 
collapsed, inflation was still shockingly high, and tax receipts dwindled (as oligarchs 
sought additional exemptions for their enterprises and industries).  As the World Bank 
and IMF moved to halt disbursements due to the lack of macroeconomic stability and 
breeched conditionality agreements, a Senate hearing concerning the two institutions 
began.  This hearing consisted of much criticism for the imposition of conditions that had 
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“adversely affected Russia’s economic stability and transition to democracy,” considering 
that neither institution had any experience with such a large-scale economic transition 
process (Woods, p. 119).  Despite the turmoil, rent-seeking, and lack of support for 
reforms on the part of the Parliament in Russia, the IMF and World Bank were pressured 
to get the ball rolling on their largest loans. 
 
Happenings in Russia 
While the World Bank and the IMF were letting go of the restrictions on aid 
disbursal, the Russian government was busy with another budget deficit.  While the 
deficit clearly breached a condition of its loans, Yeltsin and his advisors were trying to 
finance the deficit without causing more inflation.  As discussed in “Privatization in the 
Republics of the Former Soviet Union:  Framework and Initial Results” (World Bank, 
1993), following the voucher and transfer programs of privatization, the state retained 
ownership of various commodity and utility companies throughout the country.  Despite 
the oligarchical disaster of the first privatization of state assets, another round was set 
into motion.  In a loans-for-shares process, the government would auction shares of its 
remaining enterprises—which, paradoxically, had traditionally been a large source of 
revenue for the Russian government.  This wave of privatization was poorly publicized, 
and, not surprisingly, resulted in share purchases from the oligarchs interested in 
increasing their wealth.  As described by Sachs, “Russian privatization became a 
shameless and criminal activity” (p. 143) in the mid-1990s, a group of businessmen 
obtained ownership of formerly state-owned enterprises that included oil, natural gas, and 
other commodities.  It is estimated that $100 billion worth of rights to resources were 
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sold to government insiders and oligarchical power-wielders during this period, while the 
Russian Treasury only received $1 billion for the sale.  The logic behind selling rights to 
such lucrative assets was that Yeltsin would win support from this elite group that would, 
in return, finance and support his campaign for reelection in the following year—thus, 
paving the way for Yeltsin to implement more economic reforms.   
As the election in Russia neared, leaders of western countries remained concerned 
that the oligarchic support would not be sufficient for Yeltsin’s victory.  Consequently, 
following the demands of Congress and the western countries, the IMF disbursed $6.8 
billion with new monitoring requirements in 1995 and $10.1 billion in 1996.  While this 
privatization was under way, the World Bank, which was quite involved in the first-
generation privatization program, left this program to Russia and set to work on 
disbursing previous loans that Russia had been granted but not received due to not 
meeting requirements or missing paperwork.  Still fearing a Communist win, the western 
countries continued to pressure the financial institutions to make Russia’s economy work.  
Under this vein, the Paris Club began restructuring proceedings of the $38.7 billion debt 
facing Russia.  Western pressures to lend were beginning to undermine the principles of 
the financial institutions.   
 
Questionable Practices 
Following the political turmoil of 1993, the World Bank and the IMF began down 
a path of lending that was rife with problems (IMF, 2004).  On one hand, continuing 
lending would appease western governments and could possibly provide the Russian 
government with resources that could finally reform their economy.  However, with this 
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option, the institutions would have to break their own rules and go against their principles 
of institutional independence.  Also, this choice poses the risk that an ever-increasing 
amount of aid would be wasted (or channeled to oligarchs within Russia) without 
providing any benefit to Russia or the global economy.  On the other hand, discontinuing 
aid would be politically costly (as western countries that dominate the power within the 
institutions would not be happy), be viewed as an admittance that this problem was too 
much for the institutions, and all aid disbursed so far would be seen as wasted resources.  
However, suspending aid may force Russia to face their own problems, and, possibly, 
force the country deal with the oligarchical rent-seeking that was robbing their Treasury 
and citizens.  Additionally, this option would allow the institutions to maintain their 
moral standing in the world—as institutions that follow their rules and keep their 
agreements. 
Fueled by western demands, the institutions became lax on restrictions and 
continued lending despite cover-ups and dodgy accounting practices rampant in Russia’s 
financial institutions.  These practices were known to both institutions and ranged from 
improper reporting that would change the time of debits and credits to blatant lies about 
Russia’s tax administration (Woods, 2003).  As the government was void of the 
reformers the institutions staff had formed relationships with, no sympathetic 
interlocutors could be counted on to take actual steps toward reform.  The previous 
interlocutors’ views were comparable to that of Boris Federov, former Russian Minister 
of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, when he said, “The most terrible thing that the 
World Bank and IMF could do in Russia would be to remove the conditions on which 
their loans are based” (Gurria and Volcker, p. 21).   
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Following Yeltsin’s victory in 1996, the Bank released loans of $4.5 billion for 
the improvement of social protection and the coal industry.  At this point, the Washington 
Consensus was that they had worked with Russia for too long and loaned too much 
money to stop their assistance now.   Over the next two years, the institutions partnered 
with the sparse reformers in the government to encourage foreign investment, liberalize 
the capital account, and initiate tax collections from the oligarchs.  However, all 
assistance from the World Bank and the IMF was limited to previously-approved 
disbursements of loans and economic advice.   
 
Economic Crisis 
While substantial progress was made in the economy, the Asian financial crisis of 
the late 1990s proved contagious and infected the Russian economy.  The shared 
financial instruments of Asia and Russia began the problem, but a rapid accrual of debt 
from coupon redemption ($1 billion per week) and plummeting world commodity prices 
left Russia with an extremely volatile income source and high debt servicing costs.  
These factors led the financial institutions to begin developing a new loan package that 
would, hopefully, save the Russian economy.  Within months, a plan was developed that 
would provide a $17.1 billion loan, followed by $11.2 billion with specific earmarks for 
use to stave off the impending economic threats.   
At the beginning of this economic debacle, the reformers of the Russian 
government had accrued political power following two comparatively-economically 
stable years, but Yeltsin began having health problems and was generally unavailable to 
offer his support for reformative action.  Coupled with his declining power, as the 
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Russian economy began to descend into the crisis, the oligarchs again pressured Yeltsin’s 
government for more political positions.  This new government that resulted from more 
appointments and lobbying viewed the Bank and Fund as responsible for the crisis that 
was becoming the Russian economy and vocalized their opposition to accepting 
additional funds.  Surprisingly, there were other global leaders that also opposed the 
disbursement of the newly-approved loans (IMF, 2004). 
While the Russian economy was approaching financial crisis, western countries 
were finally becoming skeptical of the aid given to Russia.  As the Russian government 
and the officials in Chechnya were having disputes, the region again attempted to secede.  
A harsh reaction by the Russian national government followed, and reports of forced 
disappearances, political persecution, and civilian violence flooded western news outlets.  
Around the same time, information from the previous six years of assistance to Russia 
was released.  The shock value of the misallocation of billions of dollars by the Russian 
government (while the international financial institutions looked the other way), made 
disbursement of further aid to the country an unpopular subject both with the western 
public and western leaders (IMF, 2004).  However, despite the open condemnation of 
previous aid disbursals and increasing political pressures from the west to suspend all aid 
to Russia, the two institutions worked with the government and implemented tightened 
fiscal and monetary policies that would help the country through a simultaneous debt, 
currency, and banking crises.  While the policies developed aided the economy, another 
factor can be identified as responsible for getting the country out of the crisis. 
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Black Gold 
 As the government began following the advice of the IMF and the World Bank, 
rising global energy prices contributed greatly to Russia’s quick recovery.  The energy 
sector accounts for almost seventeen percent of Russia’s total GDP, and other oil 
products and natural gas summed are half of Russia’s total exports (IMF, 2002).  
Additionally, with the world’s largest gas reserves and seventh-largest oil reserves, even 
small price increases translate to substantially increased revenue to Russia.  With the 
price per barrel increasing almost seven-fold from 2000 to 2008, the Russian government 
realized a hefty revenue boost (IMF, 2009).   
Following advice from the IMF, Russia increased domestic oil and gas prices—to 
move toward the world market price, and began taxing oil and gas production—despite 
facing opposition from the oligarchs that still owned substantial portions of both 
industries.  This influx of money into the Russian government allowed them to pay down 
portions of their debt, and it was concluded by all parties that there was no additional 
need for aid (IMF, 2009).   
 
Concluding Aid 
While the Russian economy was saved by oil and gas price escalation, the 
government developed (somewhat) liberal principles to maintain growth and manage the 
volatility that comes with such a large part of GDP attributable to natural resources.  
Despite the sharp drop of oil prices in 2009 that adversely affected the Russian economy, 
governmental officials have staved off additional financial crises by continuing to work 
closely with staff from both the World Bank and the IMF.  While the institutions have no 
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power over the Russian decisions, governmental officials have followed their advice to 
maintain tight monetary and fiscal policy, while using resource revenue to build a rainy 
day fund.   
Since 1999, the aid that Russia has obtained has been, not surprisingly, very well-
monitored in use.  It is unknown exactly how the long current global recession will last, 
but officials from the IMF believe that, like most of the global economy, “the Russian 
economy is expected to experience a sluggish recovery” (IMF, p. 15).  During the 
recovery phase, the world will find out if the policies of the Russian economy will prove 
the country self-sufficient or if the country will find itself needing additional aid.   
 While this case study spotlights the plight of Russia following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, other Eastern Bloc countries also experienced some economic 
problems.  However, I argue that it is expected for Russia to have significantly different 
economic outcomes than these territories following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
Based on prior discussion concerning the influence institutions have on economic 
development, I assert that such differences are due to the political, economic, and societal 
institutions built in Russia over centuries of civilization that allowed for such rampant 
corruption to become commonplace throughout the USSR.  While some policies were 
applied to the entire Eastern Bloc while under Soviet control, I do not think the 
application is equal to that in Russia, nor should the effects be as strong.  Additionally, 
these prior independent countries had their own institutions before assimilation into the 
republic and such influence would continue to develop despite Soviet efforts, and Russia 
received much higher levels of foreign aid (as a percentage of GDP) than the other 
Eastern Bloc countries.  (Effects of foreign aid on economic growth are discussed in 
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013 
131 
 
previous chapters.)  Finally, Russia is the only country from the Soviet Union that is a 
top-ten world producer of oil.  (Kazakhstan produces about one-tenth of the quantity of 
oil as Russia and is on the top-twenty list of global producers.)  The resource curse is 
discussed at length in Chapter Five, and, I argue, when combined with rampant 
corruption and foreign aid, can explain the diverging economic outcomes following 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The following section uses post-Soviet data to explore 
the relationship between corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth within the Eastern 
Bloc countries.   
 
Comparing Russia to Other Eastern Bloc Countries 
 There are occasions in which, researchers are provided with opportunities to 
observe natural experiments.  These experiments have such excessive controls that they 
could never have been enacted by a researcher.  For example, the dissolution of the 
USSR has provided a natural experiment by which scholars can compare the Eastern 
Bloc territories to each other and attempt to explain the differences between them.  As 
chronicled at the beginning of this chapter, as recently as 1945, some of these countries 
were independent and not a part of the republic.   
 As noted by Heybey and Murrell (1999), the initial conditions of the Eastern Bloc 
countries are very important in determining growth performance, post-transition.  These 
initial conditions include things like geographical location and prior institutions.  For 
example, the location of the Czech Republic provides less costly trade with European 
countries than does the location of Turkmenistan.  Following these results, I find it useful 
to divide the Eastern Bloc territories into several groups based on their initial conditions 
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such as geographical location, ethnic makeup, and the conditions of their absorption and 
release from the republic.  I hypothesize that the countries within each group will have 
comparable economic effects following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that none 
of the groups will experience similar outcomes to Russia.  With the rationale behind 
group division found in the following paragraph, the table showing the divisions is 
below: 
 
Table 7.1:  Groups of Eastern Bloc Countries 
 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7 
Estonia Kazakhstan Armenia Czech 
Republic 
Moldova Croatia Russia 
Latvia Kyrgyzstan Azerbaijain Hungary Ukraine Slovenia  
Lithuania Tajikistan Georgia Poland Belarus Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 
 Turkmenistan  Romania  Serbia  
 Uzbekistan  Slovak 
Republic 
 Kosovo  
     Macedonia  
     Albania  
 
 
The countries in Group 1 are referred to as the Baltic States due to their location 
on the Baltic Sea, and they share common political institutions, cultural practices, and 
ethnicities.  Additionally, these countries quickly integrated into Western Europe 
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and joined NATO and the European Union 
in 2004.  As discussed earlier, the countries in Group 2 were created within the Soviet 
Union because they were home to non-Russian peoples.  Each country has a majority 
demographic of the ethnicity for which it was named (e.g., the majority ethnic group is 
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Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan), a low percentage of the population is Russian, and various 
ethnicities round out the remainder of the populace.  While each country has its own 
dominant ethnic group, all of these groups have a similar Turkish ancestry and are of the 
Muslim faith, and I argue these commonalities have resulted in the formation of similar 
societal institutions and similar outcomes following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Group 3’s countries are located in the Caucasus region, and all regained their 
independence from the Soviet Union around the same time.  Within Group 4, I argue 
similarities will be found concerning post-Soviet economic conditions, as these countries 
are geographically and ethnically similar.  Additionally, I expect Group 5’s post-
dissolution outcomes to be the most similar to Russia due to similar geography and ethnic 
background.  The final group includes countries of former Yugoslavia, and despite ethnic 
differences that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, I assert that these countries 
developed similar institutions over time that will lead to comparable post-Soviet 
economic outcomes.   
 
Analysis and Results 
 Using the same data and methods as in the previous chapter, I now focus on 
former Soviet Union countries.  In this analysis, I use the same explanatory variables as 
in the previous chapter, excepting the human capital indicator.  As data concerning the 
secondary school enrollment for females is not available for some Eastern Bloc countries, 
I will use the average years of schooling.  (For a complete discussion concerning the pros 
and cons of various human capital measures, see Chapter Three.)  Additionally, a simple 
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correlation test between the two measures suggests a .7509 correlation, which is fairly 
strong.  Below are the results of the analyses with only data from Eastern Bloc countries: 
 
Table 7.2:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
  
Variables GDP Growth 
  
Corruption -0.002 
  (0.004) 
ELF  0.021 
  (0.018) 
Aid*Corruption   -0.545* 
  (0.285) 
Initial GDP         -0.0000007 
        (0.000002) 
Aid    4.973* 
  (2.455) 
Oil Country  0.012 
  (0.007) 
Human Capital       -0.008*** 
  (0.002) 
Population  0.003 
  (0.003) 
Constant      0.094** 
 (0.04) 
  
Observations 217 
R-squared  0.117 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
While showing a negative and very small coefficient for the human capital 
variable is curious, the negative coefficient of the interaction variable is expected.  Also, 
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in comparison to the comparable global analysis of the previous chapter, this model has a 
better fit. Here, when the level of aid is -.0004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.  
Additionally, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable and the 
interaction term are both zero and the results are below:  
 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =         0.79 
Prob > chi2 =    0.674 
 
 At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and 
the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =         0.02 
Prob > chi2 =    0.901 
 
 To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the same 
equation as in Chapter 6: 
 
Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),  
 
to find that the impact of aid is -36.17.  This means that for a given country, an increase 
in one unit of aid is associated with a decrease in per-capita GDP of 36.17.  For example, 
an increase in aid in Russia in 1999 0.9% of GDP to 100.9% would be associated with 
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36.17 decline in per-capita GDP growth from a 6.8% growth rate to a -3616.93% growth 
rate.   
 I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:   
 
Corruption and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =         1.96 
Prob > chi2 =    0.376 
 
And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption 
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Corruption and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =         1.93 
Prob > chi2 =    0.164 
 
 Using the equation: 
 
 Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean 
 of Aid),  
 
I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is -0.11.  The application of 
this would indicate that, in Russia, in 1999, an increase in the corruption score from 8.6  
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to 9.6 would be associated with a decrease in the growth rate of per-capita GDP from 
 6.8% to -4.5%.   
 
And, with Life Quality growth as the dependent variable, the results are:   
 
Table 7.3:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable 
 
  
Variables Life Quality Growth 
  
Corruption -0.001 
  (0.002) 
ELF  0.002 
  (0.006) 
Aid*Corruption -0.121 
   (0.152) 
Initial GDP           -0.000002** 
           (0.0000009) 
Aid   0.887 
   (1.282) 
Oil Country   0.002 
   (0.004) 
Human Capital -0.002 
   (0.001) 
Population -0.001 
   (0.002) 
Constant      0.084** 
  (0.039) 
  
Observations 217 
R-squared 0.033 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The only significant finding here indicates convergence.  Here, when the level of 
aid is    -0.004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.   
Additionally, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:  
 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =    5.07 
Prob > F =         0.007 
  
At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and 
the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   666) =   10.06 
Prob > F =     0.002 
 
 To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the same 
equation as in Chapter 6: 
 
Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),  
 
to find that the impact of aid is -0.027.  This means that for a given country, an increase 
in one unit of aid is associated with a decrease in per-capita GDP of .027.  For example, 
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an increase in aid in Russia in 1999 0.9% of GDP to 100.9% would be associated with a 
decline in per-capita GDP growth from a 6.8% growth rate to a 4.1% growth rate.   
 I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable 
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:   
 
Corruption and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =           1.40 
Prob > F =    0.247 
 
And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption 
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:   
 
Corruption and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   666) =    0.44 
Prob > F =    0.506 
 
 Using the equation: 
   
 Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean 
 of Aid),  
 
I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is -0.004.  The application of 
this would indicate that, in Russia, in 1999, an increase in the corruption score from 8.6  
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to 9.6 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Life Quality from 
 -7% to -7.4%.   
 
In the previous chapter, a subset of data was created to only include post-2006 
observations due to data availability of the corruption score.  However, in the Eastern 
Bloc subset, a more appropriate cutoff is 2002.  Following 2002 and excepting Kosovo 
and Macedonia, there is only one missing observation of the corruption score.  Below are 
the results of analyses from 2002 forward:   
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Table 7.4:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward 
 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
Corruption -0.002 
  (0.005) 
ELF  0.024 
 (0.02) 
Aid*Corruption      -0.736** 
   (0.275) 
Initial GDP         0.000001 
          (0.000002) 
Aid         6.861*** 
   (2.267) 
Oil Country   0.008 
   (0.007) 
Human Capital      -0.008** 
   (0.003) 
Population       0.008** 
   (0.003) 
Constant   0.011 
   (0.048) 
  
Observations 151 
R-squared   0.125 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Though the fit of the model has improved slightly, the findings are very similar to 
the Eastern Bloc analysis with data from all years.  Here, when the level of aid is -0.0003, 
the effect of the interaction term is zero.  And, with Life Quality growth as the dependent 
variable:   
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Table 7.5:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward 
 
  
Variables Life Quality Growth 
  
Corruption      0.00009 
  (0.003) 
ELF      0.022** 
  (0.008) 
Aid*Corruption       -0.361*** 
  (0.123) 
Initial GDP          0.0000006 
          (0.0000009) 
Aid        3.291*** 
  (1.027) 
Oil Country  0.008 
  (0.005) 
Human Capital -0.002 
  (0.001) 
Population      0.004** 
  (0.002) 
Constant -0.029 
  (0.029) 
  
Observations 151 
R-squared  0.075 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The fit of this model improves upon the model that includes data from Eastern 
Bloc countries for all years, and several variables become significant, including a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term.  The effects of aid and corruption on the 
interaction term here are positive.   
 Following these general analyses of Eastern Bloc countries, I drill down to the 
groups that were presented earlier.  With Russia as the control group, I use dummy 
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groups to represent the other groups.  The results from adding these group variables when 
per-capita GDP is the dependent variable are below: 
 
Table 7.6:  Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward with Russia as the Control 
 Per-Capita 
Variables GDP Growth 
  
Corruption    0.0009 
   (0.003) 
ELF  -0.012 
   (0.018) 
Aid*Corruption      -0.638** 
   (0.239) 
Initial GDP           0.000004* 
         (0.000002) 
Aid       5.814** 
 (2.05) 
Human Capital        -0.008*** 
   (0.003) 
Population   0.006 
   (0.005) 
Group 1   0.011 
   (0.016) 
Group 2   0.017 
   (0.016) 
Group 3   0.012 
   (0.018) 
Group 4  -0.015 
   (0.009) 
Group 5  -0.004 
   (0.011) 
Group 6  -0.020 
   (0.018) 
Constant 0.03 
   (0.075) 
  
Observations 217 
R-squared  0.142 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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No significant findings concerning the dummy variables are found.  The effects of 
aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.  With Life Quality growth as 
the dependent variable and Russia again as the control variable, the findings are below: 
Table 7.7:  Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the 
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward with Russia as the Control 
  
Variables Life Quality Growth 
  
Corruption -0.002 
   (0.002) 
ELF      -0.00004 
  (0.01) 
Aid*Corruption  -0.152 
    (0.136) 
Initial GDP             -0.000002** 
           (0.000001) 
Aid 1.1 
     (1.128) 
Human Capital   -0.002 
    (0.001) 
Population  -0.002 
    (0.003) 
Group 1  -0.009 
  (0.01) 
Group 2   0.001 
   (0.005) 
Group 3 -0.004 
  (0.007) 
Group 4 -0.005 
  (0.006) 
Group 5    -0.009** 
  (0.004) 
Group 6 -0.006 
  (0.009) 
Constant  0.112 
 (0.07) 
  
Observations 217 
R-squared 0.04 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The only significant finding concerning the groups of countries indicates a 
negative relationship between Group 5 (the countries of Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus) 
and the growth of the Life Quality.  Here, when the level of aid is -0.002, the effect of the 
interaction term is zero.   
 
Conclusions 
 The analyses in this chapter examined the relationship between corruption, 
foreign aid, economic growth, and longevity within the Eastern Bloc countries.  In every 
analysis with per-capita GDP growth as the dependent variable, the significant findings 
included a small and negative coefficient on the human capital measure, a positive 
coefficient on the aid variable, and a negative coefficient on the interaction term.  The 
finding concerning human capital could be a result of data problems discussed in Chapter 
Three or could indicate that attending school in Eastern Bloc countries does not educate 
students but rather keeps them from participating within the economy.  This relationship 
warrants further investigation.  While no significant findings concerning the Corruption 
variable were discovered, the negative coefficient on the interaction term is in line with 
theory and my hypothesis that providing aid to corrupt countries decreases economic 
growth.  Further, when Life Quality growth was the dependent variable, convergence was 
found and similar findings concerning the interaction term were discovered, supporting 
the hypothesis that the citizenry within a corrupt country that receives aid does not 
experience gains through longevity and economic growth.   
 Results from the regression analyses controlling for fixed effects, joint tests, 
additional computed impacts of aid and corruption are found in the appendix.  Adding 
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fixed effects to the model estimation shows a negative relationship between the 
interaction term and moderate Life Quality growth and a negative relationship between 
corruption and moderate GDP growth.  The impact of aid becomes positive after 2002, 
while the impact of corruption is negative throughout time that data is available for.   
While significant differences in per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth were not 
found across Eastern Bloc groups (excepting Group 5), future studies may be able to 
expand the dataset to include more years of available data and further investigate these 
relationships.  The absence of the predicted significant difference between Russia and the 
other countries could indicate that since 1998, all of the Eastern Bloc countries have 
continued to undertake steps to improve their institutional quality and reached 
comparable levels.  Further analyses examining these countries is warranted, and if 
reliable data concerning corruption statistics from the period immediately following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union can be found, analyses of that time period may paint a 
more accurate picture of the differences of institutional quality between these countries.   
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Chapter Eight:  Policy Implications and Future Research Avenues 
 
Discussion 
 The increased number of studies concerning corruption, foreign aid, and 
economic growth has not only provided new conclusions but adept recommendations for 
policy-makers.  The data utilized in this literature includes panel datasets encompassing 
both decades and continents.  Many of these datasets are publicly-available and provide a 
solid foundation for future research to develop recommendations that will increase the 
effectiveness of foreign aid.  The relationship between types of foreign aid and 
institutional quality changes promises to be an interesting area of future study.  With the 
current global recession, donor countries have less money to provide for aid and are 
demanding effectiveness of that provided.  Developing a better understanding of how to 
entice recipient countries to improve their institutions and decrease corruption will lead to 
a more efficient aid environment.  While this area of study has historically been thin, 
increased interest from policy-makers and the public will ensure continued exploration 
within the field.   
The findings from this study should be useful to policymakers of all levels in 
many different regions of the world.  International officials will be able to use the results 
to direct foreign aid where it can be best utilized, while, at domestic levels, bureaucrats 
and politicians can use these findings to shift their country’s policies toward those that 
foster economic growth.  Additionally, as the emerging donors:  China, India, and Brazil, 
increase their levels of aid provision to countries with varying levels of corruption 
(Manning, 2006); their policymakers can also learn from this study.  Using a historical 
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eye, the research from Russia’s foreign aid experience may parallel with the lack of 
restricted aid these emerging donors provide and show how this aid may influence the 
economic growth of the current recipients.  Further, with the somewhat difficult Sino-
American relationship, policy-makers can learn strategies concerning trading aid for 
influence from looking back at the aid game during the Cold War.   
 The results of the empirical analysis in this dissertation suggest that aid does 
increase growth of per-capita GDP and the Life Quality score, however the results 
concerning the interaction of the corruption score and foreign aid show that the 
relationship between the dependent variables and interaction term is a negative one.  As 
the combination of aid levels and corruption levels increases, gains in economic growth 
and Life Quality growth decrease.  Policy-makers at IFIs and at domestic levels should 
heed these findings to realize that providing aid to corrupt countries can actually create 
new issues (e.g., the creation of the class of oligarchs in Russia following privatization) 
or exacerbate existing ones (e.g., ethnic fighting in highly fractionalized countries over 
which group will receive benefits from aid).  As previous studies have found, providing 
project-specific aid and on-the-ground oversight is one method of limiting the negative 
effects of providing foreign aid within a corrupt country.   
 A clear recommendation from this study could be to not provide aid to corrupt 
countries.  Additional work showing the impacts of aid and corruption indicate that, after 
2007, the impact of aid on a country’s economic and Life Quality growth is positive and 
the impact of corruption on a country’s economic and Life Quality growth is negative.  
This finding suggests that corruption is the problem when searching for economic and 
Life Quality growth—not aid receipts.  Corrupt countries could be deemed unable to 
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receive aid until these scores are improved.  International organizations or non-
governmental organizations may provide assistance and advice to these countries 
concerning how to improve their policies to decrease corruption levels.  However, as 
discussed in previous chapters, the institutions that allow this corruption to continue are 
entrenched and have been developed over long periods of time, so changing these 
institutions will be a very difficult task for any country and will require substantial 
resolve from the public and officials.   
 Further, additional work could stratify the globe and examine specific effects of 
corruption and aid within a region of similar countries, similar to the examination of 
Eastern Bloc countries in this dissertation.  Such findings could provide more specific 
information concerning the relationship between corruption and aid in a region than a 
global analysis has afforded and increase the likelihood that polices enacted would be 
effective in improving economic growth and longevity increases.  Policy-makers from 
traditional and emerging donors alike have a responsibility to use results from such 
studies to address their motivations of providing aid and to make sure that the institutions 
in the recipient countries do not use aid to pervert these motivations or decrease the well-
being of their citizenry. 
Also, following the results found from the global analysis including all years, the 
human capital measure of the percentage of females attending secondary school indicated 
a significant and positive relationship with both economic and longevity growth.  While 
the endogeneity between human capital development and economic development has 
been discussed, and the two have been found to continue along a virtuous or vicious 
cycle, this cycle does continue to present.  As, increasing female attendance in schools, 
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particularly secondary schools, has been shown to have a such significant and positive 
associations with economic growth and growth of the Life Quality Indicator, policy-
makers around the world should use these findings to implement policies that encourage 
females to attend secondary school.  As discussed in “World Development Report 2012:  
Gender and Equality Development” (2012), there are many impediments for females 
attending secondary school and some specific examples include being an ethnic minority 
in one’s country, increased levels of mortality of females in comparison to males, or 
increased household responsibility for women.  Whatever the problem, the report details 
that changing the specific impairment for a locale is difficult because these issues are 
often entrenched in a culture due to social norms (e.g., average age of marriage) or more 
formally through institutions (e.g., segregation laws).  The report suggests many avenues 
to increase the level of schooling of females such as improving the level of relative 
mortality, improving educational opportunities to severely disadvantaged groups (e.g., 
ethnic minorities within a country), creation of policies that subsidize childcare, 
implementing affirmative action, and removing discriminatory laws.  The global 
development community can increase the likelihood of progression on these avenues by 
providing funding and technical assistance.   
Globalization has resulted in countries becoming more interconnected than at any 
other time in human history.  As the number of interactions across countries and cultures 
has increased in the past few decades, those in the developed world have realized how 
markedly different life in developing countries is from our own.  The decade of poverty 
eradication that began in 1996 (United Nations, 1996) has extended but still has not 
achieved its goal.  With experience and data gathered from the past, it is my hope that 
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those responsible for future aid provision will take into account the findings of this 
dissertation and that its results and recommendations will aid in the global war on 
poverty.   
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Appendix 
 
List of Countries 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Arab World 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Aruba 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas, The 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Channel Islands 
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Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Faeroe Islands 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Polynesia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Greenland 
Grenada 
Guam 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
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Hong Kong SAR, China 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Isle of Man 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Kosovo 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao SAR, China 
Macedonia, FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mayotte 
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Mexico 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
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Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Asia 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
West Bank and Gaza 
World 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
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Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
Description of Variables for Global Analysis 
Variables Description 
Per-capita GDP growth The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from year t to 
year t+1 
Life Quality Growth The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a country from 
year t to t+1 
Corruption The Corruption score given by Transparency International 
Aid The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that country’s 
GDP 
ELF The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score  
Initial GDP The per-capita GDP in 1998 
Interaction  Aid * Corruption 
Human Capital  On a scale of 100, the secondary schooling rates of females 
Oil Country A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil producers. 
Population The natural log of the population of a country 
 
Description of Variables for Eastern Bloc Analysis 
Variables Description 
Per-capita GDP growth The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from year t to 
year t+1 
Life Quality Growth The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a country from 
year t to t+1 
Corruption The Corruption score given by Transparency International 
Aid The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that country’s 
GDP 
ELF The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score  
Initial GDP The per-capita GDP in 1998 
Interaction  Aid * Corruption 
Human Capital  The average years of schooling the population over fifteen has 
completed 
Oil Country A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil producers. 
Population The natural log of the population of a country 
  
 
 
 
Summary Statistics: 
Summary Statistics for all data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 12240 1985 14.7202 1960 2010 
Corruption Score 1726 6.754867 2.246625 1 10.6 
ELF 11235 0.336262 0.310503 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 2912 6932.73 10728.11 105.9102 70151.55 
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y_GDP_pc 9274 6417.663 10211.33 57.78493 108111.2 
yHDI_grow 931 0.008222 0.008456 -0.03564 0.07047 
yLQI_grow 8345 0.015527 0.032589 -1 0.388713 
Interaction 3028 0.146616 0.470282 -0.05301 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 11083 0.012723 0.036741 -0.00425 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 7074 7.724856 3.313182 0 16.911 
Aid 9308 0.038298 0.081295 -0.0292 2.416823 
ypop_total 12125 1.42E+08 5.46E+08 6104 6.89E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
1570 65.81366 26.89682 0.929397 100 
Eastern Bloc 12240 0.441667 1.383264 0 7 
      
Oil Country 12240 0.041667 0.199835 0 1 
country_no 12240 120.5 69.28426 1 240 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 9044 0.020671 0.056653 -0.5029 0.92586 
Human Capital 12125 15.49056 2.765948 8.7167 22.654 
_IEastern Bloc_1 12240 0.0125 0.111107 0 1 
_IEastern Bloc_2 12240 0.020833 0.142832 0 1 
_IEastern Bloc_3 12240 0.0125 0.111107 0 1 
_IEastern Bloc_4 12240 0.020833 0.142832 0 1 
_IEastern Bloc_5 12240 0.0125 0.111107 0 1 
_IEastern Bloc_6 12240 0.029167 0.16828 0 1 
      
_IEastern Bloc_7 12240 0.004167 0.064418 0 1 
GDP_pos 12240 0.809314 0.392858 0 1 
LQI_pos 12240 0.852941 0.354179 0 1 
resid_GDP 1705 -0.02918 0.053128 -0.49863 0.355081 
resid_LQI 1685 -0.00246 0.029778 -0.19247 0.113789 
 
Summary Statistics for Data Truncated by GDP Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 8855 1988.576 13.87945 1961 2010 
Corruption 1673 6.708667 2.244425 1 10.6 
ELF 8265 0.348258 0.312488 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 2817 6849.961 10694.48 105.9102 70151.55 
      
y_GDP_pc 8855 6551.539 10327.74 57.78493 108111.2 
yHDI_grow 897 0.008129 0.008151 -0.03564 0.07047 
yLQI_grow 7756 0.015503 0.026543 -0.2385 0.286078 
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Interaction 2801 0.148962 0.46442 -0.05301 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 8322 0.014936 0.038775 -0.00425 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 5648 8.007476 3.304589 0 16.911 
Aid 8520 0.036901 0.079945 -0.0292 2.416823 
ypop_total 8853 1.86E+08 6.29E+08 6242 6.89E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
1506 66.15645 26.85708 0.929397 100 
Eastern Bloc 8855 0.264483 1.071563 0 7 
      
Oil Country 8855 0.048447 0.214721 0 1 
country_no 8855 119.3556 68.66403 2 240 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 8855 0.020189 0.04252 -0.14908 0.149426 
Human Capital 8853 15.9825 2.704442 8.739056 22.654 
GDP_pos 8855 0.745342 0.435694 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 8855 0.813213 0.389763 0 1 
resid_GDP 1688 -0.0296 0.047856 -0.2166 0.098088 
resid_LQI 1668 -0.00248 0.029646 -0.19247 0.113789 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary statistics Data Truncated by LQI Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 8174 1989.039 13.84515 1961 2010 
Corruption 1661 6.704515 2.252497 1 10.6 
ELF 7770 0.38267 0.310439 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 2663 6160.636 9017.899 105.9102 47902.77 
      
y_GDP_pc 7797 5908.88 8688.506 57.78493 67554.23 
yHDI_grow 896 0.008215 0.008392 -0.03564 0.07047 
yLQI_grow 8174 0.015434 0.023569 -0.0796 0.079525 
Interaction 2690 0.154754 0.478081 -0.05301 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 7760 0.016885 0.041536 -0.00425 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 5666 7.937992 3.326647 0 16.911 
Aid 7989 0.035871 0.06681 -0.0292 1.030033 
ypop_total 8172 1.51E+08 5.89E+08 9901 6.89E+09 
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Human Capital--
Female 
1467 65.72033 27.0462 0.929397 100 
Eastern Bloc 8174 0.258013 1.061826 0 7 
      
Oil Country 8174 0.052728 0.223504 0 1 
country_no 8174 120.2929 69.5604 1 240 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 7778 0.019422 0.050835 -0.42809 0.568298 
Human Capital 8172 15.97032 2.363157 9.200391 22.654 
GDP_pos 8174 0.750673 0.43265 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 8174 0.787497 0.409104 0 1 
resid_GDP 1667 -0.02846 0.050636 -0.41022 0.234914 
resid_LQI 1669 -0.00247 0.028062 -0.10214 0.098546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Data After 2007 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 720 2009 0.817064 2008 2010 
Corruption 523 6.990631 2.105878 1.6 10 
ELF 678 0.334327 0.310867 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 672 6932.73 10734.25 105.9102 70151.55 
      
y_GDP_pc 648 8170.423 12997.54 99.42976 108111.2 
yHDI_grow 557 0.00654 0.007794 -0.03564 0.045946 
yLQI_grow 631 0.01243 0.048974 -1 0.08599 
Interaction 705 0.246056 0.682312 -0.01848 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 678 0.016589 0.05963 -0.00156 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 414 10.29622 3.067797 1.755 16.911 
Aid 660 0.040858 0.094229 -0.00246 1.030033 
ypop_total 717 1.96E+08 7.38E+08 9786 6.89E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
274 71.59953 23.82935 7.78577 99.59715 
Eastern Bloc 720 0.441667 1.384169 0 7 
      
Oil Country 720 0.041667 0.199965 0 1 
country_no 720 120.5 69.32959 1 240 
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y_GDP_pc_g~w 648 0.012408 0.043601 -0.17545 0.233896 
Human Capital 717 15.89027 2.741505 9.188708 22.654 
GDP_pos 720 0.701389 0.457967 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 720 0.741667 0.438023 0 1 
resid_GDP 392 -0.03917 0.044655 -0.23972 0.18353 
resid_LQI 389 -0.00335 0.028787 -0.09373 0.098546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Data after 2007 and Truncated by GDP Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 645 2008.977 0.813942 2008 2010 
Corruption 495 6.957172 2.093982 1.6 9.7 
ELF 609 0.348708 0.307645 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 635 6425.37 10276.62 105.9102 70151.55 
      
y_GDP_pc 645 8147.655 12983.84 99.42976 108111.2 
yHDI_grow 533 0.006559 0.007446 -0.03564 0.04298 
yLQI_grow 616 0.014079 0.027544 -0.0796 0.08599 
Interaction 641 0.246181 0.671412 -0.01848 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 615 0.017014 0.06038 -0.00156 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 401 10.34203 3.072301 1.755 16.911 
Aid 642 0.039333 0.092354 -0.00246 1.030033 
ypop_total 645 2.18E+08 7.76E+08 9786 6.89E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
260 71.45719 24.11664 7.78577 99.59715 
Eastern Bloc 645 0.491473 1.453846 0 7 
      
Oil Country 645 0.044961 0.20738 0 1 
country_no 645 120.9829 69.00735 2 240 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 645 0.012646 0.041527 -0.14421 0.133112 
Human Capital 645 16.17535 2.640021 9.188708 22.654 
GDP_pos 645 0.669767 0.470662 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 645 0.71938 0.449651 0 1 
resid_GDP 389 -0.03879 0.041264 -0.17883 0.093141 
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resid_LQI 384 -0.00315 0.028612 -0.09373 0.098546 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Data After 2007 and Truncated by LQI Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 626 2008.982 0.814672 2008 2010 
Corruption 495 6.947273 2.100517 1.6 9.7 
ELF 594 0.359849 0.308176 0 0.984 
Initial GDP 609 6159.964 9260.672 105.9102 47902.77 
      
y_GDP_pc 615 7706.859 11248.52 99.42976 67554.23 
yHDI_grow 533 0.006592 0.007754 -0.03564 0.045946 
yLQI_grow 626 0.013601 0.027294 -0.0796 0.078377 
Interaction 623 0.259377 0.694555 -0.01848 8.858281 
yaid_ELF 596 0.018033 0.062717 -0.00156 0.923939 
      
Human Capital 402 10.32496 3.089823 1.755 16.911 
Aid 625 0.036082 0.085483 -0.00246 1.030033 
ypop_total 626 2.24E+08 7.86E+08 31198 6.89E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
254 71.29909 24.32139 7.78577 99.59715 
Eastern Bloc 626 0.5 1.468877 0 7 
      
Oil Country 626 0.046326 0.210358 0 1 
country_no 626 120.4297 69.11351 1 240 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 615 0.012963 0.043037 -0.17545 0.233896 
Human Capital 626 16.36727 2.452007 10.34811 22.654 
GDP_pos 626 0.686901 0.464125 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 626 0.704473 0.456644 0 1 
resid_GDP 385 -0.03894 0.044669 -0.23972 0.18353 
resid_LQI 387 -0.0037 0.028448 -0.09373 0.098546 
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Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 1377 1985 14.72495 1960 2010 
Corruption 282 7.552482 1.3195 3 9.5 
ELF 1348 0.364021 0.216933 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 338 2105.333 2073.994 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 693 2534.632 2286.699 122.0949 13836.19 
yHDI_grow 123 0.005666 0.005343 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 573 0.015693 0.035628 -0.13122 0.134676 
Interaction 350 0.095292 0.155936 0 1.008321 
yaid_ELF 1140 0.004035 0.016091 -7.1E-05 0.33237 
      
Human Capital 965 10.20611 2.433879 1.191 16.749 
Aid 550 2.12E-02 4.45E-02 -0.00545 5.42E-01 
ypop_total 1348 1.51E+07 4.23E+07 55408 1.18E+09 
Human Capital--
Female 
180 83.9955 10.58936 14.57391 95.67303 
Eastern Bloc 1377 3.925926 1.824901 1 7 
      
Oil Country 1377 0.037037 0.188921 0 1 
country_no 1377 120.963 72.43179 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 666 0.020996 0.091909 -0.45325 0.904682 
Human Capital 1348 15.62023 1.164675 10.92248 20.8871 
GDP_pos 1377 0.872186 0.334004 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 1377 0.875817 0.32991 0 1 
resid_GDP 247 -0.00085 0.049412 -0.20985 0.098088 
resid_LQI 244 0.000419 0.031414 -0.10064 0.102143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries Data Truncated by GDP Growth 
Variable        
Obs 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
      
country 0     
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year 626 1996.84 9.886073 1966 2010 
Corruption 276 7.533333 1.321037 3 9.5 
ELF 626 0.365383 0.217409 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 329 2142.995 2086.159 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 626 2636.731 2328.746 122.3984 13836.19 
yHDI_grow 122 0.005764 0.005254 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 529 0.018192 0.031639 -0.13122 0.134676 
Interaction 337 0.098367 0.158047 0 1.008321 
yaid_ELF 587 0.00602 0.013145 -7.1E-05 0.140507 
      
Human Capital 469 11.4563 1.910173 5.509 16.749 
Aid 498 0.019593 0.036742 -0.00545 0.541714 
ypop_total 626 1.42E+07 2.69E+07 1340000 1.49E+08 
Human Capital--
Female 
177 8.41E+01 1.07E+01 14.57391 9.57E+01 
Eastern Bloc 626 3.741214 1.79959 1 7 
      
Oil Country 626 0.033546 0.180202 0 1 
country_no 626 120.6869 69.20028 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 626 0.027206 0.060036 -0.14878 0.146829 
Human Capital 626 15.71377 1.069846 14.10818 18.81737 
GDP_pos 626 0.761981 0.426212 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 626 0.77476 0.418074 0 1 
resid_GDP 246 -1.10E-10 0.047671 -0.17883 0.098088 
resid_LQI 243 0.000693 0.031186 -0.10064 0.102143 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics For EASTERN BLOC Countries Data Truncated by LQI Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 554 1999.233 7.526321 1969 2010 
Corruption 277 7.527798 1.318068 3 9.5 
ELF 554 0.356385 0.215755 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 329 2145.049 2087.882 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 549 2721.786 2442.503 122.0949 13836.19 
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yHDI_grow 122 0.005651 0.005362 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 554 0.015426 0.030925 -0.07854 0.079083 
Interaction 338 0.098126 0.157876 0 1.008321 
yaid_ELF 530 0.007279 0.014957 -7.1E-05 0.140885 
      
Human Capital 415 11.79645 1.72763 7.967 16.749 
Aid 514 0.018116 0.027246 -0.00545 0.200977 
ypop_total 554 1.56E+07 2.84E+07 1340000 1.49E+08 
Human Capital--
Female 
178 8.41E+01 1.06E+01 14.57391 9.57E+01 
Eastern Bloc 554 3.806859 1.768896 1 7 
      
Oil Country 554 0.037906 0.191142 0 1 
country_no 554 123.2798 71.27883 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 547 0.020085 0.080229 -0.31178 0.31996 
Human Capital 554 15.79216 1.102242 14.10818 18.81737 
GDP_pos 554 0.732852 0.44287 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 554 0.703971 0.456916 0 1 
resid_GDP 243 -3.96E-05 0.0488 -0.20985 0.098088 
resid_LQI 243 -4.22E-11 0.03079 -0.10064 0.054019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 216 2006.5 2.29661 2003 2010 
Corruption 202 7.556436 1.361987 3 9.4 
ELF 216 0.363482 0.217648 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 208 2105.333 2075.92 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 216 3235.908 2896.294 179.9283 13836.19 
yHDI_grow 123 0.005666 0.005343 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 216 0.031736 0.029791 -0.07128 0.099531 
Interaction 216 0.104992 0.149374 0 0.625952 
yaid_ELF 208 0.006141 0.009958 0 0.04246 
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Human Capital 152 12.42442 1.788512 8.567 16.749 
Aid 216 1.49E-02 2.07E-02 0 1.37E-01 
ypop_total 216 1.46E+07 2.75E+07 1340000 1.45E+08 
Human Capital--
Female 
121 84.25285 11.41504 14.57391 95.67303 
Eastern Bloc 216 3.925926 1.828476 1 7 
      
Oil Country 216 0.037037 0.189291 0 1 
country_no 216 120.963 72.57367 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 216 0.052507 0.059064 -0.17545 0.330305 
Human Capital 216 15.72638 1.090822 14.10818 18.78948 
GDP_pos 216 0.893519 0.309169 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 216 8.43E-01 0.36503 0 1 
resid_GDP 152 -5.29E-05 0.054514 -0.20985 0.098088 
resid_LQI 152 0.007098 0.030217 -0.09373 0.054019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002 and Data Truncated by GDP 
      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 210 2006.524 2.300802 2003 2010 
Corruption 196 7.529592 1.365375 3 9.4 
ELF 210 0.362124 0.219777 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 202 2142.158 2090.381 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 210 3271.698 2920.323 179.9283 13836.19 
yHDI_grow 122 0.005764 0.005254 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 210 0.031065 0.028666 -0.07128 0.08599 
Interaction 210 0.107027 0.150946 0 0.625952 
yaid_ELF 202 0.006284 0.010069 0 0.04246 
      
Human Capital 151 12.41268 1.788579 8.567 16.749 
Aid 210 1.52E-02 2.09E-02 0 1.37E-01 
ypop_total 210 1.49E+07 2.79E+07 1340000 1.45E+08 
Human Capital-
-Female 
118 84.34858 11.52607 14.57391 95.67303 
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Eastern Bloc 210 3.971429 1.82988 1 7 
      
Oil Country 210 0.038095 0.191884 0 1 
country_no 210 121.5524 71.78283 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 210 0.04943 0.050014 -0.14421 0.140599 
Human Capital 210 15.73188 1.102818 14.10818 18.78948 
GDP_pos 210 0.895238 0.306978 0 1 
      
LQI_pos 210 8.43E-01 0.364805 0 1 
resid_GDP 151 1.34E-03 0.051925 -0.17883 0.098088 
resid_LQI 151 0.007584 0.029717 -0.09373 0.054019 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002 and with Data Truncated by LQI Growth 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
country 0     
year 211 2006.493 2.316339 2003 2010 
Corruption 197 7.521827 1.361077 3 9.4 
ELF 211 0.364024 0.219992 0 0.701 
Initial GDP 203 2144.85 2085.861 122.3984 8849.863 
      
y_GDP_pc 211 3271.651 2920.667 179.9283 13836.19 
yHDI_grow 122 0.005651 0.005362 -0.01235 0.020319 
yLQI_grow 211 0.030329 0.028662 -0.07128 0.079083 
Interaction 211 0.1066 0.150716 0 0.625952 
yaid_ELF 203 0.006259 0.01005 0 0.04246 
      
Human Capital 152 12.42442 1.788512 8.567 16.749 
Aid 211 0.015178 0.020872 0 0.137009 
ypop_total 211 1.48E+07 2.78E+07 1340000 1.45E+08 
Human Capital-
-Female 
119 8.44E+01 1.15E+01 14.57391 9.57E+01 
Eastern Bloc 211 3.952607 1.840712 1 7 
      
Oil Country 211 0.037915 0.191444 0 1 
country_no 211 122.5308 71.54887 2 231 
y_GDP_pc_g~w 211 0.048842 0.052969 -0.17545 0.159808 
Human Capital 211 15.72342 1.103028 14.10818 18.78948 
GDP_pos 211 0.890995 0.312386 0 1 
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LQI_pos 211 0.838863 0.368532 0 1 
resid_GDP 152 -5.29E-
05 
0.054514 -0.20985 0.098088 
resid_LQI 152 7.10E-03 0.030217 -0.09373 0.054019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects Results 
 
Moderate GDP Growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption -0.000661 
 (0.00293) 
Aid -0.0315 
 (0.519) 
Interaction 0.00700 
 (0.0644) 
Human Capital--Female 0.000316* 
 (0.000161) 
Human Capital 0.167*** 
 (0.0392) 
_Iyear_1999 0.000213 
 (0.00832) 
_Iyear_2000 0.0173** 
 (0.00831) 
_Iyear_2001 -0.00155 
 (0.00839) 
_Iyear_2002 7.84e-05 
 (0.00832) 
_Iyear_2003 0.00523 
 (0.00826) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0158* 
 (0.00833) 
_Iyear_2005 0.00827 
 (0.00840) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0102 
 (0.00858) 
_Iyear_2007 0.00675 
 (0.00873) 
_Iyear_2008 -0.0144 
 (0.00896) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0666*** 
 (0.00914) 
_Iyear_2010 -0.00432 
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 (0.0103) 
Constant -2.695*** 
 (0.627) 
  
Observations 813 
Number of country_no 134 
R-squared 0.343 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   662) =    0.03 
            Prob > F =    0.9749 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   662) =    0.02 
            Prob > F =    0.8883 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   662) =    0.03 
            Prob > F =    0.9662 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
       F(  1,   662) =    0.01 
            Prob > F =    0.9027 
 
GDP Growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption 0.00172 
 (0.00186) 
ELF -0.0106 
 (0.00979) 
Initial GDP -9.76e-07** 
 (3.84e-07) 
Aid -0.267 
 (0.403) 
Interaction 0.0380 
 (0.0510) 
Human Capital--Female 0.000372*** 
 (0.000113) 
Human Capital 0.000851 
 (0.00154) 
Oil Country -0.0121 
 (0.00735) 
_Iyear_1998 -0.0126 
 (0.0112) 
_Iyear_1999 -0.0103 
 (0.00814) 
_Iyear_2000 0.00861 
 (0.00678) 
_Iyear_2001 -0.00902 
 (0.00746) 
_Iyear_2002 -0.00543 
 (0.00699) 
_Iyear_2003 0.000866 
 (0.00708) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0185** 
 (0.00836) 
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_Iyear_2005 0.00889 
 (0.00771) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0152* 
 (0.00788) 
_Iyear_2007 0.00877 
 (0.00683) 
_Iyear_2008 -0.00739 
 (0.00670) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0609*** 
 (0.00840) 
Constant -0.00710 
 (0.0251) 
  
Observations 818 
Number of country_no 134 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    1.96 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3758 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    1.93 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1643 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    0.79 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6739 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.02 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9005 
Life Quality Growth: 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00148 
 (0.00198) 
Aid -0.759** 
 (0.351) 
Interaction 0.0729* 
 (0.0435) 
Human Capital--Female 5.96e-05 
 (0.000109) 
Human Capital 0.0519** 
 (0.0264) 
_Iyear_1999 0.0112** 
 (0.00562) 
_Iyear_2000 0.0162*** 
 (0.00562) 
_Iyear_2001 0.0198*** 
 (0.00567) 
_Iyear_2002 0.0273*** 
 (0.00562) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0420*** 
 (0.00560) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0454*** 
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 (0.00563) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0351*** 
 (0.00567) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0358*** 
 (0.00579) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0424*** 
 (0.00590) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0378*** 
 (0.00605) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.00654 
 (0.00617) 
_Iyear_2010 0.0314*** 
 (0.00695) 
Constant -0.842** 
 (0.424) 
  
Observations 814 
Number of country_no 131 
R-squared 0.418 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =    1.40 
            Prob > F =    0.2465 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
       F(  1,   666) =    0.44 
            Prob > F =    0.5063 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   666) =    5.07 
            Prob > F =    0.0065 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
       F(  1,   666) =   10.06 
            Prob > F =    0.0016 
  
Moderate Life Quality growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00147 
 (0.00180) 
Aid -0.161 
 (0.331) 
Interaction 0.00497 
 (0.0411) 
Human Capital--Female -3.70e-05 
 (0.000100) 
Human Capital 0.0582** 
 (0.0244) 
_Iyear_1999 0.00429 
 (0.00524) 
_Iyear_2000 0.0119** 
 (0.00523) 
_Iyear_2001 0.0136** 
 (0.00526) 
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_Iyear_2002 0.0199*** 
 (0.00523) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0358*** 
 (0.00520) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0392*** 
 (0.00521) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0275*** 
 (0.00527) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0281*** 
 (0.00538) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0355*** 
 (0.00547) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0316*** 
 (0.00561) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0124** 
 (0.00571) 
_Iyear_2010 0.0226*** 
 (0.00652) 
Constant -0.931** 
 (0.391) 
  
Observations 805 
Number of country_no 131 
R-squared 0.440 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    1.96 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3758 
 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    1.95 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1628 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    0.79 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6739 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.02 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8858 
 
After 2007 moderate GDP Growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption 0.0165 
 (0.0132) 
Aid -7.893** 
 (3.541) 
Interaction 0.747* 
 (0.388) 
Human Capital--Female -6.71e-05 
 (0.000300) 
Human Capital 1.734*** 
 (0.487) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0183 
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 (0.0137) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0475*** 
 (0.0106) 
Constant -27.96*** 
 (7.860) 
  
Observations 194 
Number of country_no 106 
R-squared 0.586 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,    81) =    3.35 
            Prob > F =    0.0401 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,    81) =    6.58 
            Prob > F =    0.0122 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,    81) =    2.73 
            Prob > F =    0.0710 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,    81) =    4.72 
            Prob > F =    0.0327 
 
 
GDP Growth after 2007 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption 0.00562 
 (0.00347) 
ELF -0.00415 
 (0.0151) 
Initial GDP 1.04e-07 
 (6.12e-07) 
Aid 0.939 
 (0.778) 
Interaction -0.116 
 (0.0974) 
Human Capital--Female -0.000216 
 (0.000150) 
Human Capital 0.00287 
 (0.00217) 
Oil Country -0.0315*** 
 (0.0102) 
_Iyear_1998 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_1999 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2000 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2001 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2002 0 
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 (0) 
_Iyear_2003 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2004 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2005 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2006 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2007 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2008 -0.00685 
 (0.00662) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0586*** 
 (0.00778) 
Constant -0.0328 
 (0.0418) 
  
Observations 195 
Number of country_no 106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           chi2(  2) =    3.01 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2220 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.04 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.8353 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    1.46 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4818 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    1.08 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2982 
 
After 2007, moderate Life Quality growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLife 
Quality_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00174 
 (0.00724) 
Aid -1.141 
 (2.019) 
Interaction -0.0317 
 (0.221) 
Human Capital--Female -0.000262 
 (0.000171) 
Human Capital 0.712** 
 (0.277) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0200** 
 (0.00783) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0301*** 
 (0.00607) 
Constant -11.39** 
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 (4.479) 
  
Observations 195 
Number of country_no 106 
R-squared 0.719 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           F(  2,    82) =    0.05 
            Prob > F =    0.9522 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,    82) =    0.09 
            Prob > F =    0.7666A 
id and interaction=0 
F(  2,    82) =    2.90 
            Prob > F =    0.0607 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0  
F(  1,    82) =    3.70 
            Prob > F =    0.0579 
 
After 2007, Life Quality growth 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_grow 
  
Corruption 0.00268* 
 (0.00162) 
Aid 0.380 
 (0.494) 
ELF 0.0110* 
 (0.00643) 
Initial GDP 1.45e-07 
 (3.06e-07) 
Interaction -0.0496 
 (0.0625) 
Human Capital--Female -0.000158** 
 (7.47e-05) 
Human Capital 9.75e-05 
 (0.00117) 
Oil Country -0.00477 
 (0.00793) 
_Iyear_1998 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_1999 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2000 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2001 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2002 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2003 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2004 0 
 (0) 
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_Iyear_2005 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2006 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2007 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0100*** 
 (0.00375) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0328*** 
 (0.00434) 
Constant 0.00867 
 (0.0212) 
  
Observations 195 
Number of country_no 106 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           chi2(  2) =    2.82 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.2437 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.07 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7975 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    0.68 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.7122 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.23 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.6338 
 
Eastern Bloc, moderate GDP growth: 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00840* 
 (0.00496) 
Aid 1.421 
 (2.034) 
Interaction -0.140 
 (0.229) 
Human Capital -0.00246 
 (0.0126) 
_Iyear_1998 -0.0378 
 (0.0357) 
_Iyear_1999 -0.0245 
 (0.0467) 
_Iyear_2001 0.00678 
 (0.0180) 
_Iyear_2002 0.00440 
 (0.0278) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0153 
 (0.0394) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0256 
 (0.0518) 
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_Iyear_2005 0.00747 
 (0.0131) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0160 
 (0.0206) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0144 
 (0.0319) 
_Iyear_2008 -0.0127 
 (0.0436) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.105* 
 (0.0555) 
_Iyear_2010 -0.0316** 
 (0.0141) 
Human Capital 0.134 
 (0.154) 
Constant -1.987 
 (2.489) 
  
Observations 216 
Number of country_no 19 
R-squared 0.583 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           F(  2,   180) =    3.06 
            Prob > F =    0.0493 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   180) =    3.35 
            Prob > F =    0.0688 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   180) =    0.38 
            Prob > F =    0.6837 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   180) =    0.76 
            Prob > F =    0.3841 
Eastern Bloc GDP Growth: 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00394 
 (0.00414) 
ELF 0.0130 
 (0.0147) 
Oil Country 0.00651 
 (0.00873) 
Initial GDP -4.97e-06** 
 (2.20e-06) 
Aid 2.179 
 (1.692) 
Interaction -0.247 
 (0.188) 
Human Capital 0.000444 
 (0.00293) 
_Iyear_1998 -0.00985 
 (0.0186) 
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_Iyear_1999 -0.000183 
 (0.0144) 
_Iyear_2000 0.0341*** 
 (0.0106) 
_Iyear_2001 0.0365*** 
 (0.0106) 
_Iyear_2002 0.0312*** 
 (0.00782) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0401*** 
 (0.00865) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0462*** 
 (0.0121) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0394*** 
 (0.00787) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0456*** 
 (0.00806) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0417*** 
 (0.00837) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0109 
 (0.00929) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0906*** 
 (0.0177) 
Human Capital 0.000296 
 (0.00349) 
Constant 0.0514 
 (0.0652) 
  
Observations 217 
Number of country_no 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           chi2(  2) =    9.87 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0072 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    9.74 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0018 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    1.74 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4196 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.66 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.4183 
 
Eastern Bloc moderate Life Quality growth: 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_grow 
  
Corruption 0.000824 
 (0.00175) 
ELF 0.0132** 
 (0.00561) 
Oil Country 0.00719** 
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 (0.00365) 
Initial GDP -2.01e-06** 
 (9.51e-07) 
Aid 1.071* 
 (0.554) 
Interaction -0.140* 
 (0.0716) 
Human Capital 0.000953 
 (0.000845) 
_Iyear_1998 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_1999 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2000 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2001 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2002 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0344*** 
 (0.00596) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0348*** 
 (0.00455) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0221*** 
 (0.00352) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0251*** 
 (0.00329) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0408*** 
 (0.00486) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0317*** 
 (0.00453) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0454*** 
 (0.00717) 
Human Capital 0.000540 
 (0.00154) 
Constant -0.0121 
 (0.0219) 
  
Observations 151 
Number of country_no 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
           chi2(  2) =    4.83 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0894 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
           chi2(  1) =    2.32 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1276 
Aid and interaction=0 
           chi2(  2) =    3.83 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1475 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.01 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9033 
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Eastern Bloc Life Quality Growth: 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_gro
w 
  
Corruption 0.00174 
 (0.00274) 
Aid 1.786 
 (1.125) 
Interaction -0.193 
 (0.127) 
Human Capital 0.00464 
 (0.00695) 
_Iyear_1998 -0.0170 
 (0.0197) 
_Iyear_1999 -0.0378 
 (0.0258) 
_Iyear_2001 0.0150 
 (0.00993) 
_Iyear_2002 0.0137 
 (0.0153) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0274 
 (0.0218) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0251 
 (0.0286) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0274*** 
 (0.00724) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0271** 
 (0.0114) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0397** 
 (0.0176) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0276 
 (0.0240) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0542* 
 (0.0307) 
_Iyear_2010 0.00507 
 (0.00780) 
Human Capital 0.0992 
 (0.0850) 
Constant -1.634 
 (1.370) 
  
Observations 217 
Number of country_no 19 
R-squared 0.700 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   181) =    1.19 
            Prob > F =    0.3079 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
           F(  1,   181) =    0.51 
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            Prob > F =    0.4749 
Aid and interaction=0 
           F(  2,   181) =    1.30 
            Prob > F =    0.2739 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   181) =    2.03 
            Prob > F =    0.1559 
Eastern Bloc, moderate GDP growth after 2002 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00796 
 (0.00581) 
Aid 0.727 
 (2.400) 
Interaction -0.165 
 (0.276) 
Human Capital 0.0295 
 (0.0196) 
_Iyear_2003 -0.0716 
 (0.0539) 
_Iyear_2004 -0.0972 
 (0.0735) 
_Iyear_2006 -0.0250 
 (0.0226) 
_Iyear_2007 -0.0617 
 (0.0415) 
_Iyear_2008 -0.121** 
 (0.0605) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.247*** 
 (0.0800) 
_Iyear_2010 -0.0506*** 
 (0.0118) 
Human Capital 0.556** 
 (0.237) 
Constant -8.980** 
 (3.848) 
  
Observations 150 
Number of country_no 19 
R-squared 0.668 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   119) =    2.52 
            Prob > F =    0.0848 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
       F(  1,   119) =    4.97 
            Prob > F =    0.0277 
Aid and interaction=0 
       F(  2,   119) =    0.94 
            Prob > F =    0.3930 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   119) =    0.74 
            Prob > F =    0.3918 
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Eastern Bloc GDP Growth after 2002 
 (1) 
VARIABLES y_GDP_pc_grow 
  
Corruption -0.00676 
 (0.00604) 
Aid 1.023 
 (2.499) 
Interaction -0.197 
 (0.288) 
Human Capital 0.0282 
 (0.0204) 
_Iyear_2003 0.180*** 
 (0.0307) 
_Iyear_2004 0.156*** 
 (0.0142) 
_Iyear_2005 0.248*** 
 (0.0834) 
_Iyear_2006 0.225*** 
 (0.0630) 
_Iyear_2007 0.190*** 
 (0.0426) 
_Iyear_2008 0.132*** 
 (0.0237) 
_Iyear_2010 0.198** 
 (0.0791) 
Human Capital 0.631** 
 (0.246) 
Constant -10.41** 
 (4.031) 
  
Observations 151 
Number of country_no 19 
R-squared 0.678 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   120) =    2.06 
            Prob > F =    0.1319 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   120) =    3.95 
            Prob > F =    0.0490 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   120) =    0.88 
            Prob > F =    0.4177 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   120) =    0.56 
            Prob > F =    0.4572 
Eastern Bloc moderate Life Quality growth after 2002 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_gro
w 
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Corruption 0.000300 
 (0.00239) 
Aid 0.610 
 (0.986) 
Interaction -0.110 
 (0.114) 
Human Capital 0.00422 
 (0.00807) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0876*** 
 (0.0121) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0841*** 
 (0.00562) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0824** 
 (0.0329) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0817*** 
 (0.0249) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0933*** 
 (0.0168) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0813*** 
 (0.00934) 
_Iyear_2010 0.0580* 
 (0.0312) 
Human Capital 0.157 
 (0.0971) 
Constant -2.574 
 (1.591) 
  
Observations 151 
Number of country_no 19 
R-squared 0.826 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
F(  2,   120) =    0.63 
            Prob > F =    0.5340 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   120) =    0.49 
            Prob > F =    0.4849 
Aid and interaction=0 
F(  2,   120) =    1.51 
            Prob > F =    0.2258 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
F(  1,   120) =    0.77 
            Prob > F =    0.3807 
Eastern Bloc Life Quality growth after 2002 
 (1) 
VARIABLES yLIFE 
QUALITY_grow 
  
Corruption 0.000824 
 (0.00175) 
ELF 0.0132** 
 (0.00561) 
Oil Country 0.00719** 
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 (0.00365) 
Initial GDP -2.01e-06** 
 (9.51e-07) 
Aid 1.071* 
 (0.554) 
Interaction -0.140* 
 (0.0716) 
Human Capital 0.000953 
 (0.000845) 
_Iyear_1998 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_1999 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2000 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2001 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2002 0 
 (0) 
_Iyear_2003 0.0344*** 
 (0.00596) 
_Iyear_2004 0.0348*** 
 (0.00455) 
_Iyear_2005 0.0221*** 
 (0.00352) 
_Iyear_2006 0.0251*** 
 (0.00329) 
_Iyear_2007 0.0408*** 
 (0.00486) 
_Iyear_2008 0.0317*** 
 (0.00453) 
_Iyear_2009 -0.0454*** 
 (0.00717) 
Human Capital 0.000540 
 (0.00154) 
Constant -0.0121 
 (0.0219) 
  
Observations 151 
Number of country_no 19 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
CORRUPTION and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    4.83 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0894 
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0 
           chi2(  1) =    0.89 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.3445 
Aid and interaction=0 
chi2(  2) =    3.83 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.1475 
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0 
chi2(  1) =    0.01 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9089 
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Impacts 
 
Corruption 
Mean 
Aid 
Mean 
impact 
aid 
impact 
corruption 
all data  6.75 0.038 
  gdp 6.75 0.038 -0.06008 0.006128 
lqi 6.75 0.038 -7.395 0.00604 
moderate gdp 6.708 0.037 -0.01614 0.003416 
moderate lqi 6.704 0.0359 -0.05874 0.002783 
     >2007 gdp 6.99 0.0409 0.27623 -0.00159 
>2007 lqi 6.99 0.0409 0.0972 -0.00118 
>2007 and moderate gdp 6.95 0.036 0.24575 -0.00038 
>2007 and moderate lqi 6.957 0.03933 0.10116 -0.00099 
     FSU gdp 7.55 0.0212 -36.1745 -0.11821 
fsu lqi 7.55 0.0212 -0.02655 -0.00371 
fsu lqi after 2002 7.556 0.015 0.563284 -0.00532 
fsu gdp after 2002 7.556 0.015 6.126 -0.0129 
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